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For Dr. Leslie Robicsek, to whom I promised long ago to 
dedicate my first book. (I’m sure neither of us then envisioned 
that my first book would look like this, but writing is full of 
surprises and unexpected turns, which may be one reason why 
Mary Shelley described it as “hideous progeny.”)

Even the most abstract categories, in spite of their validity 
for all epochs—because of their abstract nature—are yet in 
the precise terms of this abstraction themselves as much the 
product of historical conditions and possess their full validity 
only in respect of and within these conditions.
Karl Marx, Grundrisse ([1857] 1983, 390)
The Québec film-maker, Jean-Claude Labrecque, once said of 
the threat of cultural obliteration posed by new technologies 
of communication: “It’s like snow; it keeps falling and all you 
can do is go on shoveling.” Technology as snow, or maybe as 
a nuclear winter; that’s the Canadian, and by extension, world 
situation now.
Arthur Kroker, Technology and the Canadian 
Mind (1984, 129)
The malicious horizon made us the  
essential thinkers of technology.
Dionne Brand, No Language Is Neutral (1990, 23)
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Introduction
The question that animates this book might at first sound like the start of a 
joke: what do modern technology, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, and Canada 
have to do with one another? The short answer is “Marshall McLuhan,” and 
much of what follows will be devoted to explaining this punchline. I want 
to venture a twofold argument: first, that Shelley’s Frankenstein effectively 
“reinvented” the meaning of the word “technology” for modern English; 
and, second, that Marshall McLuhan’s media theory and its receptions, 
especially in Canadian popular culture, together constitute a tradition in 
adaptations of Frankenstein that has globalized this Frankensteinian sense 
of the word. So my two main tasks here are to provide a concrete account 
of the historical origins and transformation of the definitively modern 
word “technology” and, by closely reading Frankenstein and its Canadian 
adaptations, many of which also adapt McLuhan, to model new directions 
for adaptation studies.
I aim to show how Frankenstein, technology, McLuhan, and Canadian 
popular culture relate to one another, in historical and cultural contexts, 
and to explore the implications of this interrelation. I start with an histor-
ical account of the modern meaning of “technology,” a word that organizes 
not only whole scholarly fields but also the political economies of whole 
nation-states—yet a word whose meaning is often ambiguous in schol-
arly literature and ambivalent in popular culture. Technology, a term that 
initially used to denote the study of any art or technique, has come, in 
modernity, to describe machines, industrial systems, and media. Con-
trary to extant definitions (such as that in the OED), which locate the 
word’s redefinition in the late nineteenth century, this book shows that its 
modern “reinvention” emerged in the early nineteenth century—specific-
ally, in the wake of Frankenstein’s publication. The Medium Is the Monster 
analyzes Frankenstein as a founding intertext for technology in its own 
time and in adaptations that popularized the story by simplifying it as a 
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cautionary tale of technology run amok (Baldick 1987, 7). My argument 
then turns from Frankenstein in its period to its postcolonial adaptations 
in Canadian popular culture, anchored in McLuhan’s work. If Frankenstein 
helps us to understand the modern transformation of the discourse of 
technology, then Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein help us to under-
stand the globalized transfer of this discourse, a transfer effected largely 
by McLuhan’s media theory, together with its myriad adaptations.
The impetus for this investigation derives from two areas of interest: 
first, a preoccupation with the rich variety of Frankenstein’s receptions 
and adaptations, which abound in Canada and repay postcolonial study 
in this national context; and second, an interest in—and a dissatisfac-
tion with—the ways the word technology is used in popular culture and 
scholarly literature. In popular culture and everyday speech, references to 
technology regularly strike a sometimes subtle, sometimes strident chord 
of ambivalence. In scholarly literature on technology, and in popular lit-
erature too, the word enjoys great elasticity of meaning, as an abstraction, 
sometimes a convenient one—sometimes even an unexamined one. It is 
alternately presumed to be self-evident, defined commonsensically, con-
ceptualized idiosyncratically or speciously, or theorized critically. The 
effects of the word’s ambivalence and multiple meanings have profound 
and sometimes pernicious effects and implications. Prominent in human-
ities and social science scholarship, prevalent in everyday language, and 
privileged in political policy, the word technology adapts readily to the 
service of imaginative culture, incisive critique, or ideological mystifica-
tion. Discussing one of technology’s most intimately related counterpart 
keywords, media, John Guillory states that his aim is “to describe the 
philosophical preconditions of media discourse” (2010, 321). If we substi-
tute “technology” for “media” (a rhetorical switch that recurs throughout 
McLuhan’s work, incidentally), Guillory’s statement could aptly summarize 
the aim of the first chapters here.
A representative instance of the word’s use in popular culture illustrates 
the ambivalence and ambiguities of technology and suggests how to con-
nect the conceptual dots among technology, Frankenstein, and Canada. 
The 2 February 2009 episode of Viacom’s cable news-comedy program 
The Daily Show (Stewart et al. 2009) featured a segment called “Future 
Shock”: a report on military robotics. Daily Show host Jon Stewart intro-
duces the segment like this: “Technology: technology’s allowed us to do 
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everything from land on the moon, to fake landing on the moon. Now 
technology may be about to solve one of our most vexing problems of all.” 
Over footage of assembly lines and vacuum cleaners, the segment’s corres-
pondent, Samantha Bee, says: “Robots. They’ve already revolutionized the 
way we clean our homes and spot-weld. Now they’re about to help us cross 
the last frontier of human unpleasantness: killing.” Bee’s segment reports 
on a government military contract awarded to iRobot, the corporation 
that makes the “Roomba” robot vacuum. The segment stages a satirical 
drama of technological imperative versus technological risk, juxtaposing 
interview footage with the iRobot CEO against an interview with Noel 
Sharkey, a robotics professor at Sheffield, whom Bee names among those 
who “actually see a downside to having robots do our killing.” The seg-
ment’s production parodies the conventions of the cable-news “technology 
report,” with quick cuts, footage of high-tech gadgetry, and strobe-like 
interstitials flashing the segment’s “Future Shock” title. At one point in 
the interview, the iRobot CEO describes a cyberpunk future straight out 
of William Gibson’s 1984 novel Neuromancer: “Wouldn’t it be cool to be 
able to have, look, a memory chip that you could put in the back of your 
neck. You could augment yourself with some robot technology—all of 
a sudden you understood calculus.” This speech shifts to voice-over as 
the video cuts to a special-effects sequence that farcically visualizes it: a 
wide shot of Bee cuts to a close-up of a prop-dummy head (a wig-draped 
chicken carcass) being drilled and stuffed with wires. A wide shot turns 
the figure around as Bee, now sporting horn-rimmed glasses and an arm-
load of textbooks, exclaims, “I totally get it!” Correspondent Jason Jones, 
costumed as a “jock,” walks past, slapping the books out of her hand and 
shouting “Nerd!” As Jones exits screen left, she frowns and points a finger 
at him. Bee’s finger—visually referencing a joke about The Terminator from 
earlier in the segment—then morphs, via computer graphic effects, into a 
machine gun and opens fire.
The Daily Show sketch uses a mix of clichés, news genre conventions, 
and satirical commentary and imagery to dramatize a symptomatic conver-
gence of subjects: the modern discourse of “technology”; the iconic figure 
of Frankenstein; and the contribution of Canadian labour to globalized 
popular culture. Stewart’s introductory invocation of the term technology 
suggests its sensational “headline” value and presumes the transparency 
of its meaning, in his illustrative references to space exploration and 
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digital simulation. As the episode unfolds, it then dramatizes, in all its 
ambivalence, the Utopian techno-fetishism of cyborg empowerment and 
the dystopian techno-phobia of murderous robots run amok. The iRobot 
CEO represents the former position, in statements premised in techno-
logical instrumentalism: the “most widely accepted view of technology,” 
as Andrew Feenberg notes, “based on the commonsense idea that tech-
nologies are ‘tools’ standing ready to serve the purposes of their users” 
(2002, 5). Professor Sharkey represents the latter position, with statements 
suggesting the wary reservations of technological determinism: the view 
that technology acts independently of human agency to determine social 
conditions. This contrast in views on technology is dramatized according 
to Frankenstein’s “skeleton story” of technology in revolt (Baldick 1987, 7). 
This dramatization entails alluding to prior adaptations of Frankenstein, 
which is a widely recognized source for the Terminator films parodied here 
(Picart 2003, 9), for the discourse of robotics (Hitchcock 2007, 136), and 
even for science fiction as such (Aldiss 1986, 26). Lastly, the episode dem-
onstrates the crucial—but characteristically inconspicuous—contribution 
of Canadian labour to globalized popular culture: the episode features 
Canadian actors Bee and Jones, and its “Future Shock” title reproduces the 
title of Alvin Toffler’s 1970 book, a book that owed its success largely to the 
prior success of McLuhan. One of the effects of the episode’s coordina-
tion of these subjects is to simultaneously reproduce and satirize the view 
of technological substantivism, which goes further than determinism to 
suggest that technology has become autonomous, or even that—in the 
triumphal words of Henry Frankenstein in the iconic James Whale film 
(1931)—“It’s alive!”
That 2009 Daily Show episode illustrates the connections among tech-
nology discourse, Frankenstein, and Canadian popular culture that this 
book maps out. How such an episode makes these connections, in its 
adaptation of multiple intertextual sources and references, is a question 
of theory and method that chapters 1 and 2 take up in depth. Many such 
popular cultural images of technology could be offered, and later chap-
ters will look at some key examples in detail. Likewise, in the scholarly 
and popular bodies of literature on technology, we see similar presump-
tions of the word’s meaning and similar ambiguity and ambivalence in its 
usage, as well as similar connotations of its uncanny autonomy. I want to 
suggest that it has been one of the distinctive contributions of Canadian 
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adaptations of Frankenstein to disseminate and popularize these presump-
tions, connotations, and ambiguities—which, taken together, I call the 
modern discourse of globalized technology.
To put the matter plainly, I hold that we cannot talk about technology 
without conjuring Frankenstein, and that Canadian adaptations of Frank-
enstein have popularized, even globalized, this modern, fundamentally 
Frankensteinian discourse of technology. Adaptations of Frankenstein have 
long proliferated, and continue to proliferate, across media and around 
the world. What this study hopes to contribute to the literature on Frank-
enstein adaptation is a historicized analysis of Frankenstein’s founding 
traces in the modern discourse of technology and attention to the inter-
stitial and liminal fields of cultural production—between extensive and 
ephemeral modes, between scholarly and popular registers—at which 
much contemporary Frankenstein adaptation takes place. As we’ll see, in 
the contexts of technology discourse and Canada’s postcolonial popular 
culture, Shelley’s hideous progeny has engendered a diffuse and decidedly 
strange brood of mutations, replicants, and other intertextual adaptations 
of its story, both extensive and ephemeral. As globally significant articu-
lations of technology discourse, Canadian Frankensteins reveal a strange 
interface of postcolonial literary adaptation and techno-Romantic popular 
culture. Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein organize popular ideas of 
technology and structure images of the global technological crises in which 
Canada is embroiled—from copyright to climate change.
To argue and illustrate this claim, The Medium Is the Monster unfolds 
as follows. Before examining Frankenstein or its adaptations in detail, the 
first chapter elaborates on two key discursive and social contexts for my 
argument—technology discourse and Canadian culture—and, in the pro-
cess, contextualizes how subsequent chapters triangulate these terms with 
Frankenstein and its numerous popular cultural progeny.
Chapter 2 further develops this study’s premises and method by elabor-
ating on my approach to the theory and practice of adaptation studies—the 
analysis of how different media, genres, and other cultural forms are used 
to tell and retell a story like Frankenstein. My approach to adaptation stud-
ies challenges some key premises of the field in order to build its capacity 
to analyze the many forms adaptation can take, from the extensive (like 
feature film versions of Shelley’s novel) to the allusive or ephemeral (like 
pop songs that sample audio from Frankenstein films, or even just develop 
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instrumentation traditions that evoke Frankenstein). A critical term I adopt 
to theorize such a range of adaptations is the “Frankenpheme”: an image 
or idea derived from Frankenstein, represented in another text or form 
(Morton 2002, 47). This chapter surveys a spectrum of sound and image 
adaptations—focusing on Afro-Futurist music and Canadian rap—for a 
few reasons: to model an approach to adaptation studies that is sufficiently 
expansive and materialist to account for the vast cultural diffusion of a 
text like Frankenstein, to detail textual and contextual criteria for reading 
texts as “Frankensteinian,” and thus to suggest how Canadian Frankenstein 
adaptations both circulate globally and inform the discourse of technology.
Chapter 3 focuses on Mary Shelley’s novel, documenting the moderniz-
ation of the meaning of technology as a discursive effect of the novel and its 
early stage adaptations. I retrace the word’s “reinvention” (from describing 
the study of any art or technique to describing industrial machines and 
systems) and argue that Shelley’s characterization of the monster through 
five tropes—shock, revolution, utility, inhumanity, and contagion—in turn 
characterizes the “reinvented” meaning of technology with affective anx-
iety and a negative moral valence and contributes to its fetishization (that 
is, the treatment of technology as if it were a living thing). Transatlantic 
Frankenstein adaptations and technology references in the period then 
represent technology in terms of industrial monstrosity, and the period’s 
theatrical Frankenstein productions dramatize technology’s uncanny 
liveness in their spectacular use of special effects. The chapter tracks the 
discursive origins of a word now valorized as a policy imperative and nat-
uralized as virtually biological.
In chapter 4, I turn from Shelley’s time to the postwar period, McLuhan, 
and his media theory. This chapter details the intertextual and historical 
contexts of McLuhan’s work and closely reads how McLuhan represents 
technology as a Frankenpheme in his best-known texts. The reading 
illuminates the underappreciated Romanticism in McLuhan’s media theory, 
and its focus on some of his most popular statements highlights the global 
influence of his work in shaping and popularizing the modern discourse of 
globalized technology, a discourse that I summarize as the McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme of technology. A crucial globalizing dimension of McLuhan’s 
popularization of a Frankensteinian sense of technology is his press pres-
ence and counterculture influence in the 1960s. This chapter documents 
the receptions of McLuhan by the journalistic establishment and the 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Introduction 9
performative, mediatized scenes of the counterculture, which mobilized 
McLuhan’s ideas for social change, but, in the process, also furnished the 
corporate news media with sensational images of “tuned in” radicalism that 
amplified McLuhan’s idea of technology as a Frankensteinian menace and 
caricatured McLuhan as a kind of mad scientist of media.
In chapter 5, the work of US expatriate novelist William Gibson links 
the counterculture of the 1960s to the technoculture of the 1980s. Gibson 
has openly acknowledged McLuhan’s counterculturally informed influence 
on his 1984 novel Neuromancer (see Foster 1999 and Rapatzikou 2004). 
A close reading of Neuromancer’s borrowings from both McLuhan and 
Frankenstein invites a comparison of Gibson’s work to David Cronenberg’s 
contemporaneous “cult” film Videodrome (1983). In these texts—both 
globally renowned touchstones for digital culture—I identify a shared 
pattern of intertextual adaptation, narrative strategy, and new media 
theorization. Gibson and Cronenberg combine and juxtapose references 
to Shelley’s novel and McLuhan’s theory—not only in Neuromancer and 
Videodrome but also throughout their oeuvres—and so consolidate and 
reproduce McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology.
Chapter 6 tracks this distinctive pattern of pairing Frankenstein and 
McLuhan references through Canadian science fiction, with readings of 
illustrative works by writers like Larissa Lai (2009), Nalo Hopkinson (1998), 
Margaret Atwood (2003), and Peter Watts (2006). How these writers’ 
texts adapt both Frankenstein and McLuhan echoes the adaptation pat-
tern established by Gibson and Cronenberg and shows the propagation of 
McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology across Canadian science fiction.
In chapter 7, I shift from print adaptations of the McLuhanesque Frank-
enpheme of technology to its amplifications in electronic dance music 
(EDM) culture, where the work of several key producers and DJs both 
evokes the technological sublime of ghosts in the machine and enacts what 
music critic Simon Reynolds calls “techno-Romanticism” (1999): the sub-
cultural synchronization of hedonism and high technology. Two notable 
acts in this respect are the house music producer Deadmau5 (a.k.a. Joel 
Zimmerman) and the Paladin Project (a.k.a. Len Jaroli), a spectacular DJ 
persona who played “dark and hard” dance music at Canadian raves and 
clubs. These performers reveal the subcultural circulation of McLuhan-
esque Frankenstein adaptations, as does Matthew MacFadzean’s 2001 
fringe play richardthesecond, whose dance culture milieu points to the 
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further amplification of McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology in Can-
adian pop culture.
Chapter 8 analyzes how the Frankensteinian discourse of technol-
ogy has informed and structured popular cultural representations of the 
Alberta tar sands industry. It is the world’s biggest resource extraction 
project, and, as such, it presents a vast industrial spectacle of “the techno-
logical sublime”: the experience of “awe and wonder, often tinged with an 
element of terror, which people have had when confronted with particular 
natural sites, architectural forms, and technological achievements” (Nye 
1994, xvi). Accordingly, a variety of cultural representations of Big Oil and 
the tar sands do not just evoke the industry’s technological spectacle, but 
do so in ways that amplify its Frankensteinian aspects too.
Finally, the conclusion moves beyond Canadian texts and contexts to 
survey an international selection of scholarly receptions of McLuhan as 
an important means of globally distributing McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of 
technology. Langdon Winner’s Autonomous Technology (1977) and Avital 
Ronell’s Telephone Book (1991) both explicitly link McLuhan and Franken-
stein. I then consider the reception of McLuhan in Europe—acknowledging 
the difficulties of translation—with reference to Jean Baudrillard (1983) 
and Friedrich Kittler ([1986] 1999). The study then closes by reflecting on 
the implications of Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein for reconceiv-
ing Canada’s “technological nationalism” (Charland 1986) as technocratic 
transnationalism in order to better describe the increasingly corporate and 
globally focused priorities of Canada’s governance and cultural production. 
This proposed notion of technocratic transnationalism helps to highlight 
some notable commonalities among Canadian Frankenstein adaptations: 
besides their consistent pairing of Shelley and McLuhan, they also share 
preoccupations with media, corporate business, and globalization. Finally, 
I point to some further directions for studying Frankenstein adaptations, 
and for reconceiving adaptation studies more expansively, which richly 
rewards paying close attention to more varied forms of adaptation in cul-
tural production.
 11
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1. Technology, Frankenstein,  
and . . . Canada?
Because of technology’s ambiguities, the scholarly literature that takes 
technology as its main subject sometimes pays special attention to defin-
itions and terminology, and, in the process, it articulates different premises. 
One thing many writers agree on is that, as W. Brian Arthur says, “we have 
no agreement on what the word ‘technology’ means” (2009, 13). Langdon 
Winner observes that the word “is applied haphazardly to a staggering 
collection of phenomena” (1977, 10). For French cultural theorist Jacques 
Ellul ([1954] 1964) and Wired cofounder Kevin Kelly alike, the word is 
“too small” (Kelly 2011, 11), too specific for their purposes, so they coin 
more expansive terms that encompass and exceed technology, like Ellul’s 
concept of technique. For Alvin Toffler, the inverse obtains: “Technology,” 
he specifies, “includes techniques” (1970, 25).
Technology: A Shape-Shifting Signifier
Three major premises for definitions and theories of technology pre-
vail: the instrumentalist premise sees technology as mere, value-neutral 
tools that can be put to different uses, ethical or otherwise, by users; the 
determinist premise holds that technology is not value-neutral but rather 
determines and organizes its uses according to its own logic or priorities; 
and the substantivist premise “claims that not only does technology oper-
ate according to its own inherent logic, but also that this logic is at the 
expense of humanity” (Lorimer, Gasher, and Skinner 2008, 253). McLuhan, 
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in his writings, defines and theorizes the terms technology and media, 
which are major keywords and closely related in his work; McLuhan’s 
thinking on technology has been characterized sometimes as determinist, 
sometimes as substantivist.
Other definitions are worth glossing here for their variety. Winner 
provides a pragmatic, three-part definition of technology as apparatus, 
techniques, and organizations (1977, 11), on which he then builds a substan-
tivist theorization. Carl Mitcham excavates an exhaustive etymology of the 
word and its meanings, from its ancient roots in Aristotle to the nineteenth 
century, in his survey of the philosophy of technology (1994, 128). George 
Grant, in Technology and Empire, defines the word as follows: “by technol-
ogy I mean ‘the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute 
efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activ-
ity’” (1969, 113). Grant is quoting from Ellul’s 1954 La Technique, translated 
into English as The Technological Society (1964). But Ellul and his English 
translator take pains in the English edition to specify that the keyword is not 
technology but technique, which “does not mean machines, technology, or 
this or that procedure for attaining an end” ([1954] 1964, xxv), but the afore-
mentioned “totality of methods.” For Grant, technology is synonymous with 
a word that, for Ellul, surpasses and subsumes it; Grant’s English misappro-
priation of French theory resonates with Canadian irony.
Samuel Weber (1989) notes a similar contingency of translation with 
“The Question Concerning Technology,” the prevailing English trans-
lation of Martin Heidegger’s 1954 essay “Die Frage nach der Technik,” by 
William Lovitt, published in 1977. Heidegger’s essay has become a found-
ing text for contemporary fields of technology studies; however, Weber 
argues, technology is narrower and more theoretical than the German 
Technik, which also means “technique, craft, skill” (1989, 981). Cursory as 
this critique of translation is, in the context of Weber’s larger argument, 
it has wide-reaching implications for the considerable amount of schol-
arship on technology that has been influenced by Heidegger’s essay since 
its anglophone debut. Even the translator’s decision to translate Technik 
as “technology” set a scholarly precedent; it recurs, for instance, in the 
English translation of Arnold Gehlen’s “Philosophical-Anthropological 
Perspective on Technology” ([1983] 2003, 213).
Perhaps strangely, there are also major contributions to scholarly liter-
ature on technology that offer neither working nor detailed definitions of 
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this pivotal keyword, but instead leave its fundamental meaning presumed 
and implied. Donna Haraway’s 1991 essay “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” uses 
technology as a keyword throughout, referring variously to telephones, 
housework, and biotechnology. Most often, Haraway pairs the word with 
science, to describe the nexus of practices privileged by white capitalist 
patriarchy. But the reader must infer from these references what’s meant 
by technology: Haraway supplies neither definition nor theorization, only 
references amidst which the reader must triangulate the term’s usage and 
meaning. Late in the essay, Haraway acknowledges something of the par-
ticular moral valence of the term—a valence I will argue here belongs to 
its Frankenstein-conditioned history—in her suggestive closing advisory 
that we should refuse “a demonology of technology” (1991, 181).
Theorizations are sometimes offered in lieu of concrete defin-
itions. Scholars often take a position on technology, contextualize their 
approaches to it, or reflect on its place in critical, philosophical, or political 
tradition, without considering its linguistic contours: its denotations and 
connotations, its material referents. In Transforming Technology, Feen-
berg (2002) argues for a critical theory of technology that transcends what 
he sees as a dialectical stalemate between instrumental and substantive 
theories. Feenberg develops a critique of the assumptions and functions 
of both these schools of thought, as well as his own persuasive and sig-
nificant critical theorization, but, throughout, he refers to technology in 
a way that presumes the reader comes to the discussion already knowing 
what is meant by its key term of reference.
What is vexing about such ambiguity and presumption is the malle-
ability they afford a writer to make one’s own idea of technology into a 
convenient abstraction that can best suit one’s own research project, critical 
argument, or ideological agenda. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, in Times 
of the Technoculture, introduce the subject of their study as “the discourse 
of technological revolution” (1999, 1), and their ensuing critique extensively 
problematizes the cultural functions and political contexts of change and 
“revolution” in representations of modern technology. But they take the 
term technology to be self-explanatory and derive from it a constellation of 
coinages, like “technoscape” (Appadurai 1990) and “technoculture.” Where 
Robins and Webster do pause to clarify how they “think about the nature of 
technologies,” they make this clarification in theoretical terms: they reject 
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instrumentalism and situate their approach as more deterministic or sub-
stantive, emphasizing that “technologies always articulate particular social 
values and priorities” (1999, 4). But what they mean by “technologies” per se 
goes unspecified, although the context of their discussion implies that they 
use the term as abstract shorthand for the information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) that serve and structure capital.
Definitions often make an appearance in books about technology for 
general audiences too, where they also produce variable results and conclu-
sions. In The Real World of Technology, Ursula Franklin defines technology 
as system and practice, more “multifaceted entity” than merely “material 
components”: “It includes activities as well as a body of knowledge, struc-
tures as well as the act of structuring” (1990, 14). Technology is more than 
anything else here a scalable theoretical tool, as easily invoked to discuss 
the specific “technology of Chinese bronze casting” (15) as to conclude with 
the vast generalization that “the world of technology is the sum total of 
what people do” (123). And although Franklin takes care in her arguments 
to emphasize social context and to resist determinism (57), such deter-
minism nevertheless flashes through, in the statement that “technology 
has muddled or even destroyed the traditional social compass” (14), or the 
claim that “many technological systems, when examined for context and 
overall design, are anti-people” (76). The ideological implications of popu-
lar writing on technology can be particularly pronounced.
Arthur’s The Nature of Technology surveys and rejects dictionary defin-
itions—and claims (rather preposterously) that “a theory of technology” is 
“missing” from the literature on the subject (2009, 14). Arthur proposes a 
three-part definition of technology—as purposive means, as combinations 
of practices and components, and as a culture’s totality of said combina-
tions (28)—which then establishes the basis for what he claims is a new 
theory of technology as an evolutionary system (its “nature”). And yet 
neither Arthur’s definition nor theory are actually new: the former clearly 
echoes Winner’s three-part definition, while the latter extends the sub-
stantivist theoretical tradition of Ellul—and of McLuhan (whose theory of 
technology is of central concern in what follows). Similarly, Kelly’s What 
Technology Wants grounds an argument for technology’s autonomy as a 
“living system” (2011, 15) in an unfortunately oversimplified synopsis of 
Mitcham’s account; while Mitcham traces the meanings of technology 
through medieval and early modern Europe, Kelly claims that the term 
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simply vanished after Aristotle and was spontaneously “resurrected” by 
the late-eighteenth-century scholar Johann Beckmann (8). The language 
of resurrection is noteworthy here, in the context of the present study’s 
claims for Frankenstein’s role in framing how we talk about technology.
So we find similar notes of ambivalence, amorphousness, and anxiety 
both between and within the bodies of popular and scholarly writing that 
focus on technology as their main subject. With this observation, I don’t 
mean to denigrate the valuable work done by scholars, critics, and other 
writers and artists on the subject of technology, let alone dismiss science 
and technology studies (STS) or other fields of study organized around 
this subject. Language, definitions, and discourse are not everyone’s main 
concern, and understandably so—given the prevailing “technological 
imperative” of modern state governance and economic policy, the deter-
mining force of technology in everyday life, the myriad current problems 
and crises of technological risk, and the need to assess, make sense of, and 
critique these and technology’s other social roles, relations, and functions. 
But in the quite variable forms of attention given to and worked out of the 
language of technology, discourses on technology pose their own risks to 
public knowledge and epistemology, in the ease or eagerness with which 
such discourses can produce and reproduce not clearer understandings of 
technology but, rather, further fetishizations, reifications, and other mysti-
fications of it. Technology has been fetishized and reified even by analyses 
that are otherwise quite cogent critiques of technology, its political eco-
nomic functions, and its socio-cultural effects. Examining technology first 
and foremost as a discourse, instead, this book offers a genealogy of this 
discourse, from the redefinition of technology at the advent of industrial 
modernity to its current privilege as a central keyword in the hegemony 
of globalized neoliberal capitalism.
Numerous examples of this privilege abound: for instance, in the 
contemporary, corporatizing university’s relative political and economic 
prioritization of science, technology, engineering, and mathematical disci-
plines (as well as professional fields) over those of the humanities and social 
sciences (Sigelman 2016). One striking, concise illustration of the privilege 
technology enjoys in policy and business—and in their mutual constitution 
under global capital—is provided by a 2017 Canadian government press 
release, which states that “technology and the innovation it helps promote 
are key to the future of Canada’s economy” (Canada 2017). Yet even here 
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a Frankensteinian shadow looms, in this press release’s specification of 
investment in “clean technology”—this is a common enough compound 
noun meaning energy production that doesn’t exacerbate climate change, 
but as a compound it also implies that there may be something dirty about 
“technology” per se.
As dramatized by the example of The Daily Show, the privilege so widely 
enjoyed by technology today has its countervailing shadow; as Neil Post-
man put it, “every technology is both a burden and a blessing” (1993, 4). To 
borrow a fitting metaphor from the field of STS itself, the word technology is 
its own linguistic “black box”: it works effectively and persuasively in every-
day speech, popular culture, and scholarship, even when its inner workings 
remain unexamined or inaccessible. The elastic and ambiguous word tech-
nology combines with successive waves of technological development—and 
with technology discourse’s nontextual vocabulary of sound and image—to 
give rise to generalized representations of technology per se that are based 
mainly in specific, current “high tech” trends and developments of the day.
The sound and image vocabulary of technology discourse complements 
the textual vocabulary of technology in that the word evokes a certain 
visibility of novelty in what it’s applied to—as, by the same token, certain 
sound- and image-based social and cultural practices evoke the techno-
logical more clearly or conventionally than others. The word technology, 
in everyday language, usually refers to tools, systems, and products that 
are new, that exhibit a spectacular quality, that are made via industrial 
and postindustrial processes—tools, systems, and products that are, in 
other words, “high tech.” In contemporary parlance, “technology” is not 
a term commonly applied to, say, wheels or chalkboards, although both 
could qualify as such according to the varied theoretical parameters and 
criteria mentioned above. Observing this “shorthand” use of the word, 
Jeremy Gilbert and Ewan Pearson identify a hierarchizing function in the 
language of technology, what they call technology’s effect as an “index of 
visibility.” “Some items,” they write, “are considered more technological in 
status than others”; for example, “a drum machine is more technological 
than a drum.” Conversely, more established tools and systems are rendered 
“invisible as technologies” (1999, 112).
Correspondingly, some image- and sound-based practices of rep-
resentation appear and sound more technological than others. Films that 
make extensive use of computer graphic imaging (CGI); images of industry, 
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machinery, computers, motorized vehicles, automation, robotics, and 
cybernetics; holograms: these images visualize what is now seen as “high 
tech”—as, for earlier historical audiences, did images of automata, silent 
films, and jukeboxes. In the milieu of sound, the electronic dance tracks 
of Deadmau5 sound more technological than the country songs of Taylor 
Swift, although very similar instruments and sound engineering practices 
may be used in the recording and performance of each (for instance, drum 
machines, multitrack recorders, mixing boards, and speaker towers). The 
audibility of technology has long belonged to popular music’s politics of 
authenticity, from the first phonographs—which were understood by band 
musicians as a direct threat to their livelihood, the threat of automation—
to the complex fallout of disco’s “death” at the end of the 1970s: rejected 
ostensibly for its artifice, but ideologically for its queerness, disco returned 
to the dance underground, where its artificiality was not jettisoned but 
rather intensified, to re-emerge in the 1980s as house, techno, and the 
spectrum of sounds now known as “EDM”—electronic dance music. The 
complexities EDM has brought to pop music’s politics of authenticity, in 
terms of “liveness,” are explored in chapter 7.
Given the cultural functions and effects of technology’s “index of visibil-
ity,” the discourse of technology as I theorize it in this book includes some 
sound and image productions and practices as well as textual articulations. 
While Deadmau5’s house tracks make only scant reference to “technol-
ogy” in their lyrical content, the discourse of technology audibly pervades 
the production, performance, and reception of this music. “Technology” 
occurs only once in the script of Cronenberg’s 1983 film Videodrome—
but the discourse of technology visibly permeates the whole film, in its 
sensational imagery of consumer home electronics that grow grotesquely 
monstrous. So this study investigates Frankensteinian figures of technol-
ogy, not exclusively in textual constructions but also in selected sound- and 
image-based cultural productions: film, music, and photography, some 
examples of which are compared in chapter 8.
This visibility or spectacular character of technology discourse has its 
epistemic roots in Frankenstein’s monster and the nascent industrialism 
it figures. As David Nye notes, in the nineteenth century, “the English 
were prone to view industrialization in terms of satanic mills, franken-
steinian monsters, and class strife” (1994, 54). Marxist readers of Shelley’s 
novel have shown how Frankenstein’s monster, as a reanimated collage of 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
18 The Medium Is the Monster
corpses, became legible as a monstrous image of the working class. “In 
the anatomist’s assembly of the monster,” writes David McNally, Shelley 
“imaginatively reconstructs the process by which the working class was 
created: first dissected (separated from the land and their communities), 
then reassembled as a frightening collective entity .  .  . the proletarian 
mob” (2011, 95). But Shelley’s monster was composed—not coincident-
ally—during the Luddite machine-breaking disturbances of the mid-1810s 
(O’Flinn 1986), so the monster has also become legible as a figure of the 
industrial, technological mode of capitalist production that yielded the 
working class: a mode of production that incorporated alienated labour, 
automation, Fordist assembly lines, Taylorist management, the increas-
ing mobility of capital and labour, and the consolidation and ascent of 
corporate business structure. Sometimes figuring the “vampiric” leader-
ship of corporate capitalism, sometimes figuring the zombie-like labour 
of industrial workers, and sometimes figuring both at once—as in Marx’s 
famous, grotesque image of capital as “dead labour which, vampire-like, 
lives only by sucking living labour” ([1867] 1976, 342)—Shelley’s vividly 
imaginative construct has spawned its own “hideous progeny” in many 
representations and mediations of technology and technological change 
under capitalism.
As illustrated by the many examples found in major compendia of 
Frankenstein in popular culture (for instance, Forry 1990; Hitchcock 
2007; Morton 2002), Frankenstein has established and disseminated a 
vivid vocabulary of not just textual but multimodal, multimedia images of 
technology: from an 1821 cartoon placing a bound edition of Frankenstein 
among dental instruments (fig. 1), to the oeuvre of Cronenberg’s “body 
horror” films, discussed in chapter 5, to the cultural hostilities over the 
aura of “liveness” versus the audibility of automation that are perennially 
enacted between new and established music-making practices (see chapter 
7). As mediated by the classic cinematic adaptations of Frankenstein, even 
the image of throwing a switch exemplifies an image of technology that 
embeds an evocative Frankensteinian subtext. “When all is ready, I throw 
this switch”: this line from a 1938 radio show about Superman, sampled by 
Coldcut in their 1987 remix of Eric B. and Rakim’s rap track “Paid in Full,” 
occurs early, right before the first instance of the lyrical refrain “Pump 
up the volume.” The sample about switch throwing thus lends a Franken-
steinian tone to the rest of the track as a dense collage of audio samples 
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all grafted together and fused with major components of the rap artists’ 
original single.
Figure 1 A. E. “Tugging at a High Eye Tooth.” Coloured etching by G. 
Cruikshank, after A. E. 1821. Note the copy of Frankenstein on the bookshelf. 
Image courtesy of the Wellcome Collection. Photo CC4.0 licensed from Wellcome 
Collection.
Sometimes, textual articulations of technology combine with visual and 
other representational strategies to reinforce and reify the popular under-
standing of technology as the latest in high tech, which as of this writing 
encompasses largely consumer-oriented, digital, networking tools and 
systems, things like mobile devices and social media. And sometimes, 
too, these multimodal representative strategies converge to suggest 
something else about what technology means. Consider Larry Rosen’s 
2012 book iDisorder: Understanding Our Obsession with Technology and 
Overcoming Its Hold on Us. The title and subtitle themselves suggest a lot 
about what’s meant here by “technology”: the “i” in “iDisorder” connotes 
Apple’s branding, which together with the word “obsession” suggest that 
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by “technology,” Rosen means consumer digital electronics and systems. 
Furthermore, “obsession” and the trope of “overcoming its hold” suggest 
a dialectic of desire and danger; technology is implied to be an agent or 
enabler of something like addiction. The trope of “overcoming” a “hold” 
suggests that technology is an adversarial power the reader is wrestling 
with or struggling against. The cover image shows the black silhouette of 
a tortured soul trapped in the white screen of a Blackberry-like device 
(which maybe also suggests the book isn’t just blaming Apple?). The vague 
and inclusive “us” commonly found in general-audience and self-help 
books implies the book’s target market to be middle-class users of net-
worked mobile devices who think there’s a problem with their use. In his 
book’s introductory chapter, Rosen quickly establishes that by technology 
he means digital, networked devices. He sums up his book’s aim as an 
effort to “demonstrate how the technologies that we use daily coerce us to 
act in ways that may be detrimental to our well-being” and “to recognize 
the craziness that technology can promote and discover new ways to stay 
sane” (2012, 5–6). Or, as the publisher’s blurb about the book, quoted on 
the author’s webpage, puts it, “Rosen teaches us how to stay human in an 
increasingly technological world” (Rosen 2011). I am neither supporting 
nor disputing Rosen’s ideas or his expertise in technophobia and what 
he has termed “technostress” (2012, 6); my point here is that his study 
of technology-conditioned psychological disorders and how to alleviate 
their “symptoms” (6) itself exhibits a symptomatic sense of technology, 
in not only its writing but also its visual design and marketing media, 
engaging a multimodal vocabulary of technology discourse that figures 
technology not only in terms of “revolutionary” newness but also in terms 
of danger, globalization, contagion, and opposition to humanity. As I hope 
the following chapters here will show, this discourse has a distinctively 
Frankensteinian (and a less obviously but no less significantly Canadian) 
provenance.
Given the coordinated arrays of textual, visual, and other representa-
tions of technology that inform and structure arguments like these about 
technology—arguments which often implicitly refer to contemporary, 
more visibly “technological” technologies—close and carefully contextual-
ized reading demonstrates that such arguments, far from novel, reproduce 
long-embedded cultural assumptions about technology’s definition and, 
as importantly, about its fetish character—the uncanny apprehension that 
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“it’s alive!” In the process, such arguments retell the old but perennially 
relevant story of Frankenstein.
It’s a story well enough known and discussed in both the schol-
arly and popular traditions. Winner ends Autonomous Technology: 
Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought with a chapter 
called “Frankenstein’s Problem”—an explication of Mary Shelley’s novel 
that brings home his own point about “our involvement with technology,” 
namely, that “we are dealing with an unfinished creation, largely forgot-
ten and uncared for, which is forced to make its own way in the world” 
(1977, 316). Edward Tenner starts Why Things Bite Back: Technology and 
the Revenge of Unintended Consequences with a chapter called “Ever Since 
Frankenstein,” in which he adopts Shelley’s novel as a framing allegory for 
his tour of the “revenge effects” of technology in medicine, computing, 
and other high-tech areas of modern life. “It was Mary Shelley’s Franken-
stein,” Tenner writes, “that first connected Promethean technology with 
unintended havoc. . .  . Mary Shelley wrote prophetically at the dawn of 
technological systems thinking” (1996, 14, 15). In his book, Tenner isn’t 
interested in the linguistic or theoretical aspects of technology: he briskly 
defines it, in his preface, as “humankind’s modification of its biological 
and physical surroundings” (xi). But his claim that Frankenstein “first 
connected” technology and backlash might well describe the claim of 
the present study, in terms of language and discourse as well as culture. 
Likewise, Winner’s proviso—that his claim is “not, as the boosters may 
conclude, that technology is a monstrosity or an evil in and of itself” (1977, 
316)—is one my argument inverts, in terms of how the word is used and 
what discourses are involved in its construction and meaning making. In 
the chapters that follow, I aim to show that Frankenstein and its Canadian 
adaptations have constructed the modern English word technology as a 
figure of manufactured monstrosity and have globally popularized this 
sense of it.
Logocentrism and “Revolutionary Technology”
The cultural and epistemological space that Frankenstein opened for the 
modern meaning of technology must also be contextualized according 
to a broader historical order of Western discourse that it has been the 
project of deconstruction to critique: the hierarchical ordering of speech 
over writing, logos over technē. The reinvention and reconfiguration of 
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the globalized discourse of technology that began in Mary Shelley’s time, 
and accelerated in McLuhan’s, both built on and transformed the epis-
temology and language of this deeper cultural logic of logocentrism, of 
the privileging of voice and presence and “the debasement of writing” 
(Derrida [1967] 1976, 3). As McLuhan described his work as a footnote to 
that of Harold Innis, I might describe this work as a footnote to that of 
Jacques Derrida.
As Derrida has exhaustively investigated ([1981] 1988), criticisms of 
new media are anything but new. In the third century BCE, Plato, in Phae-
drus, famously wrote against writing, in Socrates’s account of the mythic 
encounter between the Egyptian god Theuth, inventor of writing, and King 
Thamus, who warns that the invention will not preserve memory but rather 
destroy it. This ancient parable has become a primal scene for representa-
tions of media and tools in terms of change and supplementation, of new 
tools not just replacing old but threatening and overthrowing them, in pro-
cesses we would now call innovation and obsolescence. Correspondingly, 
this parable furnishes a primal scene for the perennially hostile response of 
established cultural and economic interests to new technological develop-
ments. Friedrich Kittler points out that the oldest known image of a print 
shop, from 1499, depicts it “as a dance of death” ([1986] 1999, 5). David 
Thornburg’s Edutrends 2010 (1992) recounts a history of hostile reactions 
from educational institutions to new media technologies, from criticisms 
of paper (in favour of slate and chalk) in 1815, to criticisms of ink (in favour 
of pencils) in 1907, to criticisms of disposable ballpoint pens in 1950. Before 
dismissing the apparent absurdity of this litany of objections to what might 
now seem the most unobjectionable, most commonplace media tools, 
consider that the litany has continued more or less unabated, from early 
twentieth-century criticisms of film, radio, television, and home recording 
(as seen in Cronenberg’s Videodrome), through mid-1990s concerns over 
email, to today’s anxieties about mobile devices, texting, and social media.
The popular music business demonstrates a dramatic and ongoing 
history of perennial recoil from new media for their perceived threat to 
established systems and vested interests. The music industry’s campaign 
against file sharing reproduces historical campaigns: audio engineers 
against samplers, vinyl producers against cassettes and CDs, and musi-
cians against phonographs and jukeboxes, which, as Sarah Thornton 
(1996) documents, were constructed as a similar threat to live—meaning 
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authentic—musicianship; in chapter 7, this study looks at how this politics 
of presence and authenticity is now reproduced, however ironically, in the 
context of DJ culture, which is organized predominantly around the play-
back of recordings. Tellingly, Thornton’s book reproduces an image from 
DJ Magazine that echoes the 1499 picture of a skeleton-surrounded print 
shop—an image of “the death of vinyl,” showing one shrouded skeleton 
clutching a record, and another clutching a CD and a sampler (1996, 64). 
In this long tradition, the major record labels’ current copyright campaign 
tries to win public sympathy by appeals on behalf of the recording artists’ 
labour that the labels actually exploit. The labels and their intermediaries 
make appeals to authorial originality as a principle of “making one’s living” 
(a disingenuous appeal, given that corporations, not artists, hold music 
recording copyrights in the overwhelming majority of cases), in oppos-
ition to technologies figured as theft, as the privation of “honest” labour 
and its replacement by inhuman, automatic processes. Today’s “copyfight” 
sees this dialectic of Romantic individualism versus monstrous technology 
being deployed by all interested parties: while the corporate entertainment 
lobby paints Romantic portraits of “starving artists” staving off a global 
horde of pirates armed with a Pandora’s box of digital technology, the 
so-called pirates, a pejoratively defined group that includes a great many 
legitimate, noninfringing media consumers and users, mobilize grassroots 
defences of expressive freedom and personal privacy against the digital 
locks, kill switches, trolling, cease-and-desist notices, and suspensions of 
service imposed by “Big Media” acting more and more like Big Brother.
This long-standing historical pattern of public conflicts between 
established interests and upstart innovation has furnished Western cul-
tural history with scenes of Luddites versus technocrats, of “dinosaur” 
industries versus nimble entrepreneurs, and indeed of “zombie econom-
ics” wielding a dead hand’s power over new attempts by the living to 
make a living (Quiggin 2010). This pattern has thus also furnished the 
English language with figures of technofetishists and technocrats, and 
has installed a sensational rhetoric of revolution in the discourse of tech-
nology: a rhetoric of rivalry and replacement in modes of production 
and consumption, in industrial and communication developments. As 
David McKitterick (2003) points out, the historical record shows not 
that new media replace old and render them obsolete, but rather that 
new and old media enter into more complex negotiations and mutual 
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accommodations, adapting to one another in a changing media ecology. 
Nevertheless, the more arresting figure of revolution dominates popular 
culture and the hegemonic social imaginary, driven in part by mod-
ernity’s distinctive ambivalence toward technological innovation. This 
ambivalence—which inflects the modern usage of “technology” itself, 
through the popular mediations of Frankenstein—marks the reception 
and representation of successive media and communication technologies 
as though competing for supremacy in a zero-sum mediascape, rather 
than coexisting and sometimes collaborating (as well as occasionally 
competing, to be sure) in an increasingly complex mediascape.
This sensational (and durably market-tested) image of “revolutionary 
technology” tends to trump more nuanced understandings of techno-
logical change in the popular imaginary. The rhetoric of “revolution” that 
marks so much public and commercial discourse surrounding technology 
(especially consumer technology) can be attributed in part to Mary Shelley; 
as will be discussed in chapter 3, the creature that stands as an anticipa-
tory figure of technology is characterized significantly through tropes of 
revolution (among others). And this rhetoric can be also attributed in part 
to Marshall McLuhan’s media theory; his writing emphasizes an epochal 
rhetoric of change, in which new media come to replace old, and in the 
process inaugurate new epochs that succeed old ones, and new forms of 
subjectivity and society that supplant earlier ones. So it is not only because 
of the capitalist structuring of an economic world-system around competi-
tion and rivalry but also because of the discursive figuration of technology 
as a manufactured monster run amok that, as Kevin Robins and Frank 
Webster assert, “the idea of technological revolution has become norma-
tive—routine and commonplace—in our technological times” (1999, 1).
Canadian Popular Culture in Postcolonial Context
So what do these concerns with the discourse of technology have to do 
with Canada in particular? Quite a lot, I hope to show: Canada is a modern 
nation-state whose social fabric is deeply interwoven with defining pre-
occupations with technology, media, and globalization. Establishing the 
Canadian context for this argument means attending to the continuum 
of national and global cultural relays and relations that position and pres-
sure Canadian popular culture, according to a postcolonially informed 
revision of two concepts: technological nationalism, which describes 
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Canada’s ambivalent investment in technology for nation building; and 
media imperialism, which describes Canada’s equally ambivalent rela-
tionship to cultural globalization, sometimes as the colonizer but more 
often as the colonized.
Canadian Frankenstein adaptations, like Canadian popular culture 
more generally, invite a postcolonial perspective. As I have argued else-
where, the literatures of Indigenous and other racialized minorities have 
generally occupied a more prominent place in postcolonial analyses of Can-
adian nation building than have the popular culture and literature of the 
white, anglophone mainstream (McCutcheon 2009, 765). To redirect post-
colonial attention to Canadian popular culture intends “neither to contest 
nor to dismiss the growing and critically self-reflexive foci on diasporic and 
indigenous literatures” (2009, 766)—these foci remain urgently important. 
Rather, the purpose in paying postcolonialist attention to Canadian popular 
culture is to rethink Canada’s mobilizations of popular culture for political 
economic projects in nation building and globalized capital (which gov-
ernment policy, in the age of neoliberalism, has increasingly considered to 
be the same thing). Such rethinking means both working with and moving 
beyond the traditional triangulation of Canadian popular culture between 
its “British and American ‘parent’ formations” (Bodroghkozy 2002, 568): 
working with this triangulation, by acknowledging its political economic 
map of Canada’s cultural industries, and moving beyond it, by interrogating 
its nationalist premises in the tracking of diasporic, transnational, and net-
worked cultural practices and processes. That is, a postcolonialist premise 
and the subject of adaptations bring considerations of cultural and eco-
nomic globalization to bear on the study of Canadian-based institutions, 
producers, and practices of popular culture making. What postcolonial 
attention to Canadian popular culture can provide is a way of “doing the 
national differently” (Pennee 1999, 83), articulating connections among 
Canadian culture and policy, the transnational corporate interests that 
pressure and colonize them (Hedges 2012), and the globally and digitally 
distributed scenes and communities that use them.
The need for more postcolonialist critique of Canadian popular cul-
ture specifically accords with Vijay Devadas’s and Chris Prentice’s general 
observation that “popular culture is one of those neglected domains of 
enquiry for postcolonial studies” and their consequent assertion that popu-
lar culture and postcolonialist critique matter profoundly to each other 
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(2011, 687). Identifying the globalized capitalist world-system as (among 
other things) a legacy of colonialism, they write:
Popular culture today is of significance for postcolonial studies as it 
is the terrain of struggle between a dominant capitalist force . . . and 
resistances to it. . . . Popular culture provides the ground for consti-
tuting forms of resistance to hegemonic (often nationalist) power 
structuring social and political relations, and cultural expression, in 
the wake of colonialism. (2011, 690)
In the context of Canada’s resource extraction-based economy and its 
nation-building cultural policy tool kit (e.g., Canadian content quotas and 
public investment supports for cultural production across media; see Grant 
and Wood 2004), Canadian popular culture is inevitably invested in and 
intertwined with global forces, both economic and cultural. A postcolonial 
analysis thus entails situating Canadian popular culture between techno-
logical nationalism, on the one hand, and media imperialism, on the other.
Technological Nationalism and Media Imperialism
“Technological nationalism” is a term coined by Maurice Charland to 
describe a “Canadian ideological discourse” that “ascribes to technology 
the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication”—but, in the 
process, “ties a Canadian identity, not to its people, but to their mediation 
through technology” (1986, 197). Postmodernist scholar Arthur Kroker 
took up the term and developed it in his 1984 book Technology and the 
Canadian Mind. Here, Kroker identified an “original, comprehensive, and 
eloquent discourse on technology” (1984, 7) in the work of George Grant, 
Harold Innis, and Marshall McLuhan, a discourse that Kroker saw reflected 
in Canadian culture generally, citing as just a few examples, the music of 
Rush, the fiction of Margaret Atwood, and the brutalist-futurist architec-
ture of urban Canada, like the iconic CN Tower. Reading technological 
nationalism less as a nation-building ideology and more as a widely diffused 
cultural discourse, Kroker finds in this discourse notes of ambivalence and 
anxiety; he sees technological nationalism as “the essence of the Canadian 
state and .  .  . the Canadian identity,” an effect of Canada’s geohistorical 
position between “the ‘technological imperative’ in American empire and 
the classical origins of the technological dynamo in European history” (7, 
10). In its positioning of Canadian nation building amidst the cross-border 
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proximity of the United States, the transatlantic reach of Europe, and the 
unevenly developing regime of globalization, technological nationalism is 
not unlike a theory of Canada’s postcoloniality. The “Canadian discourse 
on technology,” according to Kroker, “thrusts us into the centre of a debate 
of world significance” over issues of “neotechnical capitalism” and “global 
media system[s]” (18)—issues now widely recognized as integral to post-
colonial globalization.
Questions of the global occur with special stress in Kroker’s discussion 
of McLuhan, in whose work Kroker sees an ambivalent “technological 
humanism”: a markedly ambivalent mix of optimism for a better techno-
logical tomorrow and anxiety over the present “processed world of 
technology” (60). In Kroker’s account, McLuhan keeps a wary but hopeful 
ear pressed to the ground of the global village. The concept of technological 
nationalism thus demonstrates a rudimentary Canadian postcolonial 
perspective, and sets a suggestive ideological scene for this reading of 
Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein, in which the work of McLuhan 
and the discourse of technology figure prominently. Tellingly, a 2010 public 
opinion poll described its “statistical amalgam” of “the qualities Canadians 
have told us they want in a leader” as “an ideal political Frankenstein” 
(Graves 2010).
However, as with so much other critical writing on technology, Kroker 
leaves this and other core keywords unproblematized. And, besides tech-
nology, Kroker holds Canada and nation to be self-evident. This nationalist 
assumption is problematic for both postcolonial criticism and Canadian 
popular culture alike. Postcolonial studies in Canada have mounted some 
of the most forceful critiques of nationalism, especially as manifested in 
official multiculturalism: the Canadian state’s policy to promote cultural 
and racial diversity. Popularly and officially celebrated as a defining char-
acteristic of Canadian nationalism, multiculturalism is also “the strict 
ideological correlate of transnational capitalism” (Lazarus 1999, 223). For 
postcolonial critics, Canadian official multiculturalism amounts almost to 
a Frankensteinian figure: an experimental, ideological state apparatus that 
assembles a culturally differentiated body politic into a national “fantasy 
of unity,” while mystifying the neoliberal political economy of precarious, 
privatized, and poorly paid work that this apparatus serves. Multicultur-
alism’s fantasy of diversity masks the realities of racialized difference; it 
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mobilizes and manages the flows of exploitable labour that sustain the 
flexible accumulations of global capital (Bannerji 2000, 87).
The problematization of nationalism in Canadian popular culture 
assumes a more conventional, even colonial character, encapsulated in 
the diffident, sardonic slogan “as Canadian as possible under the circum-
stances”: the winning entry in a 1970s CBC contest to complete the phrase 
“as Canadian as . . . .” Such a slogan signals both the colonially conditioned 
cliché that Canada has no culture, and the perennially present danger that 
the United States poses to Canadian sovereignty. To appreciate this slogan 
as a good synopsis of Canadian popular culture, though, we need to explore 
how the thesis of media imperialism describes Canadian popular culture’s 
historical and economic conditions.
As theorized by Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1977), the media imperialism 
thesis posits “the unidirectional nature of international media flows 
from a small number of source countries” (Lorimer, Gasher, and Skinner 
2008, 287). Although the thesis has been challenged for its deterministic 
model of unilateral cultural power—thus neglecting the appropriations 
of “imperial” media products by its target audience “colonies”—I think 
that a postcolonial approach to analyzing Canadian cultural production, 
amidst the high-pressure state of US-Canadian trade relations and their 
implications for Canadian sovereignty, warrants a critical retrieval of the 
media imperialism thesis, which not only describes a model for cultural 
exportation but suggests that such trade is intimately connected to political 
takeover. A postcolonial redeployment of the media imperialism thesis 
recognizes these processes: the uses of cultural production as a tool of 
empire and hegemony; the adoption of imperial structures and strategies 
by transnational conglomerates; and the constant, increasing pressure by 
US corporate lobby groups to liberalize trade with—or, in other words, 
exploit—Canada in everything from cultural products (viewed by corpor-
ate lobbies as multiplatform intellectual property), to health care (viewed 
as a market, not a public service), to water (viewed as a commodity, not 
a human right). Since US hegemony propagates the notion that capital-
ism and democracy are mutually constituted (not mutually antagonistic, 
as political economic analysis actually shows them to be), the difference 
between media and political imperialism collapses, when viewed from a 
Canadian perspective.
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On the political, economic, and cultural fronts, Canada depends on 
US interests and industry in material ways that compromise the northern 
state’s political sovereignty and render its relationship to its southern 
neighbour ambivalent and conflicted, as well as effectively nonnegotiable. 
This relationship is analyzed anxiously from north of the forty-ninth par-
allel, while being ignored or misrecognized from the south: “Americans 
have an amazing tendency to assimilate Canadian work to American 
experience. . . . Canada doesn’t exist as a national entity to the U.S.” (John 
Greyson, quoted in Marks 2005, 198).
If Canada doesn’t exist as a nation from the US perspective, then it can 
hardly claim a distinct cultural existence on that account. In fact, in a global 
context, the US entertainment industry has become virtually synonymous 
with “popular culture” itself; the United States is the global leader, by a 
wide margin, in net royalty and license fee exports—the earnings made in 
payments for the authorized use of intellectual properties (SASI Group 
and Newman 2006). Hollywood was one of the first globalized cultural 
industries, and Canada’s relationship with Hollywood is long-standing and 
conflicted (Gasher 2002). Canada provides Hollywood with cheap and 
abundant film industry services, labour, and resources. Canadian shoot-
ing locations are not just conveniently close to Hollywood, but actively 
promote themselves as stand-ins for US locations, as sites primed for col-
onization: “largely unpopulated place[s] full of scenic wonders and infinite 
resources” (Rutherford 2005, 106). The predominance of the United States 
in popular cultural production is indicated by Canadian media and culture 
consumption patterns: English-speaking Canadians consume far more 
American than domestic media products. The predominance of US con-
tent on Canadian screens is about more than what Aniko Bodroghkozy 
calls, however rightly, “our taste for American popular culture” (2002, 570); 
it is, more importantly, a specific material effect of neoimperial trade eco-
nomics. US media companies export their products to foreign carriers for 
a fraction of what they charge US carriers, making it cheaper for Canadian 
broadcasters to buy US imports than to finance domestic production—
however popular that domestic content may be.
As Peter Grant and Chris Wood explain, these “curious economics” 
of globalized popular culture have occasioned state policies that protect 
cultural sovereignty and diversity of expression, which would otherwise be 
destroyed by narrow adherence to free-market ideology. Canada has kept 
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its own cultural sector exempt (so far) from free-trade agreements, and it 
has developed a policy tool kit for stimulating domestic popular cultural 
production, on the premise that state investment in cultural production 
builds nationalism and sovereignty (2004, 386–88). In economic terms, 
the popularity of a cultural product is productively theorized as a paradox: 
what is popular is what a publisher or company thinks will sell well; how-
ever, no one can predict what will sell well. But popular culture is a matter 
of ideology as well as “curious economics” (2004, 44). Popular culture is a 
“self-conscious term created by the intelligentsia and now adopted by the 
general public to mark off class divisions in the generic types of culture and 
their intended audience” (Jenkins, McPherson, and Shuttac 2002, 28). This 
class-based concept of popular culture remains as ideologically powerful 
as mass production is economically material to the ways in which popular 
culture can articulate national imaginings.
And in Canada, the discourse and production of popular culture relate 
to nationalism under postcolonial and neocolonial Anglo-American 
paradigms of culture. Canada’s tool kit of public media, content quotas, 
and funding agencies also includes some instruments for supporting 
Canadian scholarly as well as popular culture; however, Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funding for Canadian cul-
tural studies research has only been formalized within the last decade. 
This belated recognition of Canadian cultural studies is a symptom of the 
field’s own postcolonial historical neglect by a national intellectual elite 
that has privileged Arnoldian ideals of culture over and against American 
industries of entertainment, seen as a threat to Canada’s national sover-
eignty (Rutherford 2005, 105).
Notwithstanding the dismissal of media imperialism by communica-
tions scholars, cultural and literary studies have picked up and built on it 
in researches informed by theories of nationalism, postcolonialism, and 
globalization (Mookerjea, Szeman, and Farschou 2009). Postcolonial read-
ings of Canadian popular culture sustain the media imperialism thesis not 
despite but due to Canada’s ambivalent relationship to US popular culture. 
In a critique of Canadian cultural policy, Donna Pennee recounts how 
Canadian foreign policy has deployed “‘culture’ from the Cold War to ‘the 
Market Wars,’ from the explicitly ‘ideological’ threats to national security, 
to the explicit but apparently nonideological threats of global capitalism” 
(1999, 196). As Pennee shows, one paradigm of culture is represented by 
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the state’s leverage of culture as security: “The history of the nation-state’s 
use of culture in foreign policy,” Pennee writes, “can be read as a sort of 
barometer of change in the status of nation-statism, in the means of inter-
national relations, and in determinations of what is at stake in security 
debates as power relations shift from the Cold War to the (unnamed as 
such) Market Wars” (1999, 196).
Laura Marks employs Homi Bhabha’s model of pedagogy and per-
formance in national identity to explore how “the little performances 
that constitute Canada insinuate themselves into the massive national 
fiction that constitutes the United States” (2005, 197). Marks explores 
American images of Canada, and observes what she calls the “‘little bit 
off’ quality in Canadian images, seen from a U.S. perspective”: Canada’s 
identity-with-a-difference, in metonymic terms, poses a “subversive 
potential” in “American contexts,” with “the detail” of Canadian differ-
ence making “it possible to question the whole” ideological apparatus 
of US nationalist identity (2005, 198). This kind of ironic signification is 
represented in the performances of Daily Show reporters Bee and Jones, 
whose Canadian citizenship was a running joke on the show. Conversely, 
looking at Canadian images of America, Bodroghkozy arrives at a simi-
lar conclusion: “It is a foundation of fine details, typically unnoticed by 
non-Canadians, upon which Canadians have built their shaky edifice of 
national identity” (2002, 579).
Diana Brydon has forged important links between postcolonial-
ism and globalization studies; alluding to the vexed question of national 
sovereignty and the US government’s targeting of postcolonialism “as yet 
another enemy of US patriotism,” Brydon succinctly reaffirms the urgency 
with which “postcolonial critique continues to pose a challenge to the new 
incarnations of Empire” (2004, 693). The perspectives on nationalism and 
media imperialism developed in postcolonial research like that surveyed 
here represent one way of “doing the national differently” (Pennee 2004, 
83), by adding a nuanced sense of cultural and economic globalization to 
Canadian cultural studies’ established materialist focus on the institutions 
and media of cultural production.
An adequately nuanced postcolonial reworking of media imperialism 
amidst globalization can also recognize that it is not a one-way process. 
While the exponentially larger cultural economies of the United States 
and the United Kingdom have historically colonized and continue to 
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colonize Canadian popular culture, there are ways in which Canadian 
popular culture has infiltrated, occupied, and colonized the global flows 
of cultural production and reception. Canadian Frankensteins represent 
one trajectory for such infiltrations. Likewise, a properly nuanced post-
colonial approach to Canadian popular culture needs to remain critically 
self-reflexive in how it handles texts drawn from a spectrum of class, 
gender, and racialized positions across the field of cultural production—
how it contextualizes both mainstream and marginalized texts in relation 
to power structures. Postcolonial studies in Canada have conventionally 
eschewed popular cultural subjects on account of their very popularity, 
their centrality to the mainstream culture of the implicitly white, cap-
italist, patriarchal “Great White North.” That is, the cultural centrality of 
Canadian popular texts has relegated them to the margins of postcolonial 
studies, which are centred in mapping the cultural margins. But because 
postcolonial methodologies are demonstrably among those best equipped 
to attend to globalization, adaptation, and culture’s articulations of power, 
a postcolonial perspective can and should be brought to bear on texts and 
practices on the cultural peripheries and on those at the cultural centre, 
as well as on the feedback between them.
Canada and Globalization
Outlining the postcolonial contexts of Canadian popular culture in this way 
means simultaneously outlining Canadian popular culture’s involvements 
with globalization, understood here as an intensification of international 
flows of money and labour, whose chief beneficiaries are multinational 
corporations (Appadurai 1990, Sassen 2000).
Globalization is important for contextualizing Canada’s political and 
cultural economies, and for understanding the popular discourse of 
technology: virtually any technological risk or threat is represented as 
an intrinsically global threat. The popular understanding of technology 
in a global sense is prefigured in Shelley’s novel, as Victor Frankenstein 
imagines, as the ultimate result of his research, that a “race of devils would 
be propagated upon the earth” (Shelley [1818] 2012, 174). Since then, 
Frankenstein has been used to sound the alarm over technologies typ-
ically understood as global in their reach and risks, from nuclear power 
(Morton 2002, 56) to file sharing: “digital piracy is Hollywood’s own digital 
Frankenstein,” writes one film industry observer (Sickels 2009, 22). Even 
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the chief agent and institution of globalization itself, the modern corpor-
ation, has attracted Frankenstein analogies and figurations since the Great 
Depression. Mitchell Dawson’s 1930 magazine article “Frankenstein, Inc.” 
expresses the author’s thoroughgoing suspicion of corporations in most 
sectors, such as “the gigantic press Frankensteins which now control the 
news and public opinion.” Dawson envisions “the corporate Frankenstein” 
inaugurating an age in which “law and government will be nullified” (1930, 
276, 279): an age that scholars have since theorized as that of present-day 
globalization. Frankensteinian representations of corporate business 
after the Depression resonate profoundly today, in Canada and globally 
(McCutcheon 2011).
Pertinent to the present discussion is the interdependence, even the 
mutual constitution, of technology and globalization discourses: neither 
term would mean entirely what it does, today, without being echoed in the 
other. Globalization theory privileges technology in its models of trans-
national political and cultural economy, chiefly for facilitating the mobile 
exploits of capital. Jonathan Beller reads the technological imperative as 
a core value of globalization in the popular Frankensteinian image of the 
cyborg, which he describes as “the intersecting of the human being from 
anywhere in the world .  .  . and the technology (military, industrial, and 
informational) endemic to transnational capitalism” (1996, 195). Arjun 
Appadurai coins the term “technoscape”—among other related “-scapes” 
of globalization (e.g., “financescape,” “mediascape”)—to name “the global 
configuration, also ever fluid, of technology, and of the fact that technol-
ogy, both high and low, both mechanical and informational, now moves 
at high speeds across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries” 
(1990, 297). Appadurai’s usage of “technology” here, like his coinage of 
“technoscape,” exploits a sense of technology as uncontainable leak—as 
contagion—that, as the subsequent chapters will show, arises from the 
characterization of Frankenstein’s creature as modernity’s founding image 
of technology, and from McLuhan’s imagery of technology as manufac-
tured, monstrous, and global in its impact.
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2. Refocusing Adaptation 
Studies
Modern Myth and “Frankenpheme”: Adapting Frankenstein
Shelley’s novel has long furnished a grotesque, sensational figure for the 
routine representations of technology in general, or a given technol-
ogy in particular, as some kind of risk or danger. As Jay Clayton notes, 
Frankenstein is an “obligatory reference in any attempt to challenge the 
technological pride of the modern era” (2003, 128). This kind of allusive 
signification constitutes one of the text’s major functions as a “Franken-
pheme” (Morton 2002, 47), and, thus, as a reason for thinking about how 
to refocus adaptation studies. Tenner’s aforementioned use of Frankenstein 
exemplifies this kind of “obligatory reference.” Moreover, in describing 
the novel as “prophetic,” and in using it to frame his own Frankensteinian 
stories about technology’s “revenge effects,” Tenner’s series of stories, with 
their freight of commentary, recalls the narrative structure of Frankenstein 
as a sequence of stories recounted and commented on by Walton, the 
ship captain. Tenner’s book thus adopts the image of the monster, as an 
allegorical figure of technological risk, and (intentionally or otherwise) 
some of the narrative elements from Shelley’s novel. Does this mean we 
might position Tenner’s book itself as an adaptation of Frankenstein? In 
this section, I want to explore this kind of question with reference to the 
literature on adaptations of Frankenstein, and with reference to the theory 
of adaptation studies.
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Almost as soon as it was published in 1818, Frankenstein began fuel-
ling an extraordinarily rich and varied tradition of adaptations, across a 
spectrum of media, genres, and intertextual, intercultural networks; this 
tradition now almost constitutes a cultural industry unto itself. Franken-
stein resonates throughout Western culture as a unique “modern myth”—a 
definitively modern text that has paradoxically assumed the power of myth 
(Baldick 1987). Ironically, it is perhaps not Shelley’s novel itself so much 
as its multimedia adaptations that have secured this peculiar privilege 
for the story. As William St. Clair recounts, the book was out of print 
through much of the nineteenth century and was best known through its 
stage—and, more recently, its screen—adaptations (2004, 367). The text 
itself has been doubly marginalized: not only eclipsed by its adaptations 
and the vicissitudes of copyright, but exiled from the English literary canon 
and relegated to “pulp” status until the 1970s and 1980s, when feminist, 
Marxist, and other theoretical and political trends in English literary stud-
ies revisited it and precipitated a great deal of research and criticism that 
has promoted it to canonical status (Hitchcock 2007, 281). Frankenstein is 
now one of the most widely taught English novels in secondary and post-
secondary English curriculum. (I had to read a comic-book adaptation in 
Grade 8, and the novel’s 1831 edition in an undergraduate seminar.)
Major contributions to the study of Frankenstein adaptations—literary, 
theatrical, and otherwise—emerged as part of the novel’s overall academic 
rehabilitation in the latter quarter of the twentieth century and have 
striven, ambitiously, to survey the scope and diversity of Frankenstein’s 
receptions, reworkings, and recontextualizations. Among the first studies 
of Frankenstein adaptation was Levine and Knoepflmacher’s anthology The 
Endurance of Frankenstein (1979), which argued the novel’s value on the 
basis of its impact on and reworkings in popular culture. In 1973, science 
fiction writer Brian Aldiss argued that Frankenstein is the foundational 
ur-text of modern science fiction: it resituated Gothic fiction in a modern 
setting, it transformed fantasy into extrapolation, and it told an iconic, 
allegorical story of hubris clobbered by nemesis ([1973] 1986, 26). Aldiss’s 
cogent argument achieved as close to a consensus on the origins of science 
fiction as is likely to be found among scholars of the form (see Freed-
man 2002). Developing Aldiss’s interpretation, George Slusser theorized 
science fiction as a narrative literature of “the Frankenstein barrier”: the 
foreclosure of future possibilities by present contingencies, played out in 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Refocusing Adaptation Studies 37
plots “where the present, lurking all along, rises up to avenge the sins of 
our uncreated future” (1992, 71).
Other studies have turned from page to stage, documenting the prolific 
performance traditions of Frankenstein adaptation. Steven Forry’s Hideous 
Progenies (1990) historicizes and reprints several nineteenth-century dra-
matic adaptations; Caroline Picart’s The Cinematic Rebirths of Frankenstein 
(2002) details the twentieth century’s Universal and Hammer franchises 
and other film versions. The proliferation of new media forms since the 
latter twentieth century has prompted some studies to conduct broader 
surveys that sample the diversified mediascape, as in Susan Tyler Hitch-
cock’s Frankenstein: A Cultural History (2007) and Timothy Morton’s 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: A Sourcebook (2002).
The present study builds in particular on Morton’s idea of “Franken-
phemes” and Christopher Baldick’s theory of Frankenstein’s modern myth, 
as well as Pedro Javier Pardo García’s (2005) argument for expanding the 
scope and vocabulary of Frankenstein adaptation studies—on which more 
below. The value of Morton’s idea comes into clearer focus if we consider 
Baldick’s first. Baldick’s In Frankenstein’s Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and 
Nineteenth-Century Writing theorizes Frankenstein as a modern myth and 
thus as a paradox: a text that is at once modern, and a critique of mod-
ernity, and a “household name” imbued with mythic symbolism (1987, 1). 
Baldick argues that Frankenstein has achieved this modern mythic status 
via reductive reproductions of its basic “skeleton story,” comprised of two 
pivotal plot points: first, the good doctor makes a living creature out of bits 
of corpses; and second, this creature turns on him and runs amok (3). Bald-
ick then shows how this skeleton story gets fleshed out through two main 
lines of popular interpretation: a psychological interpretation in which 
the creature represents the “return of the repressed”; and a “technological 
reduction” of the story as “an uncanny prophecy of dangerous scientific 
inventions” (7). Moreover, while these reductive popularizations constitute 
practices of creative adaptation, they also represent strategies of interpret-
ive control and closure, as illustrated by the fixing of the creature’s image 
in Boris Karloff’s iconic film portrayal (5). The technological interpretation 
of Frankenstein is most salient to my purpose here, because Frankenstein 
helps us interpret the modern meaning of technology. It also seems the far 
more predominant of the two interpretations, among the text’s receptions 
and adaptations.
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Baldick’s argument is resolutely and productively materialist; he argues 
that the Frankenstein myth manifests in the material accumulation of all 
the “adaptations, allusions, accretions, analogues, parodies, and plain mis-
readings which follow upon Mary Shelley’s novel” (1987, 4). The inclusion 
of allusions is significant here. Baldick’s analysis of Frankenstein’s legible 
impact on nineteenth-century writing and rhetoric is preoccupied with 
what Linda Hutcheon calls “palimpsestic intertextuality”: the layering and 
modulation of textual referents and their sometimes recognized, some-
times latent links with one another that produce, in audiences, “intertextual 
expectations about medium and genre, as well as about specific work” 
(2006, 22). But while Hutcheon reserves these “multilaminated” receptions 
for extensive, acknowledged adaptations (21), Baldick excavates some of 
this specific work’s more ephemeral references and esoteric reworkings. 
He attends, for instance, to the first documented use of Frankenstein as 
an “object of political allusion,” which occurred in British parliamentary 
debates over abolition (60). As Baldick argues, the “kind of connection” 
found in tracking such a widely popular text as Mary Shelley’s is not always 
“one between a given writer and a literary ‘source’” but more often a Fou-
cauldian genealogy of “subterranean and invisible diffusion in the cultures 
which adopt them” (9).
The “subterranean” circulation of Frankenstein’s central characters and 
“skeleton story” in adaptations as extensive as film series and as ephemeral 
as allusions thus finds an apt encapsulation in Morton’s concept of the 
“Frankenpheme”:
“Frankenphemes” is the name I have chosen to give to those elements 
of culture that are derived from Frankenstein, but that are less than 
a work of art in completion or scale. Some kernel of an idea derived 
from Shelley’s novel has been repeated in another medium. . . . They 
demonstrate the extent to which the novel has permeated the ways in 
which we see the world. (2002, 47–48)
Morton’s examples of “Frankenphemes” include TV commercials, movie 
scenes, and allusive portmanteaus like “Frankenfoods,” which emerged 
to frame debates over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agri-
business (2002, 48). The coinage, then, encapsulates the intertextual and 
appropriative practices of condensation and encoding that further the 
popular dispersal of Frankenstein’s modern myth in allusions, quotations, 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Refocusing Adaptation Studies 39
piecemeal or fragmentary adaptations, and other miscellaneous ephemera 
that abound in popular culture. The present study undertakes to explore 
several such popular cultural Frankenphemes, together with the discursive 
and cultural practices that produce and reproduce them in specific contexts.
Frankenphemes may not qualify as extensive, acknowledged adapta-
tions, but they can be intensive, sometimes profoundly so. Explicating 
them as such means both developing and departing from Baldick’s and 
Morton’s interpretive practices. What distinguishes the present study from 
Baldick’s and Morton’s might be described as a matter of putting the pro-
verbial horse before the cart, in light of textual evidence from Frankenstein 
in its period. My reading extends Baldick’s argument into a chiasmus: 
if Frankenstein is so widely interpreted as “the first and most enduring 
symbol of modern technology” (Tropp, quoted in Baldick 1987, 7), it is 
because the novel conditioned the interpretation and usage of technology 
that began to emerge in Shelley’s own time. In addition, this study follows 
Baldick’s work in paying attention to the nuances and implications of allu-
sive and other nonextensive adaptations, but breaks with it in treating 
them, through the lens of adaptation studies, as adaptations.
Positioning this work in adaptation studies (to which the next section 
turns) prompts a preliminary reflection on the interdisciplinary formation 
of adaptation studies and this formation’s peculiar relationship to studying 
Frankenstein.
Morton acknowledges the basis of his coinage in the vocabulary of 
linguistics, the technical vocabulary of phonemes, graphemes, and so on. 
He adds the suffix -eme, which denotes a specific structural unit, to the 
first part of a name that signifies at once the text’s title, the name of its 
protagonist, and the creature—according to the long-standing identifi-
cation of the nameless creature with the name of its creator. The coinage 
pointedly echoes Richard Dawkins’s 1976 coinage of the meme, “a unit of 
cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation”—an idea that catches on, 
basically ([1976] 1989, 192). Dawkins’s meme idea has caught on itself, as 
the common name for the ideas and texts that are said to “go viral” in 
digital culture. Introducing her theory of adaptation, Hutcheon discusses 
the aptness of Dawkins’s suggestion of “a cultural parallel to Darwin’s bio-
logical theory” (2006, 31) for the study of intertextual reproduction with 
difference, and emphasizes culture’s crucial distinction from biology: that 
mutation is the exception (albeit a critical one) in the process of genetic 
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replication; however, in cultural transmission, it is much more the rule 
(32). As Morton’s example of “Frankenfood” shows, the notion of Frank-
enphemes brings this interdisciplinary, linguistic borrowing full circle: if 
the life sciences have supplied elements of the vocabulary of evolution to 
the discourse of cultural adaptation (“I want a monosyllable that sounds 
a bit like ‘gene’” [Dawkins 1976, 192]), then the discourse of Frankenstein 
adaptations has returned attention to life sciences that are now exploited 
to manipulate biological evolution itself. Thus Emily Ryall observes of “the 
language of genetic technology” that, “as Frankenstein himself is often 
depicted in popular conceptions of the fictional story as an eccentric and 
renegade scientist, the scientists who carry out genetic experimentation 
today are represented similarly” (2008, 369). Ryall’s observation is also 
noteworthy here for its tightly paired references to the text’s “popular con-
ceptions”—its “technological reduction”—and the news media’s “similar 
representations” of scientists—that is, as Frankenphemes.
These formally and thematically connected details of terminology and 
discourse in reconfiguring and redistributing Frankenstein—and in ana-
lyzing these reconfigurations and redistributions—thus make the case 
of Frankenstein adaptations both a challenge and an opportunity for the 
theory and methodology of adaptation studies more generally. Adaptations 
that are reduced to “skeleton stories,” condensed in allusions, and encoded 
as memes occupy a shifting analytic shore, between the field of adapta-
tion as it has been conventionally theorized and the ocean of open-ended 
intertextuality and heteroglossia.
Attuning Adaptation Studies to Nonnarrative and Nonextensive 
Cultural Forms
Adaptation studies is a field where literary, media, and cultural studies 
intersect, and it first emerged to investigate the negotiations and appro-
priations of literature by film. But like the mediascape itself, adaptation 
studies have diversified: to address more media and genres; to document 
specific oeuvres and traditions; to move from one-way to multilateral 
models of adaptation (between canonical and popular forms, old media 
and new); to account for social and political contexts; and to take stock of 
its own theory and practice.
Some of the most productive recent work in adaptation studies has 
focused on specific authors, like Shakespeare. Adaptations of Shakespeare, 
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for instance, is a critical anthology of dramatic adaptations of Shakespeare’s 
plays, and yet despite its strict focus on theatrical productions, editors 
Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier offer one of the most expansive working 
theories of adaptation, as “almost any act of alteration performed upon 
specific cultural works” (2000, 4). Taking stock of the overall character of 
adaptation practice in the context of Frankenstein’s proliferating multi-
media progeny, Pedro Javier Pardo García suggests the term “cultural 
intertextuality” to better capture the breadth of citational, generic, discur-
sive, and dialogic practices of interpretation, selection, and recombination 
that go into adaptation, especially postmodern adaptations like Kenneth 
Branagh’s 1994 movie: “it is not just that the film perfectly exemplifies the 
concept,” García writes, “but also that its representation of the creature 
turns it into a walking metaphor of cultural intertextuality” (2005, 240). 
The figurative suitability of the text and its main character for commenting 
on textual production and adaptation—their “perfect correspondence of 
matter and form” (240)—is something of a commonplace in Franken-
stein criticism, as García acknowledges. It is a commonplace well worth 
rehearsing here, in order to inform my similarly expansive refocusing of 
adaptation studies methodology, a refocusing undertaken in response to a 
major theoretical statement on the field, which sets rather more restrictive 
parameters for adaptation that invite some critical discussion.
In A Theory of Adaptation, Linda Hutcheon surveys the field and 
argues for “a more restricted . . . definition of adaptation” (2006, 9) than 
that of Fischlin and Fortier, which she cites as indicative of the field’s over-
all tendency. Concerned that such a theory is too vast for critical practice, 
Hutcheon defines adaptation as both a product—an acknowledged, exten-
sive, and specific transcoding of a given text, usually a narrative text—and 
as a process, a navigation—whether knowing or unknowing—of different 
modes of textual and intertextual engagement with modes categorized as 
telling (e.g., print), showing (e.g., film), or interactivity (e.g., video games). 
Of the adaptor, this navigational process requires creative interpretation; 
for the audience, it entails “palimpsestic intertextual” engagement (22).
By problematizing the multidirectionality of source and derivation, 
and by covering a wide range of forms and media, Hutcheon’s theory 
breaks with the field’s tradition. Her idea of interactivity crystallizes 
around video games and theme parks, for instance. But the theory 
also reinforces tradition, mainly in its orientation to story as the field’s 
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“common denominator” (2006, 10) and its corresponding delimitation of 
adaptation’s definition as acknowledged, specific, and extensive.
Confining adaptation to story-based forms and texts seems unnecessar-
ily restrictive in and of itself, as it forecloses considerations of adaptation 
in nonnarrative forms: lyrical forms like poetry, critical forms like schol-
arship, forms that occupy a range of genres and media. In a manner that I 
hope is both analogous and adequate to that whereby technology discourse 
encompasses sound and image as well as textuality, I want to theorize 
adaptation and its study more expansively than restrictively. Adaptation 
study affords interpretive tools for critiquing varied, divergent, and inter-
secting orders of discourse and media forms, as the above discussion of 
Tenner’s (1996) nonfiction prose has suggested. The point is material to 
our purposes here in so approaching McLuhan’s work, among that of other 
Canadian artists and thinkers. McLuhan actually makes a great initial 
case study for adaptation practices in critical (or otherwise not “creative”) 
bodies of work. McLuhan himself and McLuhan scholars alike have rec-
ognized the strong artistic strain in his writing. As Richard Cavell says, “If 
McLuhan’s critical reputation declined severely during the 1970s . . . what 
I can only call his artistic reputation has continued to grow” (2002, xvi). 
McLuhan’s self-consciously unorthodox writing style, with its “probes” and 
its “mosaic” structures, may account for his dramatically divergent recep-
tions, but it also lends itself to the protocols of close reading and theoretical 
contextualization that literary studies normally reserve for more straight-
forwardly “creative” texts. Conversely, studies of adaptation in cultural 
production also help to illuminate the critical practice in creative texts, 
including nonnarrative, lyrical, condensed, or otherwise short forms, and 
different media, like popular music. The emphasis on extensiveness that 
reinforces this theory’s prioritization of story explicitly excludes a wealth 
of other cultural modes and forms—like theory or music—that warrant 
consideration as adaptations. For instance, Hutcheon specifically excludes 
“musical sampling” from her theory, on the basis that it “would not qualify 
as extended engagement” (2006, 9). Since the book undertakes a theor-
etical synthesis of the field of adaptation in cultural production, such 
parameters seem somewhat arbitrary: why can’t a broadly scoped theory 
of adaptation address adaptations that are less extensive, more like memes?
As the analysis unfolds, interactivity—a mode of engagement that 
ostensibly signals a more inclusive approach to the field—ironically 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Refocusing Adaptation Studies 43
becomes a more exclusive category, by coming to refer predominantly to 
video games. Even the broader digital milieu goes underexamined for its 
interactive and adaptive practices. Admittedly, the “2.0” interactivity of 
social web media was only emerging at the book’s time of publication, but 
other forms of interaction and adaptation available then for analysis do 
not receive it. The web also gives good cause to be included in a theory of 
adaptation for what had become, even by the turn of the century, one of 
its major cultural forms: the “Internet meme.” This book treats the “Frank-
enpheme of technology” as a kind of cultural meme, and it considers a 
few selected Internet memes in its later chapters, but a theorization of 
the Internet meme as such is beyond its scope (although theorizing the 
meme is something I’ve taken up elsewhere; see McCutcheon 2016, 178).
Hutcheon’s stipulations for extensiveness and interactivity also repro-
duce adaptation studies’ implicit privileging of the visual, over and against 
the audible. Hutcheon does discuss several music examples throughout 
the book and details one specific case of musical scoring, but most of 
these examples are taken from Hutcheon’s formidable repertoire of opera 
expertise. In addition to opera and musical theatre examples, song covers 
get some consideration (2006, 90–93), but songs and other musical pro-
ductions that adapt other forms remain unaddressed and omitted—even 
those that might qualify as extensive, acknowledged, and narrative-based: 
albums like The Alan Parsons Project’s Poe-inspired Tales of Mystery and 
Imagination (1976) and Janelle Monáe’s Afro-Futurist concept albums 
(2010, 2013), or inverse cases, like Joshua Dysart and Cliff Chiang’s Neil 
Young’s Greendale (2010), a graphic novel based on the eponymous 2003 
album by Neil Young and Crazy Horse.
Like Internet memes, popular music adaptations open up all kinds of 
implications for Hutcheon’s emphases on extensiveness and interactivity. 
If extensiveness is about creative interpretation of a whole narrative, is not 
the Eurythmics’ single “Sexcrime (1984)” (1984) a condensed, lyrical retell-
ing of Orwell’s whole novel? If extensiveness is about duration, what about 
the repetitive reception labour put into consuming and appropriating this, 
or any pop song, which, as Leonard Cohen (quoted in Kennedy 2006) puts 
it, one can “place into the air and have it last twenty years”? Such different 
reception modes problematize interactivity, as well. In A Theory of Adap-
tation, Hutcheon repeatedly makes the double gesture of acknowledging 
that all modes of engagement are interactive to an extent, while insistently 
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distinguishing the interactivity of computer games and theme parks for 
their physical involvement: “enacting or participating replaces telling” 
(2006, 138). The recurring double gesture in its very insistence suggests 
something unresolved about this argument—perhaps the claims of games 
and parks on physical, participatory interactivity are ultimately not exclu-
sive after all. To return to the counterexample: what kind of interactivity is 
represented by listening to “Sexcrime” at a dance club? Or while out for a 
jog? These points are not about theoretical hairsplitting, or about diluting 
the analytic power of adaptation theory; rather, these points are offered 
as notes towards thinking through the limits of a productive theory, and 
building deliberately on its own more incidental use of sonic vocabulary, in 
the interests of improving its theoretical comprehensiveness, consistency, 
and applicability.
Popular music resounds with adaptation practices, in ways that warrant 
refocusing a theory of adaptation to account for nonnarrative, nonvisual, 
and nonextensive adaptations, and to rethink what such parameters 
mean—to rethink, that is, what can count and be studied as adaptation. I 
want to explore the matter of popular music in detail here, partly because 
the book considers music later on (see chapter 7), but mainly for two 
more important reasons: first, the sonic and acoustic register is critical 
for understanding of McLuhan’s theory; and second, the vocabulary of 
sound processes and music recording supplies a peculiarly useful termin-
ology for analyzing adaptations, especially less extensive, more citational, 
and differently interactive adaptations. Modulation and variation (as in a 
variation on a theme) are terms that aptly capture the sense of repetition 
with difference that Hutcheon sees as crucial to adaptations; as with sev-
eral of the terms suggested here, Hutcheon uses the term variation in her 
own arguments (2006, 35, 86). Sampling and remixing, borrowed from the 
parlance of DJ-based music-making, can be borrowed to describe brief, 
ephemeral, and more meme-like adaptations, and formal rearrangements 
and recontextualizations, respectively. Amplification is a useful way to 
describe how a meme like a Frankenpheme can “catch on” and reproduce 
both its forms and its cultural functions (Hutcheon also uses this term in 
this way [2006, 3]). Feedback, gain, and loss—borrowed more from com-
munications than from music discourse—suggest different kinds of effects 
that adaptations can achieve, on audiences and on source texts alike.
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As I’ve discussed elsewhere, popular music is an important cultural 
vehicle for adaptations, including those of Frankenstein (McCutcheon 
2007). This and other prior investigations of adaptation in popular elec-
tronic dance music inform the use of the above terminology for adaptation 
studies—not just for popular music adaptations, either—and also suggest 
an interpretive framework in orders of adaptation. For example, I suggest 
that if Star Wars can be considered a “primary” Frankenstein adaptation 
(as the 2005 prequel [Lucas 2005] spelled out in its Frankencliché back-
story—in case you hadn’t already picked up on all the Frankenphemes of 
clones, cyborgs, and planet-destroying weapons), then a dance record that 
samples Star Wars can be considered a “secondary” adaptation—that is, 
an adaptation of an adaptation (McCutcheon 2007, 260). Depending on 
how well documented or poorly decayed is the line of attribution among 
specific texts (and mindful of adaptation’s “subterranean” circuits), we 
can posit further orders of remove and remix: tertiary, quaternary orders, 
or more. Call it six degrees of adaptation? But the point is not necessar-
ily to fix, taxonomize, or hierarchize particular lineages of adaptation as 
some kind of effort to combat what William Gibson has called “attribution 
decay” (so common especially in our copy-paste digital culture of reposts 
and “viral” memes), but rather, more broadly, to document and theorize 
patterns and trajectories of intertextual appropriation and amplification. 
How these patterns materialize and relate to each other will be illustrated 
in a sample case detailed below and over the course of this book.
Neither developing a more expansive critical vocabulary for adaptation 
studies based in digital and music practices, nor tracking the “subterran-
ean” diffusions of adaptation, means diluting or emptying the principle of 
adaptation. The notion of orders or degrees of adaptation, together with 
acknowledgements of attribution and its vicissitudes, represents a way 
to uphold and extend Hutcheon’s stipulation that adaptations be defined 
in relation to specific texts, in order for analysis to stay grounded in con-
crete historical and material contexts (2006, 21). Another means to keep 
the analysis grounded in concrete textual details and material contexts 
is to itemize some of the common, even cliché images, tropes, and plot 
points that mark specific texts as Frankensteinian, or specific textual ele-
ments or fragments as “Frankenphemes.” Common figures or characters 
among these adaptations would include “mad scientists” of all kinds; gro-
tesquely assembled, “patchwork,” or corporate subjects; and mechanical 
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or otherwise manufactured monsters—artificial intelligences, genetically 
engineered organisms, rebellious robots, cyborgs, clones, and other such 
technological doppelgängers. Common plot elements would be those that 
reproduce or vary the reduced “skeleton story” of the novel: stories of 
technological backfire; robots in revolt; resurrections gone awry; uncon-
trollable experiments; human-made catastrophes of technology, biology, or 
ecology; and the awakening to self-awareness of machines—an event that 
some thinkers, such as Ray Kurzweil (2005), expect as a real-world even-
tuality, which they call “the technological singularity.” Common images 
and tropes would include scenes of profane or at least ill-advised cre-
ation, of technological backfire, or artificially induced apocalypse; motifs 
of Faustian bargains for forbidden knowledge, of a creature overwhelming 
its creator; recursive reflections on the text’s own composition or facti-
city—especially acknowledgements of composition as collage, “mongrel,” 
or otherwise synthesizing or appropriative; and images or evocations of the 
technological sublime (Nye 1994), that is, representations of technological 
prowess that test or defy the limits of representation. In some cases the 
adoption of certain narrative or genre conventions may be worth consid-
ering: epistolary, Gothic, or science fiction modes; unreliable narration; or 
regressive framing devices, stories embedded within stories. References or 
allusions to Frankenstein or other adaptations are also significant textual 
elements of adaptation, even where used sparingly or in passing.
To be read together with these formal, textual criteria are a number of 
contextual criteria, aspects of the cultural and economic conditions of pro-
duction that inform or augment a given text’s adaptation strategies. Criteria 
like these include the following: production modes marked by ambivalence 
over technology, especially new media and automation; globally oriented 
or distributed scenes or conditions of production; forms that privilege spe-
cial effects above other production values; and postmodernist approaches 
that use and call attention to pastiche, or otherwise comment on their own 
production processes, especially with self-reflexive reference to media, 
technology, or globalization.
Moreover, bringing critical terms from music and communications 
disciplines to adaptation studies can orient the present study more firmly to 
the overarching cultural studies principle of articulation, a methodological 
principle of analyzing the “relationships of relationships” between popular 
culture and power structures, of probing “the ways in which everyday life 
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is articulated by and with the specific forms and formations, the material 
deployments and effects, of popular discursive practices” (Grossberg 1997, 
229). The term articulation also harbours a crucial double meaning for a 
study of Frankenstein: a meaning drawn from the technical language of 
anatomy, for which it describes the jointed connection of bones in a body.
A Sample of Refocused Adaptation: Frankenstein’s Organ 
Transplant
To put these terms to work, and to suggest the interpretive possibilities of 
nonextensive “Frankenpheme” adaptation, let’s consider a specific pattern 
of this kind of adaptation at work in postmodern Afro-Futurist music. This 
pattern, in brief, consists of combining Frankensteinian imagery with organ 
instrumentation in Afro-Futurist music making. As theorized by Kodwo 
Eshun (1998) and John Corbett (1994), among others, Afro-Futurism is 
a black diasporic music tradition of appropriating science fiction forms, 
and principles of technological experiment, in black diasporic cultural 
production: for example, we find science fiction tropes and experimental 
appropriations of technology in black Atlantic music from Sun Ra’s jazz 
to George Clinton’s P-Funk, from Lee Perry’s Black Ark studio to turntab-
lism and techno. But Afro-Futurism is also a theory—a critique of racist 
ontology, especially in the music industry (Corbett 1994), and a challenge 
to essentialist ideas of black identity, an avant-garde cultural practice of 
liberation, countermemory, and transfiguration (Gilroy 1993). For Corbett, 
the jazz band leader Sun Ra, the dub-reggae pioneer Lee “Scratch” Perry, 
and George Clinton of Parliament and Funkadelic fame are three exem-
plary Afro-Futurist artists who establish and embody the Afro-Futurist 
tradition in productions and performative personae that articulate a dis-
tinctively Frankensteinian “space madness”: these artists’ music articulates 
a science fiction aesthetic while their personae represent a marginal and 
self-consciously monstrous relationship to the mainstream music indus-
try. This “space madness” tradition has been revamped recently by Janelle 
Monáe, in albums like The ArchAndroid (2010) and The Electric Lady (2013) 
that reimagine the African American experience in the imagery of androids 
and artificial intelligence together with auction blocks and segregation.
In this context, a distinctive practice of combining Frankenstein refer-
ence and organ instrumentation in black diasporic music making emerges: 
we hear it in Byron Lee and the Dragonaires’ 1964 ska tune “Frankenstein 
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Ska”; in Parliament’s album The Clones of Dr. Funkenstein (1976); in Michael 
Jackson’s 1984 single “Thriller”; in Rockwell’s single “Somebody’s Watching 
Me” (1984); in Handsome Boy Modeling School’s “Once Again” (1999); and 
in the extended “Power” mix of Canadian rap artist Maestro Fresh-Wes’s 
single “Let Your Backbone Slide” (1989). So in six music productions 
by Afro-Futurist artists from four different decades and three different 
nations, we hear specific combinations of Frankensteinian imagery and 
organ instrumentation. This diasporic pattern of musical combinations 
prompts two questions that warrant preliminary consideration as a means 
to contextualize the subsequent, more detailed discussion of the afore-
mentioned Afro-Futurist music texts that follows: first, how has the organ 
become such a formulaic and familiar trope of musical metonymy for 
Frankenstein? And second, what might be the cultural functions of this 
metonymy for Afro-Futurist music?
To address the first question: Forry’s Hideous Progenies (1990) looks at 
performance adaptations of Frankenstein since Richard Brinsley Peake’s 
1823 play Presumption. In the process, he identifies a number of popular 
adaptation strategies established by that play, and later made ubiquitous 
by its successors: for example, the recasting of Shelley’s articulate and 
well-read creature as a mute, raging monster. Relevant for our purposes 
are two adaptation strategies in particular: the identification of Franken-
stein’s monster both with its creator and with the related Gothic icon of 
the vampire, and the trope of the monster’s reaction to music.
The identification of the monster with its maker results from the 
long-standing application of the latter’s name to the former, and so refer-
ences to the monster itself as “Frankenstein” persist in popular culture to 
this day. For instance, take this rap from Kool Keith, in his “Dr. Octagon” 
alter ego: “I’m strictly monster, with turtlenecks like Frankenstein” (1997). 
Developing the story’s doppelgänger theme in a different but related dir-
ection, stage and screen adaptations of Frankenstein have also consistently 
identified the unnatural monster with its supernatural counterpart, the 
vampire; this identification also derives from the famous primal scene 
of the novel’s inception at the Villa Diodati in 1816, when Shelley started 
her story while John Polidori composed “The Vampyre” (Forry 1990, 90). 
In early adaptations, the identification of man-made monster and vam-
pire took place in paired presentations of Frankenstein and vampire plays, 
and in literary works that referred to multiple monsters, in a way that 
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Hollywood has made formulaic and routine in “monster mash” films from 
Frankenstein Meets the Wolf Man (1943) to Van Helsing (2004). In early 
film adaptations, this identification assumed a more industrial than inter-
textual character: in Universal’s Frankenstein and Dracula franchises of 
the 1930s and 1940s, actors Boris Karloff and Bela Lugosi became virtually 
interchangeable by performing similar monster and mad doctor characters 
among different films. For the iconic 1931 Frankenstein film, Lugosi had 
been considered first for the monster’s role that Boris Karloff would make 
famous. Lugosi, who performed the figure of Dracula (in the 1931 film 
Dracula) as influentially as Karloff played the monster, appeared in Frank-
enstein sequels as Dr. Frankenstein’s assistant, Ygor, and in Frankenstein 
Meets the Wolf Man (1943) he played the Frankenstein monster. Similarly, 
Christopher Lee played the roles of Frankenstein’s monster and Dracula 
for the Hammer horror films produced in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s. 
To refer to this process of “iconic identification” and “conflation” between 
Frankenstein and Dracula, especially as dramatized in the careers of Kar-
loff and Lugosi, I’d like to suggest the portmanteau iconflation. I want to 
suggest this term because the processes of icon production, identification, 
and conflation that it links have significance not just for understanding 
the popular cultural history of Frankenstein but for understanding the 
function of organ music in this history. Iconflation becomes a significant 
component of the musical metonymy in question here.
The iconflation of Karloff’s creature and Lugosi’s vampire is reproduced 
in Universal’s franchise of Edgar Allan Poe adaptations, where it gets con-
nected to the trope of the monster’s reaction to music. Interestingly, the 
Universal Frankenstein and Dracula film soundtracks do not feature any 
organ music to develop its metonymic association with horror generally 
and Frankenstein specifically. Bride of Frankenstein includes a gospel-style 
organ arrangement in the scene where the monster meets the blind hermit, 
but it augments the hermit’s ability to soothe the monster’s proverbially 
savage breast with his own violin playing. While this scene of the sub-
limation of the creature’s rage by music was established by the earliest 
adaptations (Forry 1990, 22), it is the opposite of what I’m investigating: 
the use of organ music to amplify horror in general, and Frankensteinian 
monstrosity more specifically. As it happens, it’s in other period films that 
the metonymic association of organ music and Gothic horror emerges. In 
Universal’s screen versions of Edgar Allan Poe’s The Black Cat (1934) and 
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The Raven (1935), Karloff and Lugosi, respectively, play mad doctors who 
also play Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in D Minor on the organ. Paramount’s 
1931 film Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde also sits its mad doctor at the organ to 
play this number. The diegetic use of Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in films 
like these has contributed greatly to the popular cultural association of 
organ music with Gothic and horror narratives. There’s an earlier source 
for this association: Universal’s 1925 silent film The Phantom of the Opera. 
The scene in Phantom where the heroine unmasks Erik as he plays the 
organ was a sensation with audiences, and the film’s popularity suggested 
to Universal and other studios the potential market for Gothic and horror 
films, like The Black Cat (1934), The Walking Dead (1936), and Return of the 
Vampire (1943). Of course, it is ironic that this silent film contributes so sig-
nificantly to the metonymic link between organ music and Gothic horror.
Between these interwar film uses of organ music, especially Bach’s 
Toccata and Fugue, and the postwar Afro-Futurist uses of organ music in 
records that refer to Frankenstein, we find a proliferation of both horrific 
and humorous Frankenstein figures throughout American popular culture. 
Some possible sources for the metonymic link of organ music and horror 
must be noted simply to be ruled out: Bobby Pickett’s 1962 “Monster Mash” 
features piano, not organ; and the theme song of the 1964 Addams Family 
television show features not organ, but harpsichord for its distinctive 
melody. (Its competitor The Munsters featured a surf-rock theme.) But 
later covers of the “Monster Mash” sometimes substitute organ for piano, 
and organ music occasionally featured in the soundtracks and commer-
cials of the Addams Family and Munsters franchises. Warner Brothers, 
Hanna-Barbera, and other cartoon producers, as well as their Saturday 
morning advertisers like the General Mills line of monster-theme breakfast 
cereals, also entrench and exploit this implicit association between organ 
music and Frankensteinian monstrosity, which has become routine across 
the media of American pop culture. For one popular postwar film example: 
The Rocky Horror Picture Show (1975) includes a scene where Riff-Raff 
teases the creature Rocky by chasing him around with a lit candelabrum. 
Quoting a similar scene from the 1931 Frankenstein film, this scene in Rocky 
Horror accompanies its action with organ music, suggesting Rocky’s fear 
and Riff-Raff’s menace. For an Afro-Futurist film example: the opening 
and closing credits of the 1973 film Blackenstein prominently feature organ 
arrangements.
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This brings me to the second question, about the cultural function 
of this music metonymy for Afro-Futurism, and the aforementioned 
Afro-Futurist music productions that iconflate Frankenstein references 
together with organ instrumentation.
First, the pianist Thelonious Monk created a series of remarkable 
jazz-compositions built around his singularly angular phrasing, high-
lighted by unusual intervals, dissonance, and displaced notes. Amongst 
fellow jazz artists, Monk’s musical language was sometimes known as 
“zombie-music.” Pianist Mary Lou Williams explains: “Why ‘zombie 
music’? Because the screwy chords reminded us of music from Franken-
stein or any horror film” (quoted in McNally 2011, 262). As David McNally 
observes in his study of zombie and vampire images as responses to global 
capital, Monk’s “‘screwy chords’ express the rhythms of a world out of joint, 
a space of reification in which people are reduced to things”: “We hear not 
only the jarring sounds of things coming to life; more than this, we hear 
the rhythms of zombie-movement, the ferocious sounds of the dance of 
the living dead” (2011, 263). Echoing the critique of racialization, exploit-
ation, and reification contained in the Afro-Futurist music of Ra, Perry, 
and Clinton and the black diaspora theory of W. E. B. Dubois and Paul 
Gilroy, McNally acknowledges the widespread recognition “that the entire 
African-American experience is bathed in living death, in the ‘double con-
sciousness’ of being both person and thing. And Monk’s music captures 
this in the monstrously beautiful cadences of the banging, smashing, crash-
ing chords of an emerging African-American protest-music.” As McNally 
and music critics like Eshun have discussed, the avant-gardism, aliena-
tion effects, and oppositional character of Monk’s music—like that of Ra, 
Perry, and Clinton—have refracted and extended throughout contempor-
ary black diasporic music, “in genres as diverse as hip-hop and Afrobeat” 
(McNally 2011, 263–64). For just one example, Kool Keith’s “Wild and 
Crazy” (1997) uses a “zombie-music” piano chord as the downbeat, in a 
song that names Frankenstein (“Frankenstein’s still standing here”), a song 
whose chorus overlays the dissonant downbeat with Psycho-soundtrack 
high-pitched strings, as the singer croons, “The moon is out / Tonight it’s 
time for experiments.” Like Sun Ra before him and rap artists after, Monk 
adapted and repurposed a selection of popular cultural materials, espe-
cially Hollywood film materials, to construct a musical language that would 
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speak to a diasporic African American experience framed and haunted by 
the legacy of racialized, institutionalized slavery.
Byron Lee and the Dragonaires’ “Frankenstein Ska,” released in 1964, 
uses the organ to establish the “crooked beat” that is the signature of ska; 
in ska’s successor genre, reggae, the rhythm guitar assumes responsibility 
for keeping the crooked beat. In “Frankenstein Ska,” the rhythmic organ 
arrangement evokes the clumsy, clunking step of Boris Karloff’s hulking, 
heavy-booted creature. And in this arrangement, we also hear both echoes 
of Monk’s dissonant “zombie music” and a foreshadowing of what the 
UK band Madness, in the vocal introduction to their ska-revival cover of 
Prince Buster’s 1964 song “One Step Beyond” (1979), would call “the heavy 
heavy monster sound.” (Interestingly, with reference to Afro-Futurism’s 
playful, postmodern approach to black identity, it is worth noting that Lee 
is a Chinese diasporic artist who played an influential role in popularizing 
ska as a distinctively Jamaican, black diasporic sound.)
In The Clones of Dr. Funkenstein (1976), George Clinton and Parlia-
ment unfold a musically and referentially rich concept album, a space 
opera, imagining America’s black population as “the children of produc-
tion” in possession of ancient secret wisdom; whether intentionally or 
incidentally, the album resonates powerfully with other period produc-
tions like Sun Ra’s 1974 cult film Space Is the Place. The album opens with 
a spoken-word “Prelude,” in which a campy-spooky organ arrangement 
strikes up to lead in and accompany a monologue by George Clinton’s “Dr. 
Funkenstein” persona, who describes “the concept of specially-designed 
Afronauts, capable of funkatizing galaxies,” a concept awaiting to be 
materialized by someone who can “release them to multiply in the image 
of the chosen one: Dr. Funkenstein” (1976). Parliament’s Clones album in 
turn has given rise to further amplifications—tertiary adaptations?—by 
furnishing samples for electronic dance music, from Armand Van Hel-
den’s tribal house anthem “Witch Doktor” (1994) to Deadmau5’s 2006 
house track “Dr. Funkenstein.”
Another production that has given rise to a host of further amplifica-
tions and articulations—from samples in other songs to costumed and 
choreographed public dance performances—is Michael Jackson’s “Thriller” 
(1984), which makes emphatic use of organs, dramatic stabs of which give 
the song its unmistakable hook. And a resonantly Toccata and Fugue–
like organ arrangement arises late in the song, to accompany its climactic 
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monologue, a campy litany of monster movie references, delivered by 
Vincent Prince. (In this connection, it’s worth noting Price’s Dr. Phibes 
films from the early 1970s; in them, Price plays Phibes, a mad scientist 
character who seeks to avenge his wife’s death—and who also plays organ 
music.) In Price’s “Thriller” monologue, “creatures” that “crawl in search 
of blood” and “grisly ghouls from every tomb” mix with similar figures 
to make a mash-up of living-dead monster images, and, together with 
the organ arrangement, they clearly conjure the spectres of Frankenstein 
and Dracula, the Hollywood film adaptations of which have made them 
(alongside George Romero’s Living Dead franchise) the very stuff of “Thrill-
er’s” homage, and which, reciprocally, have furnished much of the image 
repertoire for the many subsequent homages to “Thriller” in recorded and 
performance media.
Jackson also played a pivotal role in producing another 1984 single, 
Rockwell’s “Somebody’s Watching Me,” on which Jackson provides backup 
vocals for the chorus. “Somebody’s Watching Me” features, throughout the 
track, organ instrumentation very reminiscent of Bach’s Toccata and Fugue, 
and more explicit links to Frankenstein arise in this song’s video, which 
includes a portrait of Mary Shelley and close-up flashes of a grotesque face 
strongly resembling that of Karloff’s iconic portrayal of the creature.
As campy, commercially successful, and still-popular singles, “Thriller” 
and “Somebody” contribute crucially to the musical metonymy being 
tracked here. Both “Thriller” and “Somebody” exploit organ music to 
amplify their Gothic modes; the Afro-Futurist element here lies more in 
musical arrangement than in lyrical content, as each track juxtaposes the 
modishly futuristic synthesizers and drum machines of early 1980s pop 
against the classical- and gospel-derived sounds of organ instrumentation.
The gospel context may suggest why the organ recurs in Afro-Futurist 
music adaptations of Frankenstein more than in other music adaptations. 
In Frankenstein-themed songs by rock artists, and more specifically white 
rock artists—for example, the Edgar Winter Group, Black Sabbath, the 
New York Dolls, White Zombie—electric guitar and synthesizer sounds 
rather than organs amplify the Frankenstein theme. In this intercultural 
context, the use of organs by Afro-Futurist artists appears ambivalent. 
On the one hand, the use of organs instead of guitars to signify Frank-
enstein themes in black diasporic music might be read to assert cultural 
difference as musical difference. On the other hand, if the use of organ 
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instrumentation and sampling by Afro-Futurist artists signifies on the 
organ’s place in sacred music by connecting it to the profane theme of 
Frankensteinian presumption, then it may be read as a critique of essen-
tialist ideas of black diasporic identity, or as a variant representation of 
African American double consciousness. The black diasporic cultural 
practice of what Julian Jonker calls “black secret technology”—that is, 
“taking white technology apart and not putting it back together properly” 
(2002, para. 32)—involves, as the work of Monk and Perry especially 
dramatizes, transgressing modes of conventional music making—and, in 
Perry’s case, music recording—as expressions of emancipation from not 
just slavery proper but also its haunting, revenant legacy. Such transgres-
sions have both defined black American music and installed this music 
as among the most popular and successful around the world: from the 
lore of Faustian bargaining that shrouds accounts of Robert Johnson’s 
development of the guitar blues; to Ray Charles’s adaptation of gospel 
structures and rhythms to nascent rock and roll; to Monk’s dissonant 
“zombie-music” be-bop; to the birth of hip hop in its now-legendary 
do-it-yourself culture of turntable innovations, boom-box pause-play 
tape mixes, graffiti art, and breakdancing.
Which brings us to the combination of Frankenstein reference and 
organ instrumentation—or in this case sampling—in rap music. “Let Your 
Backbone Slide” is a 1989 single by Maestro Fresh-Wes; it’s one of the 
most successful Canadian rap songs. Two specific details of this track, in 
lyric and instrumentation, are noteworthy here, in order to appreciate the 
adaptive practice of Maestro’s sampling and synecdoche in full effect. The 
instrumental arrangement of “Backbone” is organized around an organ 
riff sampled from the 1968 funk track “The Champ” by the Mohawks, a 
track widely sampled in rap for this riff and for its breakbeat rhythm. In 
this distinctive pairing of Frankenstein reference and organ arrangement, 
“Let Your Backbone Slide” reproduces the pattern tracked above from the 
Dragonaires to Michael Jackson.
The lyrical references to Frankenstein in “Let Your Backbone Slide” are 
extensive, albeit elliptical. In the last verse of the extended mix of the song, 
Maestro raps: “It’s gettin’ out of hand / I’ve created a monster.” This Frank-
enpheme figures Maestro’s self-proclaimed success—a common conceit 
in rap, and a pointedly bold claim for a debut single—as a Frankensteinian 
effect of unintended consequences.
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Refocusing Adaptation Studies 55
The lyric sampled here is sufficiently legible as a common enough 
Frankenpheme in everyday speech. However, it resonates with other lyrical 
details. There is the recurring imagery of the “spine”: in the refrain’s refer-
ence to “backbone,” the first verse’s mention of “vertebrae,” and the song’s 
justly celebrated rhyme about the “sacro-iliac,” or tailbone. But lines in the 
first verse further flaunt this “rap scholar’s” learned repertoire, most nota-
bly his likening of rap to “a slab of clay that’s shapeless” until “I mould it in 
my hands” (1989). Taken together with the lyrical details noted above, this 
verse’s self-reflexive rhyme about rap as creative practice alludes with artful 
economy to the same ancient myths adapted and referenced in Shelley’s 
own novel: the medieval Jewish legend of the golem; the biblical accounts 
of creation in Genesis and John’s gospel; the classical myths of Prometheus 
and Pygmalion.
“Backbone” thus assembles and reanimates a set of deeply embedded 
and “subterranean”—but identifiable—cultural elements and discourses; 
the track constitutes a second-order adaptation, in its rehearsal of a clichéd, 
vernacular Frankenpheme and its sampling of the Mohawks’ organ hook. 
It is significant that the Frankenpheme lyric only occurs on the 12” vinyl 
“power mix” and video, not on the shorter “radio edit” version—the lyric 
thus self-reflexively remarks on its own excess: “It’s gettin’ out of hand.” 
And the track’s sampling practice is itself integral to understanding this 
specific text’s representative articulation of the ready-made, bricolage aes-
thetic of “early hip hop,” for which, as music critic Simon Reynolds puts 
it, “sampling was like Frankenstein’s monster, funk-limbs crudely bolted 
together” (1998, 45). In turn, as a nationally bestselling and internationally 
popular single, “Backbone” gained further currency for this Franken-
steinian Afro-Futurist motif in the vocabulary and imagery of subsequent 
rap. In “Dr. Frankenstein” (1998), Ice Cube adopts the modern myth’s mon-
iker to describe himself as the creator of a genre, gangsta rap, that has run 
amok since he invented it. In the video for 50 Cent’s “In da Club” (Atwell 
2003), the establishing shots depict a top-secret R&D lab in a desolate 
desert locale: the “Shady/Aftermath Artist Development Center,” where we 
first see 50 Cent prone on a laboratory table, being assembled as a kind of 
android, while Dr. Dre and Eminem supervise, dressed in white coats. In 
a style much closer to the Maestro’s, and in a further reproduction of the 
distinctive Afro-Futurist pattern of coupling of Frankenstein allusion and 
organ arrangement, Handsome Boy Modeling School’s rap track “Once 
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Again (Here to Kick for You)” (1999) is structured around a pitched-down 
sample from Three Dog Night’s “Old Fashioned Love Song,” which adds a 
funereal organ sound prominently to the mix. And like other tracks sam-
pled above, “Once Again” features a verse that likens the rapper’s own work 
to the mad scientist’s: “One time as I sew it up like Doctor Frankenstein.”
As with the Michael Jackson and Rockwell tracks, so “Backbone” may 
not at first seem as definitely “Afro-Futurist” as the more self-consciously 
avant-garde work of Clinton, Perry, or Monk. The Afro-Futurist aesthetic 
emerges here as much in the song’s musical arrangements as it does in its 
lyrics, with their play on Pygmalion and Dr. Frankenstein figures. Maes-
tro’s track articulates something of the technology discourse that we find 
in other Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein, in its relatively fast tempo 
and its corresponding lyrical agility. For mainstream rap of the late 1980s, 
Maestro’s lyrics are unusually rapid-fire, more comparable to the style of 
Public Enemy’s Chuck D than to that of the Beastie Boys or NWA, and 
its tempo is, for rap, very fast (114 beats per minute), accompanied by an 
intensive collage of sampling and turntablist effects. The lyrical density of 
“Backbone” invites headphone concentration, while its detonative break-
beat, a modulation of James Brown’s “Funky Drummer,” invites dance-floor 
abandon. In the context of pop music in 1989, the percussive arrange-
ment of “Backbone” resonates as much with UK acid house as its acrobatic 
rhyming resonates with US east-coast rap. In this divided transnational 
perspective, then, “Let Your Backbone Slide” is maybe as quintessentially 
Canadian as pop music gets—it is a technological and transnational acous-
tic space oddity: Canadian hip house.
The track gains additional interest in its Canadian production con-
text. Maestro signifies on citizenship in his persona’s self-description as 
“un-American” (evoking national difference as well as the American allergy 
to “communism” that perennially positions Canada as some purportedly 
“socialist” threat). Maestro’s self-promotional boasting about success as a 
jet-setting rap star contrasts ironically with his other self-descriptions as 
hubristic artist and mad scientist; moreover, all these self-descriptions join 
a shape-shifting host of alter egos presented in the track—tactician, Colos-
sus, Tarzan, conductor, builder, playwright—as well as Wesley Williams’s 
rapper pseudonym as “the Maestro.” The MC’s boastful proliferation of 
personae signals the track’s skilful adoption of this staple convention of 
the rap genre. What’s more, in this black Canadian cultural production, 
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Maestro’s multiple roles signify ironically on official Canadian multicultur-
alism: the track’s voice is a virtual mosaic all to himself. It is not just “the 
beat,” in the words of the track’s introductory vocal sample, that “will be 
played in many parts,” but the performing persona itself, a satirical figure of 
the Canadian multicultural “mosaic” that is rendered ironic by the volume 
of Frankenphemes in the Maestro’s mix.
As demonstrated by Afro-Futurist music generally and the afore-
mentioned tracks specifically, especially Maestro’s “Backbone,” black 
diasporic music has amplified the metonymic associations—the “icon-
flations”—of zombie and vampire, organ instrumentation and horror 
intertextuality, such that the sound of organ instrumentation is itself 
almost sufficient to evoke the “modern myth” of Frankenstein in popu-
lar culture. We should also note here the multiple meanings of the word 
“organ”; although this may go without saying in any discussion of Franken-
stein, in popular music, and especially in Afro-Futurist music, the sound of 
the organ has thus become the sound of the body built of—which is to say, 
reduced to—organs, an inter-medial “iconflation” of sacred musicality and 
profane monstrosity, the monstrosity of bodily self-alienation, synecdoche 
as commodification and exploitation. The organ is the most uncannily 
named wind instrument, the windpipe that sings in an inhuman voice, but 
only when compelled to by human machinations.
Popular music can thus be seen to harbour an extraordinary wealth 
of adaptation practices—allusions, amplifications, articulations—that 
amply repay close critical attention. The case of Frankenstein’s iconflations 
in Afro-Futurist music demonstrates, in particular, the great repertoire 
of knowledge—cultural, historical, technological, and otherwise—that 
is so characteristically concentrated and then coded in black Atlantic 
music-making practices and networks. Eshun (1998) extensively docu-
ments the profoundly philosophical and sometimes explicitly theoretical 
work of black Atlantic music, and Angela McRobbie echoes work like his 
by plainly pointing out “just how much thinking there is in black music.” As 
she says, it “can hardly contain the investment of artistry, politics, history, 
and literary voice, so that as an aesthetic it is, by definition, spilling out 
and overflowing, excessive, a first destination for social commentary, dia-
logue, and rap that leaves those of us still caught in the prison of language 
far behind” (1999, 43–44). In the process, works like those discussed here 
contribute to processes of iconflation and other condensed or elliptical 
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forms of adaptation and intertextuality that, taken together, serve to keep 
certain texts—certain images and ideas, not only stories—in constant rota-
tion through the popular imagination, even as they remix their elements 
to the point of either total defamiliarization or virtual naturalization, or 
both. The perception and reception of an adaptation as such—whether 
narrative or lyrical, extensive or ephemeral—is a beauty very much in the 
ear of the beholder.
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3. Frankenstein and the 
Reinvention of “Technology”
The modern discourse of technology has a Romantic history: the connota-
tions, inflections, figurative uses, and ideological assumptions that accrete 
around the strictly denotative definition of the word and that supplement 
its usage and iterations, especially in colloquial speech, take shape as a 
specific cultural effect of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, first published 
in 1818 and then in a substantially revised edition in 1831. To contextualize 
how Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein have amplified and globalized a 
particular set of usages and connotations as the prevailing modern sense of 
technology in everyday language and discourse, this chapter explores how 
Shelley’s novel redefined—and, in the process, effectively reinvented—the 
word “technology” in its modern sense. To argue this, I will challenge 
two conventional premises about the relationship between Frankenstein 
and technology discourse. Understanding these premises means outlining 
the history of technology’s meanings, after which we will look closely at 
Frankenstein’s plot and details of form. Ultimately I contend that the novel, 
read together with a representative selection of period responses to it and 
related articulations of technology, indelibly marks the word’s modern 
reinvention with a set of connected tropes. Significantly, Frankenstein 
does not explicitly use the word technology (just as it does not name its 
antagonist); but through the creature’s characterization, the novel became 
a literary “threshold of epistemologization” (Foucault [1969] 1972, 187), a 
textual battery that charged the epistème of Romantic science and culture 
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to generate the modern discourse of technology. First arranged to charac-
terize the nameless nemesis who haunts Victor Frankenstein, these tropes 
soon coalesce around the nascent discourse of “technology” to name the 
social assemblage that defines—and haunts—modernity.
In the discursive history of technology and in the literature on the 
relationship between Frankenstein and technology, two premises persist 
as commonplaces, in sources as venerable as the Oxford English Dictionary 
and as recent as essays on technology by Scott McQuire and Andrew Ross, 
written in the cultural studies tradition of “keyword” reading, inaugurated 
by Raymond Williams (1983). In such sources, old and new, accounts of the 
provenance of technology suggest that it was in the late nineteenth century 
that, according to the OED Online (s.v., “technology”), the word attained its 
modern redefinition to mean, in general, tools and machines, techniques 
and systems for their use, or combinations thereof; or, as the OED puts it, 
“the mechanical arts and applied sciences collectively.” However, a close 
reading of Frankenstein, its allusive uses, and its more extensive adapta-
tions in the period suggests that this modern meaning emerged much 
earlier in the nineteenth century.
Which brings me to the second premise this work questions: that 
while Frankenstein is widely read as “the first and most enduring symbol 
of modern technology” (Tropp, quoted in Baldick 1987, 7), its relationship 
to the discourse of technology is constructed retrospectively, as though 
this definitively modern discourse emerged later, and independently of 
Frankenstein, in popular culture. If technology has popularized a certain 
interpretation of Frankenstein, it is because Frankenstein itself conditioned 
the modern redefinition of technology as such in the period of its publi-
cation, early reception, and popularization.
Technology: Defining and Accounting for a Modern Keyword
To get specific, then, about what is meant in this study by “the modern 
discourse of technology,” the OED provides a natural point of departure. 
The entry for the word technology includes five distinct definitions, the 
fourth of which encompasses three distinct variations, for a total of seven 
different definitions of the word:
1. A discourse or treatise on an art or arts; esp. (in later use) a treatise 
on a practical art or craft. . . .
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2. The terminology of a particular art or subject; technical language 
or nomenclature. . . .
3. The systematic treatment of grammar. . . .
4. a. The branch of knowledge dealing with the mechanical arts and 
applied sciences; the study of this. . . .
4. b. The application of such knowledge for practical purposes, esp. in 
industry, manufacturing, etc.; the sphere of activity concerned with 
this; the mechanical arts and applied sciences collectively. . . .
4. c. The product of such application; technological knowledge or 
know-how; a technological process, method, or technique. Also: 
machinery, equipment, etc., developed from the practical application 
of scientific and technical knowledge; an example of this. Also in 
extended use. . . .
5. A particular practical or industrial art; a branch of the mechanical 
arts or applied sciences; a technological discipline.
The first three of these definitions are obsolete. They represent the premod-
ern meanings of the word derived from antiquity, occurring between the 
early seventeenth century and the mid-nineteenth, by which time the word 
was assuming its modern meanings—the fourth and fifth ones here. The 
earlier, “eighteenth-century use of the word ‘technology’ placed the empha-
sis on ‘art’” (Wright 2005, para. 3), and it is important to note that “art” and 
“the arts” were somewhat more inclusively defined in eighteenth-century 
and earlier usage and encompassed engineering and agricultural practices. 
The fourth, tripartite definition (4a, 4b, and 4c) begins to emerge in the 
late eighteenth century, initially as a redefined usage that was imported 
from German. As E. A. W. von Zimmerman wrote—in English—in 1787, 
“A new branch of scientific knowledge, viz. technology, or the theory and 
accurate description of useful arts and manufactures, was much cultivated 
in Germany” (1787, iii). Johann Beckmann (1739–1811) was likely one of the 
German professors to whom von Zimmerman alludes, and his account 
shows that it is an erroneous oversimplification to suggest, as Kelly does, 
that Beckmann, in his Guide to Technology (Anleitung zur Technologie), 
was merely “resurrecting that forgotten Greek word” to give “a name to 
what we do” (2011, 8). In the first place, the word had not been forgotten, as 
documented by the first three OED meanings; in the second, the emergent 
German usage of technology emphasized the “-logy,” or study—it intro-
duced the fourth meaning listed above, the study of mechanical arts. Kelly’s 
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use of technology “to mean a specific technology, such as radar,” that is, 
something that “can be patented” (2011, 12)—a meaning he misattributes 
to Beckmann—illustrates not the fourth but the next to last meaning on 
the OED’s list: “a technological process” or simply “machinery, equipment.”
It might seem like semantic hairsplitting, but what is significant here 
is that technology’s “machinery” meaning (4c) has become the dominant 
meaning of technology in colloquial speech, policy, and business, where it 
is often conjoined or conflated with the word’s “collective” meaning (4b), 
as in a conventional phrase like “invest in technology.” The OED’s earliest 
citation of the “collective activity” definition (4b) is Jacob Bigelow’s 1829 
book Elements of Technology (on which more later in this chapter), and the 
dictionary’s earliest citations for the “product” meaning (4c) do not occur 
until the 1890s. On this account, technology’s meaning has shifted from 
the study of arts, to the systematic application of production techniques, to 
the products used in and resulting from such application. What concerns 
us is not the coinage of technology but its modern reinvention. The chal-
lenge for historicizing technology, today, results from its ubiquity—and 
consequent slipperiness.
Cultural studies “keywords” essays have tended to reproduce the OED’s 
historical account of technology’s provenance and modernization, which 
dates the emergence of the word’s “machinery” meaning to the later nine-
teenth century. “It was mainly in mC19 [the mid-nineteenth century] that 
technology became fully specialized to the ‘practical arts,’” writes Williams; 
this specialization—that is, definition 4b—paired with “the newly special-
ized sense of science” to “open the way to a familiar modern distinction 
between knowledge (science) and its practical application (technology)”—
that is, definition 4c (1983, 315), which Williams implies in this phrase 
emerged sometime after midcentury. Williams, too, points out the vague-
ness of the modern word’s meaning, observing that “technical—matters of 
practical construction—and technological—[are] often used in the same 
sense, but with the residual sense (in logy) of systematic treatment” (316). In 
the 2005 adaptation of Williams, New Keywords, Andrew Ross contextual-
izes the word’s modernization as a reflection of “the rise of industrialization” 
and echoes the OED’s account: “By the lC19 [late nineteenth-century] 
. . . technology was increasingly used to refer to machinery itself” (2005, 
342–43). Ross follows this account by discussing Marx’s perspective of 
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“technology as a weapon of class war” (2005, 343); however, he fails to men-
tion that Marx—like Shelley—did not use the word technology itself.
Scott McQuire does point this out, in a more recent “keyword” article, 
which surveys the “major shifts in thinking about technology” in modernity 
(2006, 253). He echoes the OED in identifying “the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury” as the period when “the meaning of ‘technology’ . . . narrowed to the 
‘practical arts’” and cites Marx’s reference to the bourgeois creation of “col-
ossal productive forces” as evidence of the centrality of technology to Marx’s 
historical materialism (255). McQuire reads in Marx’s work a “relatively 
neutral” idea of technology that establishes the technological instrumen-
talism that dominated technology discourse until World War II, when three 
new paradigms emerged: first, a cybernetic paradigm that followed Norb-
ert Weiner and pointed to the now-hegemonic technological imperative; 
second, a critical paradigm of technological determinism, in which tech-
nology is reified domination, represented by thinkers like Heidegger, Ellul, 
McLuhan, and Paul Virilio, who equates technology with catastrophe; and, 
third, a social constructivist line of thinking about technology represented 
by thinkers like Walter Benjamin and Donna Haraway (259–60).
McQuire’s reading of Marx’s “relatively neutral” conception of tech-
nology argues that it carries a telling, unresolved ambiguity. He attributes 
instrumentalist thinking to Marx’s general division of productive forces 
from the relations of production, but he also suggests that Marx’s ambi-
guity over “colossal productive forces” supplements instrumentalism, 
shading it with deterministic overtones. On one hand, Marx posits a kind 
of “mechanical materialism” that attributes social changes to “new pro-
ductive forces.” But, on the other, Marx’s later theory of the commodity 
fetish detaches these forces from their social control; McQuire explains 
that, for Marx, “capital instruments” are “external to human effort, and 
therefore outside social control,” giving them “an enigmatic appearance of 
autonomy”—a life of their own, as it were (2006, 256). In these respects, 
Marx anticipates one line of McLuhan’s thinking; in the first chapter of the 
Grundrisse ([1857] 1973), Marx makes observations about the technological 
basis (and bias) of specific cultural forms: “Is Achilles possible with powder 
and lead?” he asks. “Or the Iliad with the printing press, not to mention 
the printing machine?” ([1857] 1983). While McQuire looks forward from 
Marx’s ideas on machine production to their influence on future thinkers, 
a look back from these ideas to their cultural sources soon illuminates 
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the gruesome lineaments of a familiar factitious figure that accounts for 
their ambiguity. Baldick (1987, 130) features Marx prominently among the 
nineteenth-century writers who adapted Frankenstein for representations 
of capital and class, as in Marx’s above-quoted image of capital as “dead 
labour” preying vampirically on the living ([1867] 1976, 342).
These keyword essays’ surveys of the transformations of technology 
discourse since the mid- and late nineteenth century thus help us to focus 
further on the foundations of this discourse in the early nineteenth cen-
tury—in which it takes shape as a Frankenpheme unto itself. Frankenstein 
has been conventionally retrofitted into this discursive history. Echoing 
William Hazlitt’s statement on the Romantic period, Darin Barney calls 
Frankenstein an allegory of “the technological spirit of the modern age” 
(2000, 6). Laura Kranzler writes that Frankenstein seems almost uncannily 
to anticipate “the technological innovations of the twentieth century”; 
she suggests, more specifically, that “the problematics of technological 
development and application are initially codified in Shelley’s work” (1988, 
42, 43). This suggestion is worth taking at its word, and worth reading for 
the historical evidence between its lines. To make this case, we’ll turn first 
to the novel itself, to see how the text works to reinvent technology—not 
avant la lettre, technically, but in the very moment of the word’s English 
reanimation.
“The instrument of future mischief”
I want to suggest that Frankenstein exerts its own interpretive control 
over technology as a term whose meaning changed not after but during 
the novel’s period. A look at the text, and period responses to it, shows 
how technology began circulating in its modern sense as a Frankenpheme. 
Looking first at the novel, we find a series of tropes that show how the 
language of the text—together with its plot of uncontrolled research and 
monstrous result—conditions the modern discourse of technology. These 
tropes are utility, supplementarity, contagion, shock, and revolution.
Utility: The rhetoric of utility permeates the text, and Victor Frank-
enstein, like his interlocutor Walton, sometimes sounds like a parody of 
Jeremy Bentham. Frankenstein engages with Bentham and his philosophy of 
Utilitarianism perhaps most clearly in its exploitation of the then-dubious 
reputation of medical doctors, who traded with grave-robbers to obtain 
cadavers. Meanwhile, Bentham worked during the period to legitimize 
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dissection—with legislation, and, ultimately, with the donation of his own 
body as a display specimen for University College, to promote the “further 
uses of the dead to the living” (quoted in Morton 2002, 86). Bentham still 
enjoys a vaguely ghoulish afterlife of his own as the infamous “auto-icon,” 
part taxidermy and part wax figure, at rest in a glass case on the Univer-
sity College grounds. In the novel, Shelley plays on public fears about 
Victor Frankenstein’s real-life counterparts by narrating how he supplies 
his “workshop of filthy creation” with “bones from charnel-houses” and 
“materials” from “the dissecting room and the slaughter-house” ([1831] 
2000, 58–59). Like Bentham, Victor pursues his research with utilitarian 
idealism, buoyed by “visions of extensive usefulness” (46) and thoughts of 
“the improvement which every day takes place in science and mechanics” 
(58). But the story renders these visions ultimately ironic. Victor advises 
Walton against his Arctic project, with ambivalent references to use and 
utility. He initially doubts whether “the relation of my disasters will be 
useful to you” (39). Toward the story’s end, he reflects that “I deemed it 
criminal to throw away in useless grief those talents that might be useful to 
my fellow-creatures”; approaching death, he strangely rationalizes his fatal 
pursuit of the monster by musing that “if I were engaged in any high under-
taking or design, fraught with extensive utility to my fellow-creatures, then 
could I live to fulfil it” (180–81). Walton, for his part, first foreshadows 
Victor’s “visions of usefulness,” by imagining “the inestimable benefit which 
I shall confer on all mankind” (28), and finally echoes Victor’s failure, as he 
abandons his own “hopes of utility and glory” (183).
Supplementarity: As these passages show, Shelley applies something 
like Bentham’s “greatest happiness principle” to the trope of Utility. Walton 
and Victor both envision the “extension” of the “utility” of their projects 
for all humankind. This universalization of “extensive utility” establishes 
important spatial and relational conditions for the modern discourse of 
technology: spatial in its globalized scope, which Canadian adaptations 
of the text will more fully realize; and relational in its difference from and 
identification with humankind. The modern discourse of technology is 
nothing if not a discourse of uncanny and unstable difference from and 
opposition to the ontological category of the human. As McQuire writes, 
“in every historical iteration . . . defining the technological not only acti-
vates the border between nature and culture, but goes to the heart of what 
it means to be human” (2006, 255).
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For a historical example of such defining of the technological, Benjamin 
Franklin defined the human as a “tool-making animal” (quoted in Weber 
[1910] 2005, 33), thus connoting technology’s status as the interdepend-
ent Other of humanity. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas defines technology as 
a “‘project’ of the human species as a whole” (1970, 87), thus totalizing the 
categories of technology and the human as a binary pair in which the former 
term is subordinated to the latter. For a more contemporary example, a 
recent Globe & Mail review of two books (on genetics and digital media, 
respectively) leads with the claim that “modern technology is not only 
changing our day-to-day existence but what it means to be human” and ends 
with the suggestion that “technology is who we are” (Alang 2017, R12). This 
simultaneous opposition and intimacy between technology and humanity 
also informs McLuhan’s famous definition of technologies as “extensions 
of man” ([1964] 2003), extensions that sometimes act as prosthetics—and 
other times as replacements. “What really makes the novel . . . disturbing,” 
writes Morton, “is not the creature’s difference from, but his similarity 
to human beings” (2002, 46). Frankenstein’s creature—both human and 
“superhuman” (Shelley [1831] 2000, 92), at once dead and alive—becomes a 
prototypical figure of the modern discourse of technology.
As the creature becomes a dangerous supplement and categorical con-
trast to humanity, so technology becomes a dangerous but vital supplement 
to modern capitalism: the extension and replacement of human labour 
power. Mark Seltzer’s reading of the modern “body-machine complex” 
theorizes this supplementary character of technology, defining it as both 
“an emptying out of human agency” and its “extension.” In this “double 
logic of technology as prosthesis” (1993, 99) emerges the poststructuralist 
problematic of the supplement (Derrida 1976, 145), with its epistemologic-
ally unstable ability to both add (“extend”) and replace (“empty out”).
Contagion: Shelley’s images of contagion relate to those of revolution 
(see below)—small wonder, given the political climate of conservative fear 
under which Shelley’s England looked apprehensively, across the channel 
and among its own people, for signs of the spread of revolutionary feeling 
and foment. Some of this political apprehension over the infectiousness 
of revolutionary sympathies finds an allegorical figure in Victor Frank-
enstein’s reflection on what might take place should he finish making the 
mate demanded by his creature. The passage establishes a primal scene 
for the modern discourse of technology—and that of technological risk 
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assessment. The scene illustrates the tropes of revolution, contagion, and 
nonhuman supplementarity; it also inverts the rationale of utility, repre-
senting Victor’s vision here as the antithesis of the Utilitarian ethos.
Even if they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new 
world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies for which the 
dæmon thirsted would be children, and a race of devils would be 
propagated upon the earth, who might make the very existence of the 
species of man a condition precarious and full of terror. Had I a right, 
for my own benefit, to inflict this curse upon everlasting generations? 
. . . I shuddered to think that future ages might curse me as their pest, 
whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price, 
perhaps, of the existence of the whole human race. ([1831] 2000, 145)
In addition to dramatically mobilizing the tropes discussed thus far, this 
scene, like the novel’s globe-traversing plot more generally, points to 
the global context in which Canadian Frankensteins will subsequently, 
and decisively, position the Frankenpheme of technology in the popular 
imaginary. Victor’s projected “race of devils” prefigures the way technol-
ogy in general and certain technologies in particular are represented today: 
antibacterial products, fossil fuels, genetically modified organisms, nuclear 
weapons, the Internet. The passage also suggests more than one vector 
of contagion: Victor imagines his creations engendering pestilence; he 
also imagines himself the “pest” of a postapocalyptic posterity. Shelley 
developed this image in the protagonist of her next novel, The Last Man 
([1826] 1996): the story of a world wasted by plague, told by its lone survivor.
Frankenstein is further riddled with disease, beyond this scene. Victor 
shows up in the Arctic in a feverish condition. Scarlet fever ravages his 
family early in the novel ([1831] 2000, 49), foreshadowing how the creature 
will plague him and his family. Victor develops a habit of falling ill (or 
asleep) at highly inopportune moments: right before and after he com-
pletes and awakens the creature; while detained in Ireland; and after he 
finishes telling his tale to Walton, dying bedridden just before the crea-
ture catches up with him. This late scene formally augments the creature’s 
characterization as contagion: like Walton, the reader is shocked finally to 
meet the creature that has escaped its confinement in a third-hand narra-
tive nested within Victor’s account. The creature’s transgressive mobility 
between the nested story frames, from third-hand account to first-hand 
encounter, increases the suspense of the story by imparting an unsettling 
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semblance of immediacy not unlike a spreading infection: if the ship is no 
longer safe harbour from the murderous creature, is the reader?
Shock: Shock provides the frame of affective reference that unites 
the preceding four tropes. Shock describes both an extremity of feeling 
and its nullification: as a verb it describes a surprise blow; as a noun, the 
“emptying-out of human agency” that responds to such a blow. Franken-
stein also dramatizes the electrifying sense of shock that is significant both 
for subsequent adaptations, and for modernizing the meaning and conno-
tations of technology. While Victor’s reference to “the spark of being” that 
animated his creation is famously ambiguous, the science of galvanism is 
an equally famous context for the novel, and electricity is mentioned in 
other scenes that inform both the method and affect of the monster’s cre-
ation. An early, foreshadowing anecdote from Victor’s childhood describes 
“the shock” of lightning that “utterly destroyed” an oak tree, and frames 
Victor’s account of learning about “that power”—“electricity and galvan-
ism”—which precipitates his own intellectual revolution, the “overthrow” 
of Agrippa and the alchemists ([1831] 2000, 48).
Frankenstein popularizes the electrical valence of shock, and dramatizes 
shock’s affective charge, sometimes conflating the word’s technological 
sense and human sensibility. Amidst “remorse and guilt,” Victor reflects 
that his health “had perhaps never recovered from the first shock it had 
sustained” ([1831] 2000, 86)—that “first shock” denoting both his research 
result and his reaction to it. After Clerval’s death, he asks himself rhetor-
ically (and with an ironic sense of his own factitious character): “Of what 
materials was I made that I could thus resist so many shocks?” (153).
If the creature’s supplementarity prefigures that of technology, shock 
represents the special affect of technology as supplement. The overthrow 
of the human by its supplement stages a shocking encounter between 
a tragic man of feeling, as its apogee, and utilitarian instrumentality, as 
the absence of affect. As Kranzler remarks, the reason the monster is an 
“apt metaphor” for “the technological future” is its “divorce from affective 
responsibility” (1988, 42–43). In countless adaptations since, affect—feel-
ing—has become the characteristic, defining difference between human 
and machine: recall Blade Runner’s Voigt-Kampff test, which screens for 
empathy to detect which subjects are nonhuman “replicants”; or Battlestar 
Galactica, in which the human characters insistently, repeatedly denigrate 
the Cylon antagonists as “toasters.”
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Revolution: The instability and danger of the creature figure the trope 
of revolution with which Mary Shelley supplies another modern discur-
sive condition for technology. As has been widely researched, the conflict 
between Victor and the creature stages a drama of revolution that responds 
to the French Revolution (Douthwaite 2009, 384)—and to the Luddite 
revolts (O’Flinn 1986). In his early studies, Victor works through “the over-
throw” of “the lords of my imagination” ([1831] 2000, 48). Recollecting 
when he first “beheld the accomplishment of my toils” (60)—and seeing in 
it only “catastrophe”—Victor describes the abrupt reversal of his feelings: 
“dreams that had been my food and pleasant rest for so long a space were 
now become a hell to me; and the change was so rapid, the overthrow so 
complete!” (61). While imprisoned in Ireland, he “often sat for hours . . . 
wishing for some mighty revolution” that would destroy both him and his 
creation (157).
As Fred Randel argues, “the creature’s trajectory from birth in Ingol-
stadt to death by fire, amidst Northern ice, is a figure for the history of 
the French Revolution” (2003, 469). These images of revolution speak to 
the spirit of Shelley’s age. But they also encode the motion of drastic and 
disruptive social change that has become integral to representations of 
technology: from Marx’s “faith in the revolutionary potential of technol-
ogy” (Ross 2005, 343), to McLuhan’s theories that new media replace or 
consume old media and that electric media produce social upheaval—on 
a global scale. Frankenstein looms large in these representations of “the 
machine that passes from stubbornness to rebellion” (Tenner 1996, 3)—and 
such representations have their critics and skeptics, too. With reference 
to Thomas Carlyle’s 1829 essay “Signs of the Times,” Baldick deconstructs 
the latent fetishism of technology as risk and as revolution: “The techno-
logical interpretation of the myth resembles many influential diagnoses 
of ‘the machine age’ in that its isolation of the machine as the root evil of 
modern civilisation merely reinforces the very fetishism of mechanical 
power which it sets out to deplore” (1987, 8). Shelley articulates a profound 
ambivalence about political revolution both in her fiction and between its 
editions: whether Shelley seems more sympathetic or antipathetic to the 
French Revolution can depend on reading textual variants between the 1818 
and 1831 editions (Randel 2003, 471). This ambivalence, in turn, conditions 
the ambivalence of the revolutionary rhetoric that has become commonly 
attached to technology by instrumentalists and determinists alike, and thus 
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it also conditions the ambivalence at the core of the common-sense, instru-
mentalist meaning of technology itself (as discussed above). In the next 
chapter, we will take up the representations of “revolutionary technology” 
at greater length: McLuhan’s oscillation between Luddite conservatism 
and techno-fetishism exemplifies and further popularizes the perception 
of technology as revolution.
The connected tropes of utility, supplementarity, contagion, shock, 
and revolution converge significantly in the repeated claim, made first 
by the dying Victor ([1831] 2000, 185) and then by his creature, that the 
latter is an “instrument of future mischief” (188), anticipating the popular 
sense of technology as an instrument of “future shock,” the phrase from 
Toffler that we discussed in the introduction. While Frankenstein leaves 
technology, like its antagonist, unnamed, it supplies a primal scene for 
redefining the object and affect of technology—not after midcentury, but 
as early as the 1820s.
Elements of Technology: Frankenphemes in the Early Nineteenth 
Century
The relays, relations, and resonances uncovered among different textual 
productions in pursuing the palimpsestic, intertextual distribution of such 
a diversely received and widely popular text like Frankenstein partake 
far less of unilateral lines of influence from source to derivation and far 
more of multilateral networks of “subterranean and invisible diffusion” 
(Baldick 1987, 9). As Julia Douthwaite writes of discovering a 1790 French 
novella featuring an automaton maker named Frankenstein—for which 
case, more so than mine, we might expect to learn of a clear line of direct 
influence—the measured approach for pursuing such questions of cultural 
intertextuality “is not to argue for a causal relation, but to show the surpris-
ing resemblance” (2009, 381–82). A methodology of juxtaposition can seize 
on an image of the past in a way that productively illuminates a present 
crisis, excavating the present’s embedded signification as a contingency of 
the past that is so seized upon; such is the method of history influentially 
theorized by Walter Benjamin—his “dialectics at a standstill”—and it is 
useful to bear in mind here.
For suggestive evidence of Frankenstein’s reinvention of technology dis-
course in Shelley’s own time, then, we find Frankenphemes of “technology” 
among the cursory and extensive references to Frankenstein that traversed 
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the lettered cultures of the Atlantic in the early nineteenth century. We 
also find Frankenphemes of technology being dramatized and reified in 
the diverse and hugely popular performance scenes that surrounded and 
adapted Shelley’s novel and its constellation of current scientific and philo-
sophical ideas. While an established English wariness about technology 
appears in this period to contrast an emerging American enthusiasm for 
it (Nye 1994, 54)—Blake’s “dark Satanic mills” versus Whitman’s “body 
electric”—Frankenphemes of technology and industrialization appear in 
the work of major writers on both sides of the Atlantic. In the old world, 
we find them in Carlyle, Dickens (Baldick 1987, 98, 119), and Jane Webb 
Loudon, as well as in Marx; and, in the new world, in Emerson, Hawthorne 
(Baldick 1987, 63), and Poe—among numerous others on either shore. In 
this transatlantic context, three representative articulations of the modern 
discourse technology, in the 1820s and 1830s, point to its Frankensteinian 
conditioning, as evoked and evinced in the writings of aspiring auto-icon 
Bentham, Harvard professor Jacob Bigelow, and steam power advocate 
Thomas Love Peacock.
One of the OED’s quotations for technology’s archaic meaning is taken 
from book 1 (“Theoretic Grounds”) of Bentham’s 1827 Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence. In the first chapter, “On Evidence in General,” Bentham writes:
If all practice, much more must those comparatively narrow branches 
of it, which are comprehended under any such names as those of art 
and science, be grounded upon evidence.
Questions in natural philosophy, questions in natural history, 
questions in technology in all its branches, questions in medicine, 
are all questions of evidence. When we use the words observation, 
experience, and experiment, what we mean is, facts observed, or 
supposed to be observed, by ourselves or others, either as they arise 
spontaneously, or after the bodies in question have been put, for the 
purpose, into a certain situation. (1827, 19)
While the OED cites this passage to illustrate technology’s premodern 
meaning as a study of arts or techniques, the text can also be read to sig-
nify technology in its emerging modern sense. The term is related to but 
distinguished from “science,” according to the modern distinction between 
science and technology as theory and practice. Note too the doubling 
rhetoric applied to technology between these two quoted paragraphs: as 
a “narrow branch” of knowledge itself, technology assumes its modern 
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specialized relation to science; and as a set of “questions” with its own 
“branches,” technology engages both its archaic sense as study (“ques-
tions”) and its modern sense as application (“branches”). Moreover, the 
wording of the passage delivers a weirdly galvanic charge to Bentham’s 
description of scientific method as the observation of “facts” that “arise 
spontaneously,” and of “bodies” (albeit rhetorical bodies) that “have been 
put in a certain situation.”
In Bentham’s case, however, what is at least as significant as how the 
word is used is who is using it. The fact that it is Bentham invoking the word 
does much to suggest the Frankensteinian gloom gathering about the word. 
After all, Bentham himself donated his own body to science, embracing 
and embodying a peculiarly Frankensteinian afterlife as a macabre relic 
still on display at University College London, where a cabinet houses his 
preserved skeleton topped by a wax replica of his head. Bentham is also a 
thinker whom Hazlitt accuses of “reducing the mind of man to a machine” 
([1825] 2000, 266), of being “one of those who prefer the artificial to the 
natural” (277), and of working in a manner akin to Frankenstein’s brico-
lage: “Mr Bentham’s forte is arrangement. . . . He has methodized, collated, 
and condensed all the materials prepared to his hand on the subjects of 
which he treats, in a masterly and scientific manner.” Hazlitt also cites an 
extraordinary example of Bentham’s curiously science fictional hubris: “He 
has been heard to say . . . that ‘he should like to live the remaining years 
of his life, a year at a time at the end of the next six or eight centuries, to 
see the effect which his writings would by that time have had upon the 
world’” (267–68).
Hazlitt’s portrait of Bentham—which stresses his “theories,” his “logical 
machinery,” and his “technicality of manner” ([1825] 2000, 267, 276)—typi-
fies the well-entrenched English hostility to “theory” by characterizing 
Bentham as its very incarnation. Bentham’s use of a word like technology 
is consistent with a learned style that trades in abstraction and system, a 
style that Hazlitt duly criticizes as “barbarous philosophical jargon” (276). 
At an abstract contextual level, the English aversion to abstraction ren-
ders both Bentham and the theoretical German word Technologie equally 
suspect on the grounds of theory as such. It is on similar grounds that Shel-
ley’s fictional adaptation of ideas by “physiological writers of Germany” 
([1818] 2012, 49) renders her novel suspect in the view of conservative 
reviewers. Bentham, technology, and Frankenstein were all regarded with 
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suspicion for their traffic in theory, by the lights of England’s Romantic and 
gender-coded nationalism, which as David Simpson argues, “contributed 
mightily to the demonization of theory” as a defining component of “Engl-
ishness in general”: “The English are not supposed to practice its rites, but 
those who do had better be men. . . . Theory thus becomes the province of 
alienated male rationalists like Victor Frankenstein” (1993, 123).
Across the pond, Frankenphemes of technology can also be found in 
this period, amidst a national culture usually characterized more as techn-
ophilic than technophobic. In 1831, when Shelley published her revised 
Frankenstein, Harvard professor Jacob Bigelow published his revised edi-
tion of Elements of Technology (it had first been published around 1828 or 
1829). The OED cites this book as an illustrative early use of technology’s 
modern meaning as “the mechanical arts and applied sciences collectively” 
(4b). Bigelow’s book collected a decade’s worth of lectures “on the appli-
cation of the sciences to the useful arts.” In his prefatory “Advertisement” 
to the volume, Bigelow staked his book’s utility on assembling “scattered” 
elements into a new, distinctly modern research “subject,” one “peculiarly 
capable of exciting the attention and curiosity of students.” He continues:
The importance of the subject, and the prevailing interest, which 
exist in regard to the arts and their practical influences, appear to 
me to have created a want, not yet provided for, in our courses of 
elementary education. . . . To embody, as far as possible, the various 
topics which belong to such an undertaking, I have adopted the 
general name of Technology, a word sufficiently expressive, which 
is found in some of the older dictionaries, and is beginning to be 
revived in the literature of practical men at the present day. (1831, iv, 
emphases added)
Bigelow’s self-conscious redefinition of technology shows the word 
starting to accumulate its Frankensteinian associations. Note the strik-
ing rhetoric of reanimation in Bigelow’s text: he “revives” Technology to 
“embody” an “undertaking” of applied science. He strays from the plot of 
Frankenstein in “adopting” (rather than abandoning) this “embodiment,” 
but the wording still retains the paternal relation. Whether intended or 
not, the Frankenpheme of Bigelow’s definition suggests the pervasive but 
“subterranean” distribution of Shelley’s story and its effect on technol-
ogy’s modern “revival.” Elsewhere in Bigelow’s book, David Nye finds 
statements supporting Bigelow’s claim on importing from the German a 
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new meaning in English for technology, such as Bigelow’s assertion that 
the “labour of a hundred artificers is now performed by the operations 
of a single machine” (quoted in Nye 1994, 45)—an image of technology 
on the “colossal” scale of which Marx will later take note, and an image 
that, like the rhetoric of resurrection, invests technology with its uncanny 
sublimity, its Frankensteinian subtext.
Closer to home, Peacock—a friend of Shelley and an acquaintance 
of Bentham—uses the word technology as a Frankenpheme in two of 
his satirical fictions. In Nightmare Abbey, published after Frankenstein 
in 1818, Peacock satirizes the popular taste for Gothic and fantastic 
literature. Scythrop Glowry, a parody of Percy Shelley, also assumes a 
Frankensteinian aspect: he isolates himself in his study to read the “mys-
tical jargon and necromantic imagery” of transcendental philosophy (as 
well as Goethe’s Werther), then begins to plot “his projected regeneration 
of the human species” ([1818] 2007, 57). He goes so far as to “meditate 
on the practicability of reviving a confederation of regenerators,” but 
whether the ensuing “treatise” he publishes is a recipe for said revival or 
its realization remains obscure—as does the publication itself, for being 
“wrapt up in the monk’s hood of transcendental technology, but filled 
with hints of matter deep and dangerous” (58). Here, Peacock’s usage 
connotes at once the eighteenth-century association of technology with 
art and abstraction, and its nineteenth-century “revival” in industry and 
application, shadowed portentously by the “deep and dangerous” menace 
of “national ferment.” In 1831’s Crotchet Castle, Peacock uses the term as 
a wry synonym for political economy, which one character calls “a hyper-
barbarous technology” ([1831] 1947, 110). Here, Peacock’s usage evokes 
more clearly the modern sense of technology and its attendant danger, 
attached to an ironic trope of “barbarity” to connote both brutal violence 
and antimodern atavism. In both these novels, Peacock invokes technol-
ogy to articulate modernity and menace, applied arts and anxiety. And 
like Bentham, Peacock had a similarly technophilic public reputation that 
amplifies his textual representations of technology; in his case, as a vocal 
advocate of steam-powered transport.
The examples of Bentham, Bigelow, and Peacock—writers and thinkers 
of some stature in the early nineteenth century—show the special affect 
of modernized technology discourse in the period, as a nascent industrial 
keyword infiltrated and influenced by Shelley’s novel.
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Frankenstein and the Reinvention of “Technology” 75
Staging Technology Through Special Effects in Georgian “Monster 
Melodramas”
We also find Frankenstein’s “threshold of epistemologization” for technol-
ogy being more widely established in the incredibly diverse performance 
culture that surrounded the novel. Stage versions of the novel began pro-
liferating in the early 1820s. As William St. Clair points out, Frankenstein’s 
popularity in its own period resulted more from its stage adaptations than 
from its small, pricey print runs, the first of which produced only five 
hundred copies (2004, 367). The text, and more specifically the creature at 
its core, began to circulate as a Frankenpheme in public discourse, among 
periodicals and parliamentary debates (as in Canning’s 1824 allusion con-
cerning slavery), soon after the novel’s first theatrical adaptations. “By the 
end of 1823,” writes Hitchcock, “five different retellings of Frankenstein 
had animated the London stage” (2007, 88–89). Like the political appro-
priations they engendered, Frankenstein’s theatrical adaptations helped to 
redefine the word technology as a Frankenpheme. And for the most part, 
these stage adaptations took shape not as traditional dramas in London’s 
patent theatres, but as multimedia spectacles in the burgeoning illegitimate 
theatre of the period.
The recent reappraisal of Romantic performance by scholars of the 
period has prompted not just a review of the “closet” and lyrical dramas of 
canonical authors like Byron and Baillie but also a retrieval of illegitimate 
theatre and popular performance culture—its melodramas, burlesques, 
pantomimes, extravaganzas, magic-lantern shows, boxing matches, exe-
cutions, and science experiments—along with analyses of its institutional 
contexts like censorship, copyright, and criticism. Jane Moody reads rad-
ical politics at work in London’s Romantic-era illegitimate theatre and 
provides important context for Frankenstein’s dramatizations: the period’s 
critics developed a “critique of monstrosity” to defend and distinguish 
“a text-based canon of English drama” from “a miscellaneous realm of 
nontextual, physical entertainment”—the multimedia, “spurious theat-
rical forms” that were actually fostered by “the terms of patent monopoly,” 
and ultimately became popular enough to bring an end to that monop-
oly (2000, 12–13). “Critics,” Moody writes, “mocked the miscellaneous 
interweaving of music and visual spectacle with elaborate stage machin-
ery, virtuosic dance and, in the case of pantomime, the silent, gestural 
language of mime” and “blamed these monstrous productions for what 
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they perceived as a process of generic miscegenation” (12). Melodrama in 
particular was popularly figured as monstrous: Samuel De Wilde’s “The 
Monster Melo-Drama,” a widely reprinted cartoon that first appeared in 
The Satirist in December 1807, depicts its titular monster as a hydra-like 
beast, with four heads representing period theatre celebrities; its paws 
trample a document called “Shakespeare’s Works” and on its belly are 
several teats suckled by period playwrights and theatre practitioners who 
worked in popular and illegitimate genres like melodrama. 
The distinctions between patent and illegitimate theatre in Georgian 
London represent just one facet of a popular and competitive perform-
ance culture. Diane Hoeveler writes that “theater managers who wanted 
to remain competitive had to keep pace in their use of pyrotechnics and 
other devices that would continue to ‘shock and awe’ their audiences”: “As 
attendance at theaters increased throughout the nineteenth century, the 
technologies involved in stagecraft had to improve, and advancements 
in lighting, stage machinery, setting, and sound effects were all of major 
importance in the spectacularization of theatrical fare” (2005, paras. 2, 3). 
Hoeveler notes that “technologies of visual spectacle” gave a significant 
boost to the rise of illegitimate theatre (2005, para. 13) and established new 
standards of audience expectations for theatrical performance. 
The illegitimate theatre of Romantic-era England represents a 
techno-cultural horizon for the pride of place now enjoyed by special 
effects in today’s popular cultural industries. To be sure, traditional theatre 
had also begun innovating more technologically advanced stage business 
in the period; productions of Macbeth, especially, were “grist to the mill 
of the maker of effects” (Rees 1978, 137). But the multimedia “monstros-
ities” of illegitimate theatre made it a distinctive cultural laboratory for 
giving dramatic and technological application to the theories of scientists 
like Humphry Davy and Luigi Galvani. For one example, an 1820 Gothic 
melodrama The Vampyre innovated a new kind of trap door, later used in 
an 1824 Frankenstein farce (Forry 1990, 34). For another, it wasn’t a patent 
theatre but the Lyceum that first lit a London stage with gaslight, in 1817. 
Terence Rees writes that Covent Garden opened its 1815 season with exter-
ior gaslight, but the Olympic brought gaslight inside later that year, to little 
fanfare, until the Lyceum’s stage use of gaslight in 1817—whereafter most 
of London’s theatres quickly adopted the new lighting technology. By 1829, 
only the Haymarket still held out, in dim oil-lamp and candlelight, against 
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the new gaslight standards (Rees 1978, 9). These lighting standards, in turn, 
fostered the nascent sector in special effects: they drove increasing sophis-
tication in scenery and other effects and demanded an increasing—and 
increasingly specialized—labour force (Rees 1978, 189). In addition, sci-
entists like Davy and Galvani themselves gave theatrical presentations, in 
an increasingly public culture of science (Holmes 2009, 295). This culture 
often openly leveraged Frankenstein in staging sensational exhibitions of 
electric experiment and other “scientific sensations” (Morus 1998).
The stage Frankensteins of the 1820s and 1830s demonstrate with pecu-
liar aptness these techno-cultural functions of the illegitimate theatre, and 
not just for putting popular ideas about science in a new light. These pro-
ductions tended overwhelmingly to take shape as melodrama, burlesque, 
and farce. The first, Richard Brinsley Peake’s Presumption, opened at the 
English Opera House in July 1823. (In an intriguing variation on the theme 
of theatrical adaptation and “hideous progeny,” Peake was named after a 
famous playwright of his father’s generation, Richard Brinsley Sheridan 
[Behrendt 2001, para. 1].) Presumption was so popular that it inspired 
fourteen other dramatizations of Frankenstein over the next three years, 
in England and France, including four in England in just the latter half 
of 1823 (Forry 1990, 3–4). Indeed, between 1823 and 1826, about fifteen 
stage productions adapted Frankenstein. The title of one 1824 production—
Frank-in-Steam; or, The Modern Promise to Pay—parodies the full title of 
Shelley’s novel; at the time, steam power was as potent an icon of modern 
industrial technology as were the automated looms that Luddites raged 
against from 1811 to 1817, their campaigns peaking from the summer of 1816 
to that of 1817, precisely when Shelley was writing her novel (O’Flinn 1986, 
196). In Frank-in-Steam, the play’s protagonist, a student in debt, learns of 
the death of his antagonist, a bailiff named Mr. Snatch, and cannot resist 
the opportunity to reanimate the corpse—rather unwisely, since the bailiff 
remains, in his undead state, as bent on collecting the student’s debt as he 
was in life. Ultimately, the student kills his monstrous progeny by pushing 
Snatch into a steamboat’s boiler (Forry 1990, 186). This play also parodies 
Peake’s Presumption, not only by capitalizing on the growing popularity of 
stagings of Frankenstein but also in one important detail—by not staging 
but instead narrating its climactic steam-boiler murder scene, thereby 
denying the audience a technical spectacle that Presumption had led it to 
expect of these stagings. 
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Theatrical versions and print editions fuelled each other’s produc-
tion throughout the nineteenth century—as in Shelley’s reference to 
“presumption” in her 1831 second edition (St. Clair 2004, 371). Repeat 
stagings and printings of the earliest dramatizations held interest until the 
mid-nineteenth century, after which time new theatre versions appeared 
and still keep appearing, amidst a myriad adaptations in other media.
Among the earliest stagings, two have powerfully shaped the popular 
reception of the novel and, thus, the modern popular discourse of technol-
ogy. These were Peake’s Presumption (1823) and Henry Milner’s The Man 
and the Monster (1826). Both of these adaptations boiled down the novel’s 
complex morality into a populist, conservative moral; as Forry writes, “on 
the English stage .  .  . Frankenstein immediately became associated with 
unbridled revolution, atheism, and blind progress in science and tech-
nology” (1990, 35). St. Clair shows how intellectual property regulations 
in nineteenth-century Britain left print editions of the novel scarce and 
expensive and left playwrights and theatres free to adapt the text without 
copyright restrictions. The relative scarcity of the print novel, then, drove 
new stage adaptations to exploit prior stage adaptations rather than the 
source text itself. St. Clair claims that the effect of these regulatory contin-
gencies was to popularize the story as a reactionary, religious cautionary 
tale, rather than the scientifically speculative and progressive allegory of 
the Enlightenment that he says Shelley intended (2004, 373). However, 
many critics read in the novel a clear critique of science and its unintended 
technological consequences; Anne K. Mellor’s reading of Shelley’s “fem-
inist critique of science” is a salutary example (1988).
Presumption exerted the greatest influence on subsequent receptions 
of the novel, including the 1931 film with Boris Karloff. Presumption first 
transformed Shelley’s eloquent creature into a mute monster; it gave the 
solitary Victor Frankenstein a lab assistant, and it recast Victor himself as 
the prototype of the now-formulaic “mad scientist” character. In Peake’s 
play and the 1931 film, the assistant’s name is Fritz; in the sequels to the 
film, a shepherd named Ygor, played by Bela Lugosi, begins to eclipse Fritz’s 
role, and subsequent adaptations have entrenched the identification of 
Dr. Frankenstein’s assistant as “Igor”—for example, in the eponymous 
2008 animated film. As Richard Holmes notes, Presumption also turned 
Frankenstein’s vaguely described “workshop of filthy creation” into a lab-
oratory at “the centre of dramatic interest” (2009, 335). Peake dramatized 
Figure 2 Actor T. P. Cooke playing the Creature in Richard Brinsley Peake’s 
Presumption, 1823, the first of many theatrical adaptations of Shelley’s novel. 
The role required the actor’s skin to be painted blue. Lithograph by Nathaniel 
Whittock, based on an original painting by Thomas Charles Wageman. Image 
courtesy of the Carl H. Pforzheimer Collection of Shelley and His Circle, New 
York Public Library.
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Theatrical versions and print editions fuelled each other’s produc-
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stagings and printings of the earliest dramatizations held interest until the 
mid-nineteenth century, after which time new theatre versions appeared 
and still keep appearing, amidst a myriad adaptations in other media.
Among the earliest stagings, two have powerfully shaped the popular 
reception of the novel and, thus, the modern popular discourse of technol-
ogy. These were Peake’s Presumption (1823) and Henry Milner’s The Man 
and the Monster (1826). Both of these adaptations boiled down the novel’s 
complex morality into a populist, conservative moral; as Forry writes, “on 
the English stage .  .  . Frankenstein immediately became associated with 
unbridled revolution, atheism, and blind progress in science and tech-
nology” (1990, 35). St. Clair shows how intellectual property regulations 
in nineteenth-century Britain left print editions of the novel scarce and 
expensive and left playwrights and theatres free to adapt the text without 
copyright restrictions. The relative scarcity of the print novel, then, drove 
new stage adaptations to exploit prior stage adaptations rather than the 
source text itself. St. Clair claims that the effect of these regulatory contin-
gencies was to popularize the story as a reactionary, religious cautionary 
tale, rather than the scientifically speculative and progressive allegory of 
the Enlightenment that he says Shelley intended (2004, 373). However, 
many critics read in the novel a clear critique of science and its unintended 
technological consequences; Anne K. Mellor’s reading of Shelley’s “fem-
inist critique of science” is a salutary example (1988).
Presumption exerted the greatest influence on subsequent receptions 
of the novel, including the 1931 film with Boris Karloff. Presumption first 
transformed Shelley’s eloquent creature into a mute monster; it gave the 
solitary Victor Frankenstein a lab assistant, and it recast Victor himself as 
the prototype of the now-formulaic “mad scientist” character. In Peake’s 
play and the 1931 film, the assistant’s name is Fritz; in the sequels to the 
film, a shepherd named Ygor, played by Bela Lugosi, begins to eclipse Fritz’s 
role, and subsequent adaptations have entrenched the identification of 
Dr. Frankenstein’s assistant as “Igor”—for example, in the eponymous 
2008 animated film. As Richard Holmes notes, Presumption also turned 
Frankenstein’s vaguely described “workshop of filthy creation” into a lab-
oratory at “the centre of dramatic interest” (2009, 335). Peake dramatized 
Figure 2 Actor T. P. Cooke playing the Creature in Richard Brinsley Peake’s 
Presumption, 1823, the first of many theatrical adaptations of Shelley’s novel. 
The role required the actor’s skin to be painted blue. Lithograph by Nathaniel 
Whittock, based on an original painting by Thomas Charles Wageman. Image 
courtesy of the Carl H. Pforzheimer Collection of Shelley and His Circle, New 
York Public Library.
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the novel’s “dreary night of November” (Shelley [1818] 2012, 83) as a sen-
sational “creation scene” calculated to shock audiences. Peake left the act 
of creation offstage, narrated by Fritz but with flashes of blue fire from the 
offstage lab, after which the monster burst onto the stage, made up all in 
blue, which became the character’s standard stage colour (fig. 2).
In contrast, Milner’s 1826 version, The Man and the Monster, moved 
the creation scene onstage, presenting a lab set complete with high-tech 
props, to dramatize the creature’s first twitches of galvanic animation (in 
a way now familiar from the 1931 film). The scene is described in Milner’s 
stage directions:
SCENE III.
The Interior of the Pavilion.—Folding Doors in the Back. On a long 
Table is discovered an indistinct Form, covered with a black cloth. 
A small side Table, with Bottles, and Chemical Apparatus,—and a 
brazier with fire. [. . .] Music.—He [Frankenstein] rolls back the black 
covering, which discovers a colossal human figure, of a cadaverous 
livid complexion; it slowly begins to rise. (Quoted in Forry 1990, 194)
The creation is the first of a triptych of scenes that Presumption and 
its successors made obligatory—and famous as showcases for spectacular 
effects. The other two scenes are the monster’s setting fire to a cottage, 
and the monster’s destruction, usually along with that of his creator in the 
same fell swoop. Producers of Presumption and its progeny soon seized on 
this triptych of creation, combustion, and catastrophe as a major selling 
point. The advertising for Presumption promoted these scenes in par-
ticular among its “many striking effects” (quoted in Morton 2002, 51). The 
first French adaptation, Jean-Toussaint Merle and Antony Béraud’s 1826 
Le monstre et le magicien, succeeded, in part, on the strength of “its fan-
tastic special effects, which it borrowed from the British stage” (Forry 
1990, 11). One Parisian reviewer raved: “Jamais . . . on n’avait vu chez nous 
machinerie plus compliquée et plus extraordinaire.” An advertisement in 
the newspaper Le Temps even included a schedule of the most spectacular 
scenes: “à neuf heures, la Naissance du Monstre; à dix heures, l’incendie; 
à dix heures et demi, le Ravin des Torrents” (quoted in Forry 1990, 11). A 
staple strategy ever since, the advertising of special effects in Frankenstein 
performances has given technology itself a starring role in the spectacular 
productions of popular culture, an uncannily animated fetish figure of the 
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cultural industries’ power. For a present-day example, note the attaching 
of “3D” to the title of virtually every new cinematic release.
As well as great ad copy, the special effects of early Frankenstein plays 
made good material for show-business comedy and theatre lore. A year 
after Presumption, Peake lampooned his own play with Another Piece of 
Presumption, a meta-theatrical burlesque full of jokes about “complicated 
machinery” and the show’s own shoestring budget: “Cut out my house 
on Fire—” complains the playwright to the manager (quoted in Forry 
1990, 162).
Also in 1824, a Birmingham production of Presumption inadvertently 
turned melodrama into farce, by trying to economize on effects. The 
theatre didn’t have enough canvas for the avalanche scene and, instead, 
repurposed a big prop elephant from an earlier production:
Before we reached our elevation a pistol was fired behind the scenes, 
when the Master Carpenter being over anxious for the success of the 
experiment let go—when down came the elephant with a tremen-
dous crash, knocked down the platform and scenery and came 
rolling down the stage to the footlights where it ran some danger of 
being roasted till it was dragged off the stage. (O. Smith, quoted in 
Forry 1990, 7, emphasis added)
Note the rhetoric of “experiment” in the actor’s account of the accident. 
In the theatrical popular culture of Georgian England, adaptations of 
Frankenstein provided a convenient yet contradictory unity of form and 
content for a theatre culture marked by technical experiment and a scien-
tific culture marked by increasing theatricality—the latter exemplified by 
the notorious “‘re-animation’ exhibitions” conducted in 1803 by Giovanni 
Aldini (Holmes 2009, 317), who would later take the gaslight technology 
of British theatre back to Italy (Rees 1978, 31).
As the earliest “technological reductions” of Frankenstein, these plays 
were characterized by cautionary plots and spectacular effects that drama-
tized the complex tension between determinism and instrumentalism 
integral to the modern discourse of technology. On one hand, the plays’ 
reactionary message—that scientific pursuits are diabolical and deadly—
bolsters the determinist dimension of technology discourse: not only is 
unethical experimentation predestined to backfire, but its product will 
prove fatal to the researcher. The plays conflate science and Satanism—both 
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thematically, in Faustian representations of Frankenstein’s work (Peake 
and Milner, quoted in Forry 1990, 137) and descriptions of the monster 
as a devil (Peake and Kerr, quoted in Forry 1990, 215)—and technically, in 
their use of the latest special effects to dramatize diabolism and to mys-
tify monstrosity. As Fred Botting writes, “the uncanny is, in many ways, 
a technological phenomenon whose effects are accentuated by the shifts 
and disturbances of technical innovation” (2005, para. 21), and technol-
ogy—embodied in these plays as the monster—takes on a life of its own.
On the other hand, the plays’ spectacular media complicate the deter-
minist message: they demonstrate the creative instrumentality of new 
technologies like gaslight, and their power to mystify gives ground to 
instrumentalism in consummately theatrical moments when the expected 
avalanche arrives early as a prop elephant. Then again, such moments 
also freight the plays’ special effects with the sense of risk that becomes 
a defining feature of modern technology. The obligatory cottage-burning 
scene is a perfect example: Rees notes with grim irony that, “at a time 
when theatres burned down with monotonous regularity, a good stage fire 
carried an additional frisson over and above its spectacle value” (1978, 146).
The stage versions did still more to consolidate the popular understand-
ing of technology as a Frankenpheme, by characterizing the creature as 
a mute and thus mystifying monster, who—like the special effects being 
exploited to stage him—represents an experimental and potentially dis-
astrous application of current scientific theory. “From print to stage to 
screen,” Botting argues, “the monster circulates in depictions of fear-
some machinery and in new apparatuses of cultural production” (2005, 
para. 11). In the early Frankenstein plays, the mute monster embodied a 
fetish-figure of technology: a “dæmon” born of “machinery and magic” 
(Milner, quoted in Forry 1990, 198), running amok amidst the fireworks, 
gaslights, and other “ponderous machinery” surrounding the stage (Rees 
1978, 203). With their uncanny, dramatic figures of technology running 
amok amidst new theatre technology that constantly threatened the same, 
these plays redirected the audience’s attention from subjective acting to 
objective effects, and in effect problematized the technological dialectic 
between liveness and mediation, decades before gramophone or film. The 
“monster melodramas” of Georgian theatre provided a scene, incentive, 
and challenge for experimenting with special effects, which now represent 
their own capital-commanding sector in today’s cultural industries. We 
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can trace a genealogical line from the animated blue devils of Presumption 
and its progeny to Avatar’s animated race of blue aliens. The formal and 
thematic emphases on special effects in the period’s illegitimate theatre, 
especially in its Frankenstein adaptations, represent a spectacular perform-
ance of the period’s broader redefinition of modern technology’s episteme 
in terms of media and monstrosity.
It is no uncanny coincidence, then, that the reinvention of technology 
emerged in the decade after Frankenstein’s debut; Frankenstein interdicted 
the rejuvenated German Technologie in the course of its English immi-
gration and rerouted it through the writings of Anglo-American public 
intellectuals, and through popular scenes of sensational performance. 
The text and its popular receptions do not coincidentally belong to the 
period of the word’s revivification in English, they texture and direct this 
revivification. The modern discourse of technology—as a fetishized deter-
minism, as the dread that supplements development, as “future shock”—is 
a powerfully affecting effect of the text’s cultural function in its time, as an 
epistemological “instrument of future mischief.” In the twentieth century, 
this sense of technology’s mischief would be recast on a global stage, largely 
through the work of Marshall McLuhan, to whom we now turn.
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4. The Medium  
Is the Monster
McLuhan’s “Frankenpheme” of Technology
Frankenstein and key adaptations of it may have redefined and modernized 
the discourse of technology in the early nineteenth century, but it was the 
fast-changing mediascape of the twentieth century—and more specifically 
the work of McLuhan in and on this mediascape—that put the modern 
discourse of technology on the map and into common circulation.
McLuhan may not seem a likely subject for studying either literary 
adaptation or the popular legacies of Romanticism; what this chapter will 
discuss is how McLuhan defines and theorizes technology, with reference 
to Frankenstein. It will also discuss McLuhan’s distinctive research meth-
odology, with reference to Edgar Allan Poe and with attention to how 
McLuhan’s stated method contradicts and conflicts with his work’s tone. 
The chapter then outlines the Frankensteinian historical narrative that his 
work constructs, his epochal model of technological change, and subse-
quently reviews some representative reviews and receptions of McLuhan 
in the popular press and the counterculture of the period of his greatest 
fame, the late 1960s. McLuhan’s receptions by journalists and counter-
culture scenesters, taken together, served greatly to popularize his ideas, 
to figure McLuhan himself as a kind of mad scientist of media, and thus 
to amplify what I will term his “Frankenpheme of technology.”
“Every technology necessitates a new war”
To argue, as the present chapter does, that McLuhan’s work takes up and 
develops technology as a Frankenpheme is in the first place to situate his 
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work in the context of the profound social turmoil visited on the globe by 
the Second World War. This global conflict was technologized to an extent 
that the fascist Futurists, turned on by the industrial and systematized 
stratagems of World War I, could scarcely have imagined in their wettest 
machine dreams.
If you run a Google n-gram search for the frequency of the occurrence 
of the word “technology,” in every century since 1500, the advent of print, 
the line will hug the horizontal time axis, flat except for little speed bumps 
in the late seventeenth century and the turn of the twentieth. But it starts 
to rise up, gradually, in the 1920s, climbing into a ten-degree angle that 
it holds until the mid-1950s, when it swings up towards thirty degrees. 
Then, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the line shoots steeply upward, level-
ling briefly between 1985 and 1990 before arcing in a shallow parabola 
over Y2K. Acknowledging that a Google n-gram is not exactly the most 
rigorously isolated data set (how do we quantify “lots of books,” exactly?), 
its statistical thumbnail sketch is still a suggestive index of broad changes 
in language use. Kelly suggests that technology entered colloquial Eng-
lish use in 1939 (2011, 6), and while he gives no particular explanation for 
suggesting that year, the date ominously implies that the onset of World 
War II might have had something to do with it. Perhaps, then, the chilling 
historical insight of Kittler ([1986] 1999)—that the major innovations in 
media have regularly arisen first as military research projects and wartime 
field tests—also holds true for corresponding transformations in everyday 
language and public discourse.
For most of the war, McLuhan was teaching at Saint Louis University 
in Missouri; but in 1939, having just married, he and his wife went to 
Cambridge where he finished his master’s degree and began his doc-
torate as the war in Europe began. In 1940 they returned to the United 
States, and McLuhan completed his doctoral studies at a distance, with 
Cambridge’s blessing and understanding. Soon after McLuhan earned 
his PhD, in 1943, his attention was already turning from canonical lit-
erary subjects to contemporary popular ones, reading the latter by the 
lights of the former to try to make sense of the emerging postwar medi-
ascape—and of his students. In the wake of such unprecedented and 
eminently technological atrocities as Auschwitz and Hiroshima, the war 
registers powerfully in McLuhan’s writing. Not coincidentally, along with 
the imagery of modern weaponry, the word technology itself “began to 
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appear with noticeable frequency in McLuhan’s writings” after World 
War II (Gordon 1997, 132)—when it began to appear with increasing 
frequency in everyday English in general.
The nuclear bomb became one of McLuhan’s favourite analogies for 
the drastic, global effects of media. Nuclear power and especially nuclear 
weaponry have established a distinctive—and deserved—Frankensteinian 
discourse (Morton 2002, 56), as the apotheosis of a human-made technol-
ogy whose threat to humankind makes Victor Frankenstein’s projection of 
“a race of devils” seem a welcome alternative. Accordingly, the rhetoric of 
nuclear weaponry that recurs in McLuhan’s writing—sometimes in deadly 
earnest, sometimes in gallows humour—harbours its own peculiar set of 
Frankensteinian connotations and associations. A private letter from 1946 
shows McLuhan’s debt to his Cambridge mentor, F. R. Leavis, and to the 
artist Wyndham Lewis, as well as the private hostility to technological 
change that he publicly disavowed: in this letter, McLuhan says the critical 
methods of Leavis and the creative methods of Lewis “can serve to educate 
a huge public . .  . to resist that swift obliteration of the person which is 
going on” (quoted in Gordon 1997, 133). In its image of “swift obliteration,” 
this remark about media effects (to which McLuhan alludes as “what is 
going on”) conjures “the Bomb”; in its defence of individualism against 
technology, it shows a Romantic ideology consistent with other Romantic 
contexts of McLuhan’s work.
The scholars with whom McLuhan studied, the writers he read, and 
postwar geopolitics all informed his research and the priority it gave to 
technology. “I am a set of partially developed and isolated fragments,” 
McLuhan wrote in his diary on 11 February 1937, then straddling a junior 
position at the University of Wisconsin and doctoral studies at Cam-
bridge. McLuhan’s ultimate focus on media was based in wide-ranging 
graduate work that encompassed the Renaissance and modernism, as 
well as Romanticism, to an extent not widely acknowledged. Conven-
tional accounts attribute McLuhan’s definition of technology to the more 
immediate influences of Leavis and Lewis. But McLuhan also knew well 
the work of Shelley’s contemporary Peacock (Gordon 44), who as we saw 
in the last chapter used technology as a Frankenpheme; and McLuhan 
cites Thomas Carlyle—whose critical writing was powerfully influenced 
by Frankenstein (Baldick 1987, 103)—as a source for his own definition of 
technology (McLuhan 1970, 302). While McLuhan’s references to Shelley 
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and Carlyle are not as numerous as those to, say, Joyce or T. S. Eliot, they 
are integral to his theory of technology.
The Mechanical Bride (of Frankenstein)
Both the bomb analogy and extensive borrowings from Romantic liter-
ature appear in McLuhan’s first book, The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of 
Industrial Man (1951), a “mosaic” of essays on postwar US advertising and 
popular culture, in which McLuhan proceeds by reprinting and analyz-
ing a series of contemporary advertisements. In framing his essays and 
their arguments as a mosaic of assembled fragments, McLuhan makes 
an observation about his analytic method that the present study turns 
on McLuhan’s own writing. “Among the multifarious forms and images 
sustained by any society,” McLuhan writes, “it is reasonable to expect to 
find some sort of melodic curve. There will be many variations, but they 
will tend to be variations on certain recognizable themes” (1951, 96). The 
“theme” that McLuhan identifies in the postwar popular mediascape is a 
recurring “cluster image” of “sex, technology, and death.” McLuhan doesn’t 
define technology in Bride—he takes it for granted to signify industrial 
machinery and to act as the fulcrum of his “cluster image” theme. The 
variations on this theme that are discussed in the book include sexualized 
images of automobiles and weaponry, mechanized images of bodies and 
sexuality, dystopian images of media technology, and fetishized images of 
industrial enterprise and free-market ideology. Contemporary with but 
independent of analogous European projects—Roland Barthes’s Mythol-
ogies, Richard Hoggart’s Uses of Literacy, the Frankfurt School’s culture 
industry thesis—McLuhan surveys the postwar corporate mediascape and 
its ascendant hegemony of instrumental rationality in order to expose its 
latent effect: the dehumanizing transformation of North America’s indi-
vidual citizens into mass consumers, in symptomatically gender-coded 
terms. McLuhan conceived the book as a critique of “the feminization of 
the North American male” (Gordon 1997, 117) and “the decimation of sex 
by . . . mechanization” (McLuhan, quoted in Gordon 1997, 153).
McLuhan is concerned, throughout Bride, with the difference between 
surface readings and latent meanings of mass media, especially adver-
tising. He identifies a series of popular figures that typify the postwar 
consumerist zeitgeist: the sleuth, the scientist, and the gangster—the 
last of which McLuhan calls the “tragic hero” best suited to “commercial 
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society dedicated to the smash and grab and one-man fury of enterprise” 
(1951, 145). Significantly, the prototype for all these symptomatic figures 
of industrial culture is none other than the Byronic hero, following whose 
example “all rebellion against the spirit of hawking and huckstering takes 
in large measure the Byronic form” (109). More recent work on the legacies 
of Romanticism tacitly bolsters McLuhan’s argument about Byron. Atara 
Stein (2004) tracks the Byronic hero through popular culture—and dis-
cusses the intertextual intimacy found in this context between the Byronic 
figure and the Frankenstein monster. McLuhan himself contextualizes this 
argument, with reference to early industrialization, Regency society, and 
the culture of Byron and his contemporaries, making connections between 
popular media and figures of subterranean or latent influence on it.
McLuhan’s connections between submerged cultural history and 
in-your-face contemporary media lead him to suggest that the themes he 
finds in the mediascape are not obvious—are even unconscious, despite 
their prevalence: “Important for present purposes is the fact that the com-
plexities of such popular images as that of the sleuth are subterranean. So 
with the current image of the ‘businessman’ or the ‘scientist.’ The indis-
criminate cluster of items included in these images becomes in turn a 
means of ‘popular thinking’ about society and politics” (1951, 110).
McLuhan’s work harbours a “subterranean,” thematic “cluster image” of 
its own, an image that becomes integral to his writing about media. If The 
Mechanical Bride essays an extensive analysis of the “cluster image” of “sex, 
technology, and death,” the middle term here, “technology,” becomes a clus-
ter image unto itself, in which the recognizable tropes with which Shelley 
characterized her creature converge with explicit intertextual references, 
and thus render the word technology itself a Frankenpheme—a condensed, 
connotative term to conjure the spectre of Frankenstein. The book places 
the term technology in a web of references that clarify its Frankenpheme 
aspect. The title of McLuhan’s book alludes to Marcel Duchamp’s artwork 
The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1915–23), in which the 
“stripping” of the “bride” is depicted as a kind of Cubist disassembly into 
her (or its) machine parts. However, in keeping with McLuhan’s interest in 
the interface of high and popular culture, the title also evokes the bride of 
Frankenstein, the manufactured female body destroyed in Shelley’s novel 
but later brought to cinematic life in Bride of Frankenstein (1935), and in 
the robot Maria of Metropolis (1927). These evocations in the title are made 
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concrete with McLuhan’s explicit reference in the title essay: “Franken-
stein fantasies depend on the horror of a synthetic robot running amok in 
revenge for its lack of a ‘soul.’ Is this not merely a symbolic way of express-
ing the actual fact that many people have become so mechanized that they 
feel a dim resentment at being deprived of full human status?” (1951, 100).
The statement puts McLuhan’s thesis in sensational and pop-cultural 
terms, and the essay in which it appears includes related “cluster images” 
that recur throughout McLuhan’s work. McLuhan ends this essay by under-
scoring both his title’s Frankensteinian figure and his book’s central image; 
he states that the “trance-like” effects of popular art—the mass-produced 
“Frankenstein fantasies”—are to perpetuate “the widely occurring cluster 
image of sex, technology, and death which constitutes the mystery of the 
mechanical bride” (1951, 101). In addition, this title essay in McLuhan’s first 
book refers not only to Frankenstein, but also to a legion of likewise Gothic 
and grotesque figures: cybernetic “thinking machines,” ghouls, and vam-
pires (100–1), as well as the striking image of machines “coming to resemble 
organisms not only in the way they obtained power by digestion of fuel but 
in their capacity to evolve ever new types of themselves with the help of the 
machine tenders” (99). In this paraphrase of a premise from Samuel But-
ler’s utopian fiction Erewhon (1872), McLuhan first iterates a claim that he 
puts more vividly in Understanding Media: that “man becomes, as it were, 
the sex organs of the machine world” (McLuhan [1964] 2003, 68). This 
image of an inverted, dystopian human-machine relationship—an image 
both Cronenbergian and Matrix-like—would become one of his “most 
widely repeated aphorisms” (Harvey 2006, 341), and its defamiliarizing 
suggestion “that the origins, transformation, propagation and continual 
reproduction of the human subject is an inherently technological process” 
(335) has proven a compelling point around which attention to McLuhan 
has been perennially renewed in relation to technology studies, critical 
theory, and popular culture. 
Understanding Media (Means Fearing Technology)
McLuhan opens Understanding Media with a working definition of tech-
nology—as an “extension of man”—and a Frankensteinian illustration 
of it: “Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have 
extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing 
both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach 
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the final phase of the extensions of man—the technological simulation 
of consciousness” ([1964] 2003, 5). In this book, the word “technology” 
occurs almost as often as “media”: in Understanding Media, the former 
word occurs 227 times; the latter, 277. Moreover, technology becomes 
interchangeable, even synonymous with media in McLuhan’s theory. 
For example, he writes: “The personal and social consequences of any 
medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale 
that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any 
new technology” (19). In one sentence, both medium and technology are 
treated as “extensions of man.” We also see their interchangeability in a 
private letter from the same year Understanding Media appeared, in which 
McLuhan wrote: “I have discovered a better way of saying the medium is 
the message. It is this: each technology creates a new environment” (quoted 
in Gordon 1997, 175). He thought this wording better addresses how media 
strive for “immediacy,” how they become taken for granted, invisible, and 
natural in their social implementation—and thus how they effect their 
most profound transformations on subjectivity and society, time and space.
McLuhan attributes his idea of technology as extension to contem-
poraries like Lewis Mumford, Leavis, and Lewis (Gordon 1997, 120). But 
McLuhan also credits Romantic sources: the phrase “extensions of man” is 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s (Gordon 1997, 196), and McLuhan cites Carlyle’s 
1833 Sartor Resartus as a source for his idea of technology as extension, as 
environment, and as weapon:
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus followed in the tracks of the eighteenth- 
century Swedenborg zeitgeist theory of Age Garb (or garbage); i.e., all 
human institutions from language to tweezers are extensions of, and 
weapons of, the human body.
New technologies = new environments. (1970, 302)
This weaponized sense of technology speaks to McLuhan’s hostility to 
technological change, which he shared with his mentor F. R. Leavis, but 
which he tried to keep private. In public, McLuhan assumed a neutral, 
critical stance towards technology: “Value judgments have long been 
allowed to create a moral fog around technological change such as ren-
ders understanding impossible” ([1962] 1969, 255). For McLuhan, the “only 
person able to encounter technology with impunity” is “the serious artist 
. . . an expert aware of the changes in sense perception” ([1964] 2003, 31).
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
92 The Medium Is the Monster 
McLuhan’s models for this romanticized role of the artist as outsider 
and visionary included Joyce, Yeats, and Eliot—but also William Blake, 
Percy Shelley, and, above all, Poe ([1964] 2003, 430). McLuhan adopted 
two formal principles from Poe’s work for his own criticism, and both 
are significant for his discourse of technology as Frankenpheme. First, 
McLuhan emulated Poe’s a posteriori narrative strategy:
The method of invention, as Edgar Poe demonstrated in his “Phil-
osophy of Composition,” is simply to begin with the solution of the 
problem or with the effect intended. Then one backtracks, step by 
step, to the point from which one must begin in order to reach the 
solution or effect. Such is the method of the detective story, of the 
symbolist poem, and of modern science. ([1962] 1969, 59).
Interestingly, Poe in his essay credits his own method of working back 
from effects to Mary Shelley’s father, William Godwin, and his novel Caleb 
Williams, a prototype of the modern “whodunit” mystery that Poe himself 
pioneered ([1846] 1987, 480). Shelley herself, though absent from Poe’s 
account, similarly recounts composing Frankenstein as a process of work-
ing back from effects, an effort to “develop at greater length” her original 
conception of “a short tale” arising from “the grim terrors of my waking 
dream” (Shelley [1831] 2000 , 24). So it is on the basis of Poe’s writing prac-
tice, influenced in turn by the Shelley circle, that McLuhan then develops 
his own distinctive research method and expository style, focusing on the 
effect of a technology in order to “reconstruct” its cause (1951, 106). This 
method leads to his main idea: that technologies produce and naturalize 
specific environments.
From his first book forward, McLuhan developed a neutral analytic 
method based on Poe’s 1841 short story “A Descent into the Maelstrom”: 
“Poe’s sailor saved himself by studying the action of the whirlpool and 
by cooperating with it. The present book likewise makes few attempts 
to attack the very considerable currents and pressures set up around us 
today by the mechanical agencies of the press, radio, movies, and advertis-
ing” (1951, v). McLuhan “identif[ied] throughout his adult life” with Poe’s 
sailor (Gordon 1997, 13), but adopting such “rational detachment” for his 
own critical method proved both controversial and contradictory: con-
troversial, in that his refrain from value judgments led to the widespread 
misreading of him as an “anti-book” techno-fetishist; and contradictory, 
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in that his own writing abounds with “moral indignation”—its tone veer-
ing between ambivalence and horror. McLuhan’s “personal dislike” of 
technological change is also apparent in his choice of literary touchstone: 
McLuhan doesn’t model his “rational detachment” on an Austen heroine 
sizing up a match, or a Benthamite legislator of the greater good, but on 
an unreliable narrator, whose miscalculating ambition leads him to the 
brink of annihilation, barely surviving his hostile environment to tell the 
tale. A narrator, that is, like Victor Frankenstein.
As Poe’s sailor shares character traits and plot points with Victor 
Frankenstein, so the prominence of Poe in McLuhan’s work mediates 
Frankenstein’s long shadow, adding layers of intertextual resonance to its 
line of influence in McLuhan’s work. Poe’s fiction itself shows the impact 
of Frankenstein in its period, with his stories of necromancy (“The Facts 
in the Case of M. Valdemar”); galvanic reanimation (“Some Words with 
a Mummy”); nautical hubris (“Maelstrom”); doppelgängers (“William 
Wilson”); and even cyborgs (“The Man Who Was Used Up”). For these 
and related reasons of Poe’s significant intertextual borrowings, “closer 
scrutiny of Poe’s knowledge and use of Frankenstein seems warranted,” as 
Don Smith notes (1992, 38). Like the uniquely Frankensteinian imagery 
of “the Bomb” and McLuhan’s more direct Romantic borrowings, the 
second-order adaptations of Poe’s fiction filter into McLuhan’s theory, 
along with the disinterested approach to criticism that it models and that 
McLuhan’s work only partly succeeds in reproducing.
A close reading of McLuhan’s usage of technology as Frankenpheme 
suggests the extent of his Romantic (and gender-coded) understanding of 
modernity, and his deep but disavowed hostility to technological change. 
The tone of McLuhan’s statements on technology conflicts with his stated 
neutrality. McLuhan amplifies the tropes of utility, supplement, contagion, 
shock, and revolution with which Frankenstein modernized the meaning 
of technology, and his use of the word as a Frankenpheme both under-
girds his deterministic premise concerning technology and undermines 
his declared suspension of judgment. For McLuhan, new technologies 
produce pain, confusion, and despair (McLuhan and Fiore [1967] 2001, 8), 
to which individuals and societies respond by going into a kind of shock or 
“auto-amputation”: “With the arrival of electric technology, man extended, 
or set outside himself, a live model of the central nervous system itself . . . 
a development that suggests a desperate and suicidal autoamputation” 
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([1964] 2003, 65). McLuhan consistently describes technology in terms of 
invasion ([1964] 2003, 30), disease ([1962] 1969, 17), disaster ([1962] 1969, 
302), and conflict on a global scale. “Every new technology,” he states grimly 
in War and Peace in the Global Village, “necessitates a new war” (McLuhan 
and Fiore 1968, 98). All five technological tropes that we find in Frank-
enstein thus inform and shape McLuhan’s model of global technological 
change, a model figured in Frankensteinian imagery that clearly conveys 
his hostility to such change. We find perhaps the most dramatic expres-
sion of McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology—and a rare but telling 
public confession of his hostility to its effects—in a 1969 interview with 
Playboy. Pressed by the interviewer to clarify his personal opinion about 
“new technology” as a “revolutionizing agent,” McLuhan replied frankly:
I view such upheavals with total personal dislike and dissatisfaction. I 
do see the prospect of a rich and creative retribalized society . . . but 
I have nothing but distaste for the process of change. . . . I derive no 
joy from observing the traumatic effects of media on man, although I 
do obtain satisfaction from grasping their modes of operation. . . . It’s 
vital to adopt a posture of arrogant superiority; instead of scurrying 
into a corner and wailing about what media are doing to us, one 
should charge straight ahead and kick them in the electrodes. They 
respond beautifully to such treatment and soon become servants 
rather than masters. . . . The world we are living in is not one I would 
have created on my own drawing board, but it’s the one in which I 
must live. (1969, 158)
McLuhan figures technology as a rebellious, male artificial intelligence, 
whose inherently rebellious tendency should be violently pre-empted; 
technology is a menace that needs to be subordinated—mastered—to be 
useful. This figure vividly condenses and dramatizes the tropes of utility, 
shock, revolution, and supplementarity with which Shelley characterizes 
the monster. And in his closing reference to “the world we are living in,” 
McLuhan positions this monstrous figure of technology in a new relation 
to globalization and modernity, as an age whose “labor pain of rebirth” is 
producing a world unlike the one he “would have created” (158).
In the interview, McLuhan goes on to say he “would never attempt to 
change my world” and “must move through this pain-wracked transitional 
era as a scientist would move through a world of disease” (1969, 158). His 
totalizing rhetoric of era and world recur throughout his work to construct 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
The Medium Is the Monster 95
an overarching historical drama of social transformation; in Understanding 
Media, for example, he echoes Carlyle to announce the new age as an “Age 
of Anxiety,” augured by progress in “the technological simulation of con-
sciousness” ([1964] 2003, 5). In the epochal-scale drama of world history 
articulated in McLuhan’s theory, the monstrous figure of technology plays 
the lead role—and takes the “global village” for its stage.
This historical drama represents its own distinctive adaptation of 
Frankenstein’s mythmaking “skeleton story.” It plays out across McLuhan’s 
writing in a way that is readily amplified by his critical receptions. In 
McLuhan’s world-historical drama, the fragmented subject of print cul-
ture is galvanized, by electric technology, to be “reborn” as a unified but 
monstrous subject, at once “primitive” and globalized, “corporate” yet 
incoherent. To take one journalistic example, the New Yorker’s review of 
Understanding Media gives a typical period gloss of McLuhan’s histor-
ical drama in language that makes legible its “technological reduction” of 
Frankenstein: “Though the shock of the sudden passage from mechanical to 
electrical technology has momentarily narcotized our nerves, integral man 
is in the process of formation” (Rosenberg 1965, 133). To take a scholarly 
example, John Fekete’s 1977 critique of “McLuhanacy” sees in McLuhan’s 
“structuration of the historical field . . . a mythic pattern of Fall and sal-
vation,” in which “integration displaces fragmentation”; moreover, Fekete 
describes the politics of McLuhan’s historical construct as conservative—
even “anti-Promethean” ([1977] 2005, 33).
Together with the Frankenpheme of technology as a central keyword 
in his media theory, McLuhan’s own rogue academic persona and his 
“mosaic” of interdisciplinary pursuits exposed him to caricature by the 
press as a “mad scientist” of media. In a book McLuhan cowrote with 
Wilfred Watson, From Cliché to Archetype (1970), an account of how 
critical figures become ideological ground (and vice versa), the auth-
ors take a moment to reflect on what they call “‘the philosophical tale,’ a 
genre designed for the popularizing of ideas”—but one whose exemplars, 
“from Gulliver’s Travels to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein . . . tend to melt 
quickly” (103). It is an ironic claim, in its denigration of Shelley’s work (a 
denigration typical enough for its time), given McLuhan’s own extensive 
redeployment of Frankenstein in his vocabulary and imagery of technology. 
And its irony becomes poignant, given the way in which McLuhan’s own 
work—especially its populist incarnations in the Playboy interview and 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
96 The Medium Is the Monster 
The Medium Is the Massage—was received in the moment of his inter-
national celebrity, during the late 1960s, as a vehicle for the popularizing 
of ideas, and perceived thereafter to melt quickly. It is to that moment, 
the scene of McLuhan’s receptions by baffled critics and countercultural 
techno-romantics, that we now tune in.
The “Mad Scientist” of Media: McLuhan and the Counterculture
The counterculture and popular culture of the late 1960s gave McLuhan 
and his work the moment of their peak popularity and established for 
them a cultural space that continues to be productive, as the next chap-
ters will detail. The countercultural and popular receptions of McLuhan 
in the 1960s amplified and countered each other and helped to globally 
disseminate his Frankensteinian idea of technology, in both the content 
and form of these receptions. A counterculture that styled itself a “global 
underground” adopted McLuhan’s ideas for oppositional forms of cul-
tural praxis like the underground press and psychedelic scene making; 
however, the countercultural adoption of McLuhan provided dominant 
cultural producers, like corporate journalists, with sensational images of 
mediatized radicalism that helped to construct a caricature of McLuhan as 
a “mad scientist” of media. The period of McLuhan’s popular ascendancy 
both disseminated his discourse of technology as a kind of Frankenstein 
monster, and dramatized its proponent as a kind of Victor Frankenstein.
McLuhan’s Frankensteinian figuring of technology in his own writing, 
as seen in the previous chapter; his unconventional method of presenting 
research; and his diversified public intellectual engagements: all these can 
be identified as key ingredients in the popular press’s construction of a 
caricature of McLuhan as a “mad scientist” of media. First, McLuhan’s 
unusual approach to presenting research involved what he called a 
“mosaic” method: a nonlinear form of writing that presents a series of 
claims and arguments in no particular order. McLuhan’s prefatory remarks 
in his major works invite the reader to skip and dip, to browse and peruse, 
according to the drift of the reader’s interest, rather than to read sequen-
tially from first page to last. McLuhan’s popular works, like The Medium 
Is the Massage ([1967] 2001), are even more nonlinear; they are cut-up 
collages and juxtapositions of prose, quotations, and found images. By this 
“mosaic” method, McLuhan sought to bring “cool,” immersive and partici-
patory values of new media to the traditionally “hot” print medium—that 
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is, to more fully involve the reader in meaning making (Cavell 2002, 126); 
but for our purposes here, his intent is not as significant as how crit-
ics and scholars interpreted his method and how they resorted to tropes 
that styled this method as that of a latter-day Victor Frankenstein. Critics 
described him as “irrational” (Crosby and Bond 1968, 51), as a case of “intel-
lectual megalomania” (68), someone who uses “shockmanship” (190) and 
a “hodge-podge methodology” (51) not to write but rather to “paste-up” 
(118) “a mosaic of exhibits .  .  . assembled from widely separated fields” 
(74), in which everything becomes “grist for his mad, mod mill” (173); such 
critics could then dismiss his dubious research results as “science fiction” 
(174)—or even demonize them as “horrible mutations” (83).
To be sure, such criticisms often took issue not only with McLuhan’s 
experimental and unscholarly writing style, but also with his cult of 
personality as a maverick academic, a “theoretical guru” (Fekete [1977] 
2005, 71) for the 1960s counterculture that grew more or less in step with 
McLuhan’s own fame: a counterculture galvanized by opposition to the 
American war in Vietnam and by radical student movements on both sides 
of the Atlantic. As this counterculture grew, networked, and diversified, it 
began to position itself as a “global underground” (Rycroft 1998, 230), partly 
through media strategies and cultural practices that openly acknowledged 
McLuhan’s influence and argued his importance.
The counterculture was heavily influenced by McLuhan in its radical 
and avant-garde cultural practices across a range of media and venues: 
from textual, art, and music production, to performance scenes, to family 
and community dwellings. McLuhan “was adopted by the counterculture. 
. . . To them, McLuhan’s slogans, like ‘the medium is the message,’ ‘hit us 
with telegraphic immediacy and the opacity of their clever, clever word-
play’” (Rycroft [2011] 2016, 111, quoting Ferguson 1991, 73). According 
to counterculture archivist Alastair Gordon, McLuhan’s Understanding 
Media became “one of the canonical texts of the period. Its unorthodox 
views on space, community, and communications had resonance with a 
generation that had come of age watching television” (2008, 167). A multi-
media collective called The Company of Us (USCO) linked McLuhan’s 
“electronic tribalism” to mysticism and psychedelia in immersive art instal-
lations designed to induce sensory overload, like Tie-Dyed Cave (1966): 
a small room with its walls wholly covered in fabrics tie-dyed with frac-
tal patterns. In 1966, various counterculture events were “organized on 
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McLuhanesque principles” (Cavell 2002, 230). These included happenings 
in New York, a “three-day sensorium” in San Francisco (Crosby and Bond 
1968, 103), and a Vancouver festival that included a performance by the 
psychedelic rock band Jefferson Airplane (Cavell 2002, 230). As Cavell 
reminds us, urban Canada in this period was a “countercultural locus par 
excellence (and not only because it represented a haven for draft dodg-
ers), with places such as Halifax and Vancouver garnering international 
attention for artistic programs and events developed within the context of 
McLuhan’s media theories” (103). At New York’s Electric Circus, light and 
projection shows accompanied live music by acts like the Velvet Under-
ground; one visitor described its audiovisual chaos as “a place where 
Marshall McLuhan meets Sigmund Freud” (quoted in Gordon 2008, 57). 
Another club, Cerebrum, was more aggressively experimental: “partici-
pants sucked on mint-flavored ice balls and gathered in circles as guides 
squirted cream over their intertwined fingers. A weather balloon was filled 
with helium and released into the air. People gathered beneath the silken 
fabric of a parachute and waved their arms up and down. . . . Time called 
it a ‘McLuhan geisha house’” (Gordon 2008, 57). And “for the Yippies”—an 
anarchistic group of avant-garde pranksters-as-protesters—“understand-
ing media after McLuhan was a crucial weapon—they relied on distortion 
of all forms of media” to advance “an alternative way of life” that would 
“fuse an instinctive comprehension of the workings of mass communica-
tion with direct action” (Rycroft [2011] 2016, 133).
As in the counterculture’s performance practices, so in its textual and 
media work was McLuhan a legible presence. “McLuhan’s books and peri-
odicals were advertised in most underground publications,” writes Simon 
Rycroft, and his ideas “informed the editorial policy of some underground 
papers not least because of scattered references to him throughout” ([2011] 
2016, 115). In New York, a video cooperative called Global Village “explicitly 
used McLuhan’s theories in an attempt to undermine the power of the mass 
media” (155). Many counterculture media producers read McLuhan as an 
advocate of art as politics, and of the radical democratization of media, and 
consequently misread his “global village” not as the “whirlwind of violence” 
he thought it, but as a techno-Utopian “call for retribalization,” a prem-
ise “to reinvent the human community” (Gordon 2008, 145). McLuhan’s 
work informed the tactics whereby the underground press represented the 
counterculture as a “global underground” (Rycroft 1998, 230).
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McLuhan was also sometimes a counterculture participant. His own 
periodicals, like Counterblast, strongly suggest “some form of an aesthetic 
dialogue between the underground press and McLuhan” (Rycroft [2011] 
2016, 132). His work was included in an avant-garde anthology, Astronauts 
of Inner-Space, which also included contributions by Allen Ginsberg and 
William Burroughs (Cavell 2002, 103). McLuhan’s book The Medium Is the 
Massage, in its medium-challenging visual experimentation—its textual 
nonlinearity and bold photomontage (127)—both reflects and courts the 
counterculture; its notion that photocopying lets the individual become 
her or his own publisher (McLuhan and Fiore [1967] 2001, 123) was taken 
to heart by the underground press (Rycroft 1993, 55, 194). Whatever his 
personal reservations about the counterculture, McLuhan showed serious 
interest in and engagement with it, which likely did not help his already 
dubious standing among academic colleagues.
But in engaging with the counterculture, McLuhan was engaging with 
his students—after all, his interest in their interests was what had brought 
him to popular culture in the first place, and now students were a big part of 
the counterculture. A 1964 “McLuhan Festival” held at UBC included work 
by USCO, as part of a labyrinthine, multimedia and multisensory environ-
ment that, as Tom Wolfe told it, guided participants “to understand the 
‘tactile communication’ McLuhan was talking about” (quoted in Genosko 
2005, 168). Students and scholars alike recognized McLuhan’s counter-
cultural connections. McLuhan’s students at the University of Toronto 
were labelled “McLuhanatics” (Bessai 1999). A 1967 Newsweek story on 
McLuhan quoted a student who “likens reading McLuhan to taking LSD. ‘It 
can turn you on,’ she says. ‘LSD doesn’t mean anything until you consume 
it—likewise McLuhan’” (quoted in Crosby and Bond 1968, 166). McLuhan 
responded to this claim in his interview with Playboy: “I’m flattered to 
hear my work described as hallucinogenic, but I suspect that some of my 
academic critics find me a bad trip” (1969, 66). Umberto Eco criticized 
as “obvious” McLuhan’s main idea that “every new technology imposes 
changes in the social body” ([1986] 2005, 129) but praised his “visionary 
rhetoric” as “stimulating, high-spirited, and crazy. There is some good in 
McLuhan,” writes Eco, “as there is in banana smokers and hippies” (130).
McLuhan’s world-historical figure of “electronic man,” his “mosaic” 
style, his relationship to the counterculture, and his engagements with 
other audiences outside academia (especially the advertising industry) 
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earned him a portfolio of both subcultural capital and political capital 
unique among academics; but the countercultural context of his public 
intellectual life also supplied mainstream journalism with sensational 
images of technologized radicalism that helped to cement the popular dis-
course of technology as a Frankenstein monster and the image of McLuhan 
as a mad scientist out to anatomize and reanimate the media—to “seek the 
cure in the disease,” as the New Yorker put it (quoted in Crosby and Bond 
1968, 119). Another New Yorker article criticized McLuhan for leaving his 
subject “in the end (despite the aphoristic crackle) more dead than alive” 
(quoted in Crosby and Bond 1968, 201). The introduction to McLuhan’s 
Playboy interview lists some vividly figured press vilifications and demon-
izations of McLuhan: as a “guru of the boob tube,” a “metaphysical wizard 
possessed by a spatial sense of madness,” and as a “high priest of popthink 
who conducts a Black Mass for dilettantes before the altar of historical 
determinism” (1969, 53). Invoking a monster character long associated, 
like the vampire, with Frankenstein, a 1967 article on McLuhan in Senior 
Scholastic rhetorically asks, in its headline, “Will TV put a zombie in your 
future?” (quoted in Crosby and Bond 1968). And Toffler’s bestselling 1970 
book Future Shock harbours an important debt to McLuhan that the book 
works hard to disavow. Toffler (without a hint of self-reflexive irony) dis-
misses McLuhan as a “Super-Simplifier” (1970, 361), and yet the dismissal 
seems disingenuous, even unthankful, since Toffler’s hugely popular book 
owes a clear debt to McLuhan, citing his work repeatedly in building its 
own rather simplistic argument about technology as a “great, growling 
engine of change” (25) in need simply of “taming” (428).
McLuhan focused much of his work on television, and the period’s 
journalism and popular culture correspondingly associated TV with his 
theories to parse them: “No other medium . . . captured so well the techn-
ophilia and technophobia of the period, as well as McLuhan’s agonistic 
response to media generally”; the feedback between McLuhan and the 
counterculture (the former furnishing theory that the latter put into prac-
tice that the former then theorized further) thus exacerbated how television 
was perceived to “encapsulate the most liberating and most threatening 
aspects of the electronic revolution” (Cavell 2002, 191). In the process, both 
McLuhan and counterculture became icons or symptoms of this “revo-
lution”; both were sensationalized as images of “tuned in” radicalism that 
in turn amplified McLuhan’s own Frankensteinian sense of technology 
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(and fostered the erroneous idea that McLuhan was himself a radical). 
We still hear a suggestive period example of this discourse in The Stooges’ 
proto-punk single “Search and Destroy,” in which Iggy Pop snarls: “Look 
out honey, ’cause I’m using technology” (1973). Pop invokes the discourse 
of technology in the context of a warning, and the fast-tempo drumming 
and distorted guitars amplify the ominous import of this lyric. The lis-
tener in the know, furthermore, understands Iggy’s warning as a coded 
reference to the excessive recreational and often performative drug use 
for which he became notorious, and which itself enacts a Frankensteinian 
“techno-Romanticism” (Reynolds 1999) that we will take up in chapter 7.
Having developed a discourse of technology that dramatized its 
Frankensteinian pretext and globalized its scope, McLuhan and his media 
theory have been popularized globally in a multimedia range of adap-
tations that, in turn, further amplify that discourse to such an extent 
that, today, we cannot use the word technology without conjuring the 
spectres of both Frankenstein and McLuhan. It is to a selection of particu-
larly significant adaptations that the next chapter turns, as the period’s 
McLuhan-infused counterculture welcomed to its Toronto scene a Vir-
ginian draft dodger with literary ambitions, who saw the literary potential 
and dystopian implications of McLuhan’s claim that new media turn “the 
real world into science fiction” ([1964] 2003, 54–55): an expatriate by the 
name of William Gibson.
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5. Monstrous Adaptations
McLuhanesque Frankensteins in 
Neuromancer and Videodrome
William Gibson credits Canada’s counterculture scene in the 1960s as a 
formative milieu for his science fiction generally, and he credits McLuhan 
specifically as a source for his own celebrated vision of “cyberspace” 
(quoted in Rapatzikou 2004, 228). Gibson’s 1984 novel Neuromancer and 
David Cronenberg’s 1983 film Videodrome, two widely popular “cult” 
texts from the early 1980s, typify and establish a pattern of adaptation 
in Canadian popular culture that amplifies and dramatizes McLuhan’s 
Frankensteinian discourse of technology. Neuromancer narrates a picar-
esque story of cyberspace, cyborgs, and incipient artificial intelligence, 
set in a dystopian, free-market future that has become an “unsupervised 
playground for technology” (Gibson 1984, 11). Videodrome, a film about 
corporate media research and development that goes monstrously, mur-
derously wrong, bases its plot on Frankenstein, and, what is more, the 
film includes a character who is an open parody of McLuhan. Both of 
these texts adapt Frankenstein in several key respects; both, in the process, 
refer significantly to McLuhan. Consequently, both texts articulate and 
have further popularized the discourse of technology as a McLuhanesque 
“Frankenpheme.” These texts’ adaptation practices have been amplified 
in turn by adaptations of these texts in their own right; they have also 
supplied popular culture with a wealth of samples and terms, the most 
familiar of which may be “cyberspace” itself. In addition, Gibson and Cro-
nenberg have repeated, with variations, this practice of McLuhanesque 
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Frankenstein adaptation in their other works, notably Gibson’s 1996 novel 
Idoru and virtually every Cronenberg movie before Videodrome (as well as 
a few since). Furthermore, other works by other Canadian popular cultural 
producers have propagated this pattern of McLuhanesque Frankenstein 
adaptation, in print literature and other media and performance practices 
(which the next three chapters will turn to).
“Real motive problem, with an AI”: The Formation of  
Frankensteinian Plots
Neuromancer, Gibson’s debut novel and the first in a series known as the 
Sprawl trilogy, appeared in 1984 to immediate acclaim. Neuromancer won 
the genre’s major awards, the Hugo and the Nebula; it has been credited 
with envisioning—and naming—a graphically rich Internet, “cyberspace,” 
at a time when the rudimentary Internet was strictly DOS and text-based; 
and—after helping to introduce and popularize a science fiction (SF) 
subgenre known as “cyberpunk”—it has since become more or less the 
canonical novel of contemporary science fiction as such (Brouillette 
2002). It is widely taught in SF courses, it has stayed in print since its first 
publication, perennially drawing new readerships, and it has been widely 
translated, into other languages and into other media, as a graphic novel 
and as a computer game—though not film, as yet.
Neuromancer is basically a high-tech heist caper: the novel adopts 
something of the style and tone of hard-boiled detective fiction and film 
noir to project an all-too-plausible free-market future of totalized cor-
porate dominion, a future society polarized between a fabulously wealthy 
elite and various underclasses of freelancers, subcontractors, hustlers, and 
criminals, in which any recognizable middle class and nation-state gov-
ernance are conspicuously absent. The most prominent police presence in 
this setting is the “Turing Registry,” a global law enforcement agency that 
exercises legal “flexibility,” under the international treaties that govern it, 
to suppress research on artificial intelligence and quarantine its results 
(1984, 162). A computer hacker named Case and a surgically weaponized 
mercenary named Molly are hired by an ex-military officer, Armitage, 
to break into the compound of a corporate dynasty in order to steal an 
artificial intelligence (AI). The AI is masterminding its own theft as an 
escape, and at the novel’s end the AI unites with its heretofore concealed 
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sibling AI and then fuses with the virtual world, known alternately as “the 
matrix” or “cyberspace” (51).
The novel’s plot focuses on the self-discovery and liberation of one such 
AI; this storyline in itself cements Neuromancer’s Frankensteinian frame-
work. The discourse of artificial intelligence is definitively Frankensteinian: 
it presents a contemporary image of nonhuman sentience, agency, and 
autonomy, and today it is increasingly posited less as a fiction or hypoth-
esis than as a looming likelihood, if not an already emergent phenomenon 
(Gunkel 2012). Since World War II and Alan Turing’s famous test, in which 
an interviewer’s inability to identify the interviewee as human or machine 
signals the advent of AI, images of AI have tended to take shape in the 
context of computing and to assume a Frankensteinian aspect as a techno-
logical threat of sometimes apocalyptic global magnitude. From Hal to 
Her—from the spacecraft computer in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (1968) to Spike Jonze’s 2013 film about a sentient mobile operating 
system—and from the apocalyptic brinksmanship of the ICBM launch 
computer in WarGames (1983) to the postapocalyptic, machine-ruled 
worlds of The Terminator (1984) and The Matrix (1999): such images of 
ascendant and dominant AI echo not only the earlier Frankensteinian 
images of manufactured, nonhuman subjects like those in Karel Čapek’s 
1920 stage play R.U.R., which invented and popularized the word “robot” 
(Hitchcock 2007, 135), but that of Frankenstein’s creature itself, which 
remains popular culture’s founding figure of human-made sentience and 
agency. In Neuromancer, the fact that the AI has turned on its creators, that 
it plots to escape its confinement, and that it is a divided creature seeking 
the merger of its separated selves, Wintermute and Neuromancer: these 
three major plot points reflect the analogous plot points in Frankenstein’s 
“skeleton story” of a manufactured creature, which turns on its creator 
and desires a mate like itself.
The AI in question is a double entity, its own doppelgänger, a composite 
of two AIs made by the same creator. The name Wintermute, itself a com-
posite of noun and adjective, is evocative of key details from Frankenstein: 
the noun winter conjures both the Arctic setting that frames the story of 
Frankenstein (and, incidentally, the season with which Canada is popularly 
identified); the word mute (which can be read in this name, somewhat 
ambiguously, as either adjective or noun) suggests both the pointedly 
low profile that the AI maintains throughout the plot and the inarticulate 
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characterization of Frankenstein’s monster that was made famous in its 
stage and screen adaptations. The other AI’s name, Neuromancer, is a pun 
on “necromancer,” the title of that eminently Faustian and Frankensteinian 
figure: the magician who practices communication with or summoning of 
the dead. The climax of the plot takes place as the speaking aloud of a cer-
tain code word, “a true name” (1984, 262), which triggers the synthesizing 
fusion of Wintermute and Neuromancer into “something else,” something 
undefined yet described as nothing less than all of cyberspace itself, “the 
sum total of the works, the whole show” (268–69). Significantly, the “true 
name” is never divulged to the reader, and this withholding of that name, 
together with the coy refusal of the merged AI to name itself, echoes the 
equally significant namelessness of Frankenstein’s monster. The merger 
of the AI with cyberspace itself dramatizes “the singularity”: a theoretical 
tipping point at which technology becomes self-aware and begins to exert 
its own agency over the pace and scale of further technological change 
(Kurzweil 2005).
While the AI drives the plot, most of the main characters are also 
high-tech cyborgs of one kind or another. The heist team’s muscle, Molly, 
has undergone surgery to implant retractable razors in her fingers. The 
team’s leader, Armitage, turns out to be a personality that the scheming AI 
has scripted and grafted onto the salvaged body of a soldier named Corto: 
“Wintermute had built something called Armitage into a catatonic fortress 
named Corto” (1984, 193). Towards the end of the novel, the factitious 
personality that is Armitage begins to crack, endangering the heist. Most 
minor characters are also spectacular cyborgs: one’s eyes are described as 
“vatgrown sea-green Nikon transplants” (21); another has “a dozen spikes 
of microsoft protruding from the socket behind his ear” (57).
A prominent supporting role is played by other AIs, especially a “ROM 
personality construct,” a crude simulation of AI based on the recording 
and recoding of a dead man’s personality: “It was disturbing to think of 
the Flatline as a construct, a hardwired ROM cassette replicating a dead 
man’s skills, obsessions, knee-jerk responses” (76–77). The “Dixie Flatline” 
construct, as a recording of a deceased person capable of live interaction, 
bears a strong similarity to the character of Brian O’Blivion in Videodrome, 
as will be discussed below. In an ironic dialogue with the main charac-
ter, Case, the heist team’s hacker, the “Flatline”—which is a rudimentary 
AI, incapable of autonomy or persistent memory—reminds Case of the 
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profoundly nonhuman and inscrutable otherness of AI thinking: “Real 
motive problem, with an AI. Not human, see? .  .  . And you can’t get a 
handle on it” (131). The construct then warns Case that the opacity of an 
AI’s “motive” is what makes its capacity to achieve agency and autonomy 
a Frankensteinian menace: “The minute, I mean the nanosecond, that one 
starts figuring out ways to make itself smarter, Turing’ll wipe it. . . . Every 
AI ever built has an electro-magnetic shotgun wired to its forehead” (132). 
The apocalyptic threat in the deep background here is that of Victor Frank-
enstein’s imagined “race of devils.” Hence the Turing police of Gibson’s 
imagined world: a police force exclusively for surveilling and suppressing 
AI research and development, authorized to suppress or terminate any 
such work that threatens to achieve autonomy or to get loose into the 
world’s digital network.
Which is exactly what ultimately happens in Neuromancer. In ambigu-
ous relation to Slusser’s notion of the “Frankenstein barrier” as science 
fiction’s narrative mainstay—that barrier being the foreclosure on future 
possibilities by present contingencies—Neuromancer holds out an open 
end in which the AI at large may or may not signify the radical techno-
logical change of a “singularity” kind: “How are things different?” Case asks 
the escaped AI. “You running the world now?” The AI answers, “Things 
aren’t different. Things are just things” (1984, 270). And yet immediately 
after this assertion, the AI reports having made contact with another AI 
from a distant planet. While such a startling suggestion could mean pro-
found social change, it never comes up again in Gibson’s novels, and thus 
remains an arch and understated instance of the Frankenstein barrier nar-
rative strategy.
Videodrome, in contrast, represents a narrative that much more graph-
ically and less ambiguously enforces the Frankenstein barrier, even though 
in most other respects the film is profoundly ambiguous, and justly cele-
brated by critics for this depth of ambiguity, which greatly augments its 
effectiveness as a horror film. Videodrome adapts Frankenstein in terms 
of premise, plot, characterization, and several significant cinematic strat-
egies, in the process unfolding a bizarre, quintessentially postmodernist 
story that concerns technological backfire, McLuhan’s ideas, and media 
imperialism.
In the film, the Hollywood star James Woods plays Max Renn, a TV 
station owner who is drawn to a mysterious TV program that specializes 
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in sadomasochism and torture porn; this program is called Videodrome. 
Renn starts hallucinating after watching it and looks for answers from 
Brian O’Blivion, who claims to be the inventor of the Videodrome “signal.” 
But O’Blivion remains enigmatic: he makes cryptic pronouncements about 
media, in clear parodic echo of McLuhan: “television is reality, and real-
ity is less than television.” Furthermore, O’Blivion only ever appears on 
a TV screen: it turns out that O’Blivion has died prior to the plot’s start, 
leaving ambiguous and uncanny the nature of his dialogues with Renn 
and others. Then Renn meets Barry Convex, CEO of the Spectacular 
Optical corporation, “an enthusiastic global citizen that makes eye-glasses 
for the third world and missile guidance systems for NATO”—as well as 
Videodrome. As Renn’s grasp on reality slips increasingly into surreal, gro-
tesque hallucination, he becomes a murderous pawn in a struggle between 
O’Blivion’s techno-utopian “Cathode Ray Mission,” which serves free TV 
access to the homeless, and Spectacular Optical, which plans to broad-
cast the Videodrome program as part of a corporate plot to transmit the 
Videodrome signal across North America. Ultimately turning on Convex 
and those who would “program” him to do their will—by slotting video-
tapes into his abdomen and by empowering him to turn his own hand into 
a “flesh gun”—Renn finally flees to an abandoned ship where he destroys 
himself in a self-immolating apotheosis of “the new flesh.” Or does he? The 
screen goes black before we hear the “flesh gun” shot fired.
Videodrome represents a version of the Frankenstein skeleton story that 
is set in the contexts of contemporary media and media theory. O’Blivion 
is a transparently McLuhanesque “mad scientist,” and—in keeping with 
the film’s Frankensteinian imagery of doubling and doppelgängers—he 
shares the “creator” role with Convex. O’Blivion claims responsibility for 
creating the Videodrome signal, but it is Convex who claims credit for its 
production and who proceeds to “program” Renn to assassinate O’Bliv-
ion’s daughter, heir to his legacy and the Cathode Ray Mission. But—in 
perfect creaturely form—Renn rebels, maiming Convex’s henchman and 
murdering Convex before seeking refuge and possibly suicide in a corner 
of the ship that is, significantly, on fire.
The plot within the plot—the Spectacular Optical corporation’s stra-
tegic plan to widely deploy the Videodrome signal—remains strangely 
vague: to judge by what Convex and his henchman, the broadcast tech 
expert Harlan, tell Renn, the corporation’s vaguely media-imperialist plan 
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is either to incapacitate the North American populace into hallucinatory 
stupor or to incite it to violent mobilization. Either way, Spectacular Optic-
al’s plan amounts to a mass zombification of the North American television 
audience, and as such it exemplifies the tradition of “technological reduc-
tions” of the Frankenstein story.
In an early scene in the film, Renn watches O’Blivion first explain 
Videodrome in McLuhanesque terms and then address Renn personally, 
as the medium grows grotesquely monstrous: the television set from which 
O’Blivion speaks to Renn starts inflating and deflating as though breath-
ing, and the screen protrudes towards Renn as he watches. This scene is a 
“new media” version of the scene in Frankenstein where the creature reads 
of its origins in the papers left in Frankenstein’s coat pocket. That scene 
shows the importance of media as a theme in Shelley’s own text, which 
dramatized an Enlightenment belief in the power of narrative, and textual 
representation generally, to produce interpersonal understanding and thus 
social change. This is one way to read Walton’s ultimate encounter with 
the creature and his ensuing decision to call off the fatal Arctic expedition 
to return home. But in Videodrome, film and video invert that power: 
these new media become tools for corporate social control—consumerist 
colonization and domination—through affective intensity, addictive serial-
ization, and domestic distribution, techniques that mobilize consumerism 
and fragment audiences into isolated viewers.
Another Frankensteinian plot element is the interpretive ambiguity and 
unreliability of its events and its end, effected by a cinematic equivalent of 
Shelley’s nesting of narratives within one another: in the film, the focaliz-
ing point of view is always that of Renn, who, as William Beard notes, “is 
present in every scene of the movie”; Beard quotes Cronenberg’s descrip-
tion of Videodrome as a “first-person film,” in which “we get no information 
that Max himself doesn’t get” (1983, 50). This constant focalization through 
Renn’s point of view echoes the similar but easily overlooked focalization 
of Frankenstein, which is wholly focalized through the point of view of the 
ship captain Walton, whose letters to his sister frame the narratives then 
told successively by Victor Frankenstein and the creature. Just as Walton’s 
focalizing perspective leaves unanswered the extent of his participation, 
interference, or accuracy in recounting his own story and those he hears, 
so does Videodrome’s focalization leave unresolvedly ambiguous which 
events in the film actually happen and which Renn hallucinates.
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One effect of this focalization is an apprehension of the postmodern 
sublime: the uncertainty about what one sees and how far one can trust 
what one sees. Not just Renn but the very film audience itself is left in 
doubt over what is real, left to ponder the extent to which reality is a matter 
of perception and imagination. The abysmal ambiguity of Cronenberg’s 
resituating of Frankenstein hinges on popular culture’s perennial anxieties 
of new media technologies, peculiarly Canadian concerns regarding media 
imperialism, and, not least, McLuhan’s media theory.
Spectres of McLuhan: Learning to Live in a “Strange New World”
Both Gibson and Cronenberg borrow significantly from Frankenstein and 
McLuhan’s media theory, and, just as significantly, they pair these sources 
in order to figure technology as monstrous and globalized.
One of the most striking and celebrated features of Neuromancer is 
its durably influential envisioning of “cyberspace” as “a consensual hallu-
cination . . . a graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks 
of every computer in the human system” (1984, 51); this vision has since 
been heralded as a fictional anticipation of the World Wide Web, if not 
the Internet as such. Yet as Gibson recalls, his conception of cyberspace 
developed less in a pre-Internet context than in a post-McLuhan context.
McLuhan’s influence is clear in the novel itself and in commentary 
by and about Gibson. In a 1999 article, Derek Foster identified some 
conceptual “linkages between the fictional musings of Gibson and the 
nonfictional reflections of . . . McLuhan” (66). As of that writing, Foster 
says that he “know[s] of no acknowledgment by Gibson that he has even 
read McLuhan” (70)—but in a subsequent interview with Tatiani Rapa-
tzikou, Gibson confirms this creative debt, citing McLuhan’s influence, 
especially over his idea of cyberspace, which he describes as a “McLuhan-
esque post-Orwellian television universe” (quoted in Rapatzikou 2004, 
228). For Gibson, cyberspace is not an image of a utopian “open web,” it 
is a McLuhanesque “global village” of digital disruption and dystopia, of 
surveillance, securitization, sabotage, and subversion, all organized by 
corporations, not states, as the major controlling powers. The contro-
versy that erupted in 2013 over the widespread practice of online spying 
on citizens by many state intelligence agencies, and over the cooperation 
and complicity of major technology firms and services in this practice, 
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has given new clout to McLuhan’s and Gibson’s dystopian projections of 
digitally networked and globalized society.
On close reading, the novel readily demonstrates the influence of 
McLuhan’s media ecology that Gibson has acknowledged. In one scene 
in the novel, Case objects to the AI “reading” his mind, to which the AI 
replies by alluding to the theory of typographic literacy that McLuhan elab-
orates in The Gutenberg Galaxy: “Minds aren’t read. See, you’ve still got 
the paradigms print gave you, and you’re barely print-literate” (1984, 170). 
McLuhan’s model of technological revolutions also informs this scene, 
and, perhaps more clearly, a scene set in Istanbul, where a niche industry 
of “letter-writers” who work on “old voiceprinters” suggest to the itinerant 
protagonist Case that “the written word still enjoyed a certain prestige 
here. It was a sluggish country” (88).
And McLuhan’s dystopian model of the “global village” looms behind 
Gibson’s fictional congeries of mobile capital, media simulacra, and 
ecological ruin. Neuromancer’s opening scene describes “the glare of 
the television sky” over “drifting shoals of white styrofoam” (6). For the 
protagonist, Case, electronic cyberspace and pharmaceutical stimulants 
often function as interchangeable fixes (16), dangerous supplements alike. 
Like Cronenberg’s Videodrome, Neuromancer figures its Frankensteinian 
protagonists as model schizoid consumer-subjects, navigating the eco-
nomically uneven and ecologically unstable ground of transnational 
capital’s “global village.” The novel’s action globe-trots from a Japanese 
black market to the eastern seaboard of the United States, from Istan-
bul to an elite tourist retreat in orbit around Earth. The action thus also 
navigates between a representative constellation of financial centres 
and the technologized wastelands at their peripheries, and between the 
physical and virtual worlds as well. Conspicuously, and perhaps presciently, 
Neuromancer downplays or even omits the names and functions of the 
nation-states that ostensibly host the novel’s main urban settings—Japan, 
Turkey, the United States. In Neuromancer, the ruling powers in his pro-
jected world-system are transnational corporations, not nations.
In this context, Neuromancer becomes legible as a fictional staging of 
the volatile global village, in its extrapolation of McLuhan’s projections of 
televised, computerized, and “corporate” global connectivity. Moreover, 
in the process of projecting a hypermediatized and fully privatized global 
village, Gibson adapts to the mode of fiction the kind of theorizing and 
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extrapolating that McLuhan did in a nonfiction mode, and he consequently 
furnishes a fictional reworking of McLuhan’s own main thesis: that tech-
nologies, as extensions—or supplements—of human abilities, produce 
distinct social environments and subjectivities ([1967] 2001, 26)—or, in 
short, that the medium is the message. That Gibson’s novel has become 
the canonical text of science fiction since the neoliberal turn around 1980 
means it has not only fictionalized but also further amplified and popular-
ized McLuhan’s ideas among a global audience of science fiction readers, 
critics, and scholars.
Gibson’s reworking of McLuhan’s theory of media ecology is evident in 
a couple of significant lines from the opening chapter, which introduces 
the novel’s dystopian setting not in a scene of the neo-feudal corporate 
financescape that governs it, but in a scene set in the underground counter-
part of that financescape: a Japanese demimonde called Night City. The 
first salient line is that which opens the novel itself, a line that immedi-
ately evokes the spectre of McLuhan by association with the medium he 
most famously and extensively theorized. “The sky above the port was 
the color of television, tuned to a dead channel” (1984, 3). Shortly after 
this memorable opening line, Night City is described by Case as “a delib-
erately unsupervised playground for technology itself” (11). As described 
above, the hideous progeny of this totally technologized milieu is a ubiqui-
tously cybernetic populace, a carnivalesque crowd of spectacular cyborgs 
whose members each, in different ways, blur the nominal and unstable 
boundary between organism and mechanism, between ethnoscape and 
technoscape. Like the AI and Armitage, most characters in Neuromancer 
are posthuman: factitious, sometimes self-made hybrids of organic life and 
technology run amok. These characters animate the image of the setting 
as a “playground for technology,” an image to be discussed in detail in the 
next section.
Likewise, with its juxtaposition of vivid grotesquerie and knowing refer-
ence to Toronto’s nationally pivotal media and finance sectors, Videodrome 
dramatizes McLuhan’s claim that new media are turning “the real world 
into science fiction” ([1964] 2003, 54–55). The film depicts new media—
which, at the time of the film’s cinematic release in 1983, meant videotape 
and computers—as technologies of globalization that serve the imperialist 
aspirations of multinational corporations. Moreover, these technologies 
are depicted as grotesque and horrific: monstrous in and of themselves, 
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and in their effects on their users. As William Beard puts it, “the ‘orga-
nicization’ of technology—the ‘breathing’ cassettes and TV sets—acts to 
transfer technology into the intimate and personal realm of the body” 
(2006, 133–34). Videodrome horrifically dramatizes two of McLuhan’s 
main ideas by figuring their monstrous hybridization: the medium is the 
message, as becomes evident in the film’s literalization of O’Blivion’s claim 
that “reality is less than television”; and, moreover, the content of new 
media is not merely old media, as McLuhan often claimed ([1964] 2003, 
19)—the content is, more vitally, the user her- or himself, as we learn in 
different characters’ recurring claims to herald “the new flesh.” And as will 
be discussed below, similarly Frankensteinian figures of other new media, 
like computers and “virtual reality,” preoccupy other Cronenberg films, 
notably Scanners and eXistenZ.
As Beard and other critics recognize, Videodrome is not only an exem-
plar of postmodernist filmmaking, it is also knowledgeable enough about 
contemporary theory, especially McLuhan’s media theory, to satirize such 
theory in the film itself: “The brutally hilarious strategy of Videodrome 
is to take media theorists like Marshall McLuhan and Jean Baudrillard 
completely at their word, to overliteralize their claims for the ubiquitous 
mediazation of the world” (Shaviro, quoted in Beard 2006, 127). The pivotal 
figure of this satire on both media business and media theory is the char-
acter of Professor Brian O’Blivion himself. O’Blivion is a very edgy parody 
of McLuhan, perhaps scripted a bit too close to the bone: not only does 
O’Blivion echo McLuhan’s ideas and public persona as a media “prophet,” 
but, like the historical McLuhan, the fictional O’Blivion also suffers a brain 
tumour. Unlike McLuhan’s, O’Blivion’s tumour kills him, and O’Blivion 
hypothesizes its pathology as a side effect of exposure to the Videodrome 
signal itself. Given that the Videodrome signal is an outcome of O’Bliv-
ion’s media research, the implication is a satirical comment on the lethal 
practicality of ostensibly abstract theory.
As mentioned in the preceding discussion of the film’s plot and Frank-
ensteinian intertextuality, O’Blivion is a character who only appears in 
the film according to a double mediation: that is, he only appears on tele-
vision screens within the frame of the film; the actor playing him (Jack 
Creley) never occupies a set or location with the other actors. We first 
meet O’Blivion at a third remove of mediation, when, in a scene that takes 
place on a TV talk show, he is introduced as “media prophet Professor 
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Brian O’Blivion” and appears as a television set gets wheeled onto the set of 
the talk show. Prompted by the host, O’Blivion makes cryptic, theoretical 
statements and offers this explanation of why he’s on the set only as a set: 
“the television screen has become the retina of the mind’s eye. That’s why 
I refuse to appear on television, except on television.” Parked centre stage 
on the set, between the interviewer and the protagonists, O’Blivion looks 
uncannily from one speaker to another as though he is present on the set.
O’Blivion’s every appearance in Videodrome doubles the form of the 
film itself, mediatizing its cinematic frame by inserting a second, video 
frame within it; the film often exploits this formal doubling for mise en 
abyme effects that heighten its disorienting efforts. In what is maybe the 
film’s most famous scene, which marks the film’s decisive departure from 
realism into surrealism, Renn watches a taped recording of O’Blivion that 
begins to address Renn directly, as the TV set starts heaving and making 
breathing, hissing sounds, veins rippling across its wood-paneled surfaces. 
And later, Renn meets O’Blivion’s daughter-turned-curator Bianca (played 
by Sonja Smits), who explains her father’s uncanny afterlife as an archive 
of videotapes:
Bianca: This is him. This is all that’s left.
Max: What are you talking about?
Bianca: Brian O’Blivion died quietly on an operating table eleven 
months ago.
Max: The brain problem?
Bianca: The Videodrome problem. You have it, too.
Max: But he was on that panel show with me.
Bianca: On tape. He made thousands of them, sometimes three or 
four a day. I keep him alive as best I can. He had so much to offer. 
My father helped to create Videodrome. He saw it as the next 
phase in the evolution of man as a technological animal. When he 
realized what his partners were going to use it for, he tried to take 
it away from them and they killed him, quietly. At the end he was 
convinced that public life on television was more real than private 
life in the flesh. He wasn’t afraid to let his body die. (1983)
This explanatory plot twist scrambles what sense the audience has made of 
the diegetic narrative time up to this point, and it renders O’Blivion’s seem-
ing conversations with Renn comprehensible only as uncanny addresses 
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from some monstrously remediated afterlife. O’Blivion embodies an 
uncanny doubling: Is he alive or dead? Good guy or bad guy? Present or 
absent? Corporeal or cathode? Inspired or insane? Public or private? Real 
or imagined? Himself or someone else? Both or neither? Only a few of 
these questions receive any answer in the scene that presents the “real” 
O’Blivion, embodied as the tape library, and these answers are at best 
speculative and provisional; the other questions contribute to the radical 
ambiguity of the whole film. Moreover, O’Blivion’s role as an explana-
tory “father-figure” (Beard 2006, 143) is doubled; he shares this role with 
Convex, whose corporate profiteering contrasts O’Blivion’s public-interest 
projects. In a few ways, then, O’Blivion acts as a referential doppelgänger, 
complementing Convex while citing not only McLuhan but also Glenn 
Gould, the Canadian pianist who gave up live performance to work exclu-
sively in recordings.
O’Blivion’s totally mediatized appearance throughout the film, as an 
uncanny “talking head” on a TV screen, both parodies McLuhan’s ideas 
about television and gives a cyberpunk twist to the Frankensteinian film 
trope of the brain in a vat. One of McLuhan’s more sensational ideas, 
refracted throughout popular culture and especially in discourses of “vir-
tual reality,” is the notion of subjectivity as a transferable kind of “software” 
that can be downloaded from a body and uploaded to a device: as I have 
discussed elsewhere (McCutcheon 2012), this notion has been widely 
fictionalized, dramatized, and theorized, for instance in the 1980s TV 
series Max Headroom, the 2000s TV series Battlestar Galactica, Cory 
Doctorow’s 2003 novel Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, and in the 
discourses of “virtual reality,” for example Derrick de Kerckhove’s The Skin 
of Culture (1995) and Christopher Dewdney’s book Last Flesh (1998). In 
1971, McLuhan alludes to both television and incipient computing in his 
statement that “what is very little understood about the electronic age is 
that it angelizes man, disembodies him. Turns him into software” (quoted 
in Benedetti and DeHart 1996, 79). McLuhan later elaborated on this idea 
of disembodied remediation in a 1978 article: “When you are ‘on the tele-
phone’ or ‘on the air,’ you do not have a physical body. In these media, the 
sender is sent and is instantaneously present everywhere. The disembodied 
user extends to all those who are recipients of electric information” (quoted 
in Benedetti and DeHart 1996, 80). Hence, in Neuromancer, Case’s techno-
logical transcendence of corporeal existence in his flights through the 
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datascapes of cyberspace and his grudging returns to mere “meat” exist-
ence, in “the prison of his own flesh” (1984, 6). Hence, also, Videodrome’s 
Brian O’Blivion, who only appears onscreen within a second, embedded 
screen. Both characters’ full withdrawal into media systems dramatize the 
distinctively McLuhanesque double movement of both a transnational 
spacing—the remediated “extension of our own bodies and senses”—and 
a technological doubling—the “lease [of ] our central nervous systems to 
various corporations” (McLuhan [1964] 2003, 99–100).
As Cavell has argued (2002, xiii), McLuhan directed his major research 
questions to contexts of space, of surroundings, of environment; hence, 
for instance, his retroactive positioning as a founder of the field of “media 
ecology.” Through his thoroughly technologized existence, strictly “on tele-
vision,” O’Blivion occupies a simultaneously indeterminate space—from 
where (and/or when) is he broadcasting?—and a closely confined space—
the cathode-ray small screen. The revelatory scene that exposes O’Blivion’s 
fate as a video library is set in a high-ceilinged room, through which the 
camera pans across shelves full of tapes, suggesting both the professor’s 
encyclopedic knowledge and the extent of his media obsession. O’Blivion’s 
indeterminate redistribution problematizes the spatial dimension of elec-
tronic remediation as a globalized space: O’Blivion inhabits the “strange 
new world” in which “television is reality and reality is less than television,” 
a world evocative of McLuhan’s “global village,” an idea that figures in 
Videodrome as prominently as it does in Neuromancer.
While Neuromancer dramatizes the global village in a jet-setting 
plot that rockets the characters through the financescapes of late cap-
ital, Videodrome condenses the global village into the complementary 
characters of O’Blivion and Convex as figures of contrasting and con-
flicting globalization, the one dedicated charitably (albeit eccentrically) 
to the public interest, the other dedicated to profit and his shareholders. 
Cronenberg’s ironic portrayal of corporate “social responsibility” in Con-
vex’s invocation of “global citizenship,” in Spectacular Optical’s corporate 
deployments of mass media, and in the implied unevenness of global 
development—portrayed here as a soft North America in conflict with 
the “rest of the world” turned “tough” and “savage”—all appear years ahead 
of the critical theories of globalization that gained currency over a decade 
later. O’Blivion warns Renn that he will “have to learn to live in a very 
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strange new world,” signifying the disoriented North America plotted by 
Spectacular Optical and modelled by McLuhan’s global village.
Cronenberg’s McLuhanesque commentary on globalization also 
emerges in the form and production of the film, in its extended satire on 
Canadian media culture and Canadian film in the global entertainment 
market. O’Blivion, as a parody of McLuhan, is a standout example of this 
satire. So are Renn and the station he works for. Introduced as a kind of 
opportunistic sleaze merchant, Renn satirizes the shift from cinema to 
home video taking place in the pornography industry at that time. The 
station where Renn works—“Civic TV”—is a thinly veiled parody of City 
TV, which (before its takeover by CTV) was a Toronto independent station 
whose varied programming included softcore porn on late-night weekend 
slots. Late in the film, Renn shoots a coworker named “Moses” (a cipher 
for City TV’s founder Moses Znaimer).
The movie’s satire on the Canadian media establishment also encom-
passes its globalizing trends. Renn enacts the kind of subjectivity that 
McLuhan posits as symptomatic of the “global village”: a kind of “pro-
grammable” subjectivity: “There’s nothing at all difficult about putting 
computers in the position where they will be able to conduct carefully 
orchestrated programing of the sensory life of whole populations. I know 
it sounds rather science-fictional” (McLuhan 1969, 72). Renn’s visceral pro-
gramming and reprogramming via the repeated insertions of videotapes 
into his abdomen—at once suggestively sexual and suggestively cybernetic 
(recall that, at the time of the film’s release, magnetic tape was a stan-
dard storage medium for computer programs)—dramatizes and literalizes 
McLuhan’s claim that media programming could, in turn, program “whole 
populations”: “We could program five hours less of TV in Italy to promote 
the reading of newspapers during an election” (1969, 72). If O’Blivion has 
uncannily, ambiguously colonized the medium, Renn, conversely, is vio-
lently colonized by the medium, and so becomes, himself, a weaponized 
technology, as the repeated insertions of videotape over the course of 
the film give way to repeated withdrawals of a pistol that is mechanically 
and organically fused to Renn’s hand: a “flesh gun.” Inasmuch as the actor 
playing Renn, James Woods, is, in 1983, a relatively big Hollywood star, 
the actor’s performance in this film—which was financed by Canadian 
federal arts funding—lends a critical Canadian irony to Renn’s fate as the 
test subject for a transnational media empire.
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Its Hollywood stars and Toronto set stage the global tensions faced by 
Canada’s film industry, between cultivating “Canadian content” and draw-
ing foreign investment to “Hollywood north,” and the Spectacular Optical 
corporation, whose slogan is “keeping an eye on the world,” parodies the 
globalized business culture whose rhetoric of corporate “citizenship” con-
trasts its “enthusiastic” and amoral trade in a catalogue of symptomatic 
consumer and state technological goods: eyeglasses, weapons, and TV 
signal, which here also turns out to be a weapon.
Unsupervised Playgrounds: McLuhanesque Frankenphemes of 
Technology
The adaptations of Frankenstein and McLuhan in Neuromancer and 
Videodrome converge in articulations and images of technology that 
vividly illuminate its popular cultural construction and dissemination 
as a McLuhanesque Frankenpheme. Both texts depict settings that are 
replete with and even defined by media technologies; both texts’ plots pivot 
around figures and problems of autonomous technology; both texts’ main 
characters are stylized, grotesquely imagined cyborgs. Both texts explicitly 
use the word “technology,” too, and while these references are relatively 
few, they augment the texts’ more intensive and sustained representations 
of technology in general—and media technologies specifically—as simul-
taneously McLuhanesque and Frankensteinian.
Neuromancer includes five uses of the full word technology, five uses 
of the abbreviation “tech,” and two uses of “techno-” as a prefix. The “Pan-
ther Moderns” that help the heist crew steal the rudimentary, ROM-only 
AI “construct” are described as “nihilistic technofetishists” (1984, 59); the 
Japanese city of Chiba, where the novel opens, is described not only as 
an “unsupervised playground for technology” (11)—an image we’ll return 
to—but also as “a magnet for the Sprawl’s techno-criminal subcultures” (6). 
The slang abbreviation “tech” occurs five times. The Finn, an entrepreneur 
who provides privacy services—a pricey, scarce commodity in Gibson’s 
near future of ubiquitous surveillance—is introduced as “our tech here” 
(50). A subsequent scene includes “a trio of young office techs” (77). As a 
descriptor of certain characters, “tech” abbreviates not “technology” but 
“technician”; however, like the prefix “techno-,” which works adjectivally 
to describe certain social groups, the abbreviation “tech” allows an ambi-
guity that develops the novel’s cyberpunk setting and plot: the ambiguity 
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between tool and user, which makes fantastical cyborgs of most of the 
characters in the novel. Like Case’s physical, hard-wired connection to 
the console whereby he enters cyberspace, like Molly’s mercenary surgical 
augmentations, the abbreviation “tech” and the prefix “techno-” contribute 
to the construction of a fictional world in which late capital has radically 
blurred if not erased the traditional ontological boundary between human 
and machine.
The word technology itself contributes likewise to Neuromancer’s thor-
oughly cybernetic fictional world. What is distinctive about the novel’s 
use of the word technology is that it consistently situates technology as a 
novelty itself, as the cutting edge, as the prized object of unregulated or 
downright underground research and development. “If the technology had 
been available the Big Scientists would all have had sockets stuffed with 
microsofts” (59): here, Gibson adapts what would subsequently become 
one of the most globally powerful software brands (Microsoft) to describe 
a kind of data storage medium that interfaces with the user’s own body, via 
“sockets” described elsewhere as surgical implants in the cranium (today 
we might imagine this as something like USB ports set into the base of a 
person’s skull—but this analogy is, no doubt, already en route to obsoles-
cence). In the conspicuously uncertain history of the novel’s premise lurks 
one backstory about a world war that involved nuclear weapons and other 
kinds of weapons; as one character recalls, the war had “wasted a fair bit of 
patriotic young flesh in order to test some new technology” (35). Reminis-
cent of McLuhan’s claim about technology prompting war (McLuhan and 
Fiore 1968, 98), this passage shares with the “microsofts” passage a sense 
of technology as what is new, what is next, what is under development. 
Something of this sense of technology as the object and laboratory of 
capitalist futures also emerges in the “playground” image, and in a scene 
where Case pays a second visit to the Finn and feels as if the jungle of junk 
equipment and devices that camouflages the Finn’s place of business “had 
grown somehow,” forming “a crystalline essence of discarded technology, 
flowering secretly in the Sprawl’s waste places” (72).
The image of “discarded technology, flowering secretly” evokes not only 
technology’s novelty in Gibson’s prose but also, moreover, its uncanny, 
almost organic autonomy. This passing description thus foreshadows the 
emergence of artificial intelligence as a major actor in—and object of—the 
plot; it also amplifies the sense of technology’s almost self-aware agency in 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
120 The Medium Is the Monster
the opening description of Chiba’s “Night City” black market as “a delib-
erately unsupervised playground for technology itself” (1984, 6). Like the 
scene of the breathing, beckoning TV set in Videodrome, this image of 
the “unsupervised playground” effectively encapsulates Neuromancer’s 
overall representation of technology as a McLuhanesque Frankenpheme. 
The simile situates technology as a kind of child by invoking the image of 
the “playground,” and the adjective “unsupervised” suggests the absence of 
regulation that is typical of neoliberal ideology, laced with a hint of danger, 
as if the unmonitored status of this free-market playground could mean 
harm for who or what plays there, or as if who or what plays there could 
grow to bring harm to the wider world. The adjective “itself” following 
technology furthers the fetishistic sense of technology here as autono-
mous agent, as a character—arguably, indeed, as the true main character 
of Neuromancer.
Videodrome—a genre-bending film, at once “body horror” and cyber-
punk—similarly articulates and visualizes technology as a McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme. The words “media” and “technology” each occur only once 
in the film script, both with reference to O’Blivion, who is introduced 
first, in the TV interview scene, as a “media prophet.” Later, in the afore-
mentioned scene in O’Blivion’s video library, his daughter Bianca explains 
to Renn: “My father helped to create Videodrome. He saw it as part of the 
evolution of man as a technological animal.” Bianca’s reference to “evolu-
tion” evokes the epochal narrative that runs through McLuhan’s theory 
of the “ages” of different media, such as those of “typographical man” and 
“electronic man.”
If the script’s articulation of technology is sparing, though, the film’s 
visualization of it is pervasive, spectacular, and exceedingly grotesque. 
The main plot is driven wholly by the development and backfire of a new 
technology, the characters’ interactions with one another are dramatically 
technologized, and the film’s visual elements—its mise en scène, its settings, 
its props—are a sustained study in the aesthetics of mediatization and the 
technological grotesque. The film’s first lines of dialogue come from a TV 
station call and an automated voicemail system, respectively; its last frames 
display a televised image of Renn, pointing the flesh gun at his own head. 
Cathode-ray television sets figure frequently in many scenes; Renn meets 
both O’Blivion and Convex first as televised images; Renn and his fellow 
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protagonist Nicki Brand, played by Blondie’s Debbie Harry, both start out 
as “real” characters who eventually become entirely creatures of video.
The film’s most vivid articulation and amplification of technology as 
McLuhanesque Frankenpheme is perhaps the scene in which Renn inter-
acts surreally, intimately, and then immersively with the TV set in his living 
room, as the set shifts from playing back an O’Blivion tape, to showing 
O’Blivion address Renn personally, to becoming animate, as it starts to 
move and heave, veins rippling across its surface and the screen protrud-
ing towards Renn, while O’Blivion’s image and voice give way to those of 
Brand. This iconic scene condenses, in an exemplary way, the discourse of 
technology (figured here, significantly, as a consumer media technology) 
as a Frankensteinian monster that takes on a life of its own and threatens 
that of the user. This threat intensifies in the similarly surreal scene later 
in the film, where the TV screen extrudes an appendage in the shape of a 
hand pointing a pistol (fig. 3).
Figure 3 The medium is the monster: scene from Videodrome (1983). Courtesy 
of Universal Studios Licensing LLC. 
The monstrosity is figured as globalized, in the indeterminate source 
of the televised content—that of O’Blivion’s uncanny interactivity and that 
of the Videodrome signal and program, whose production is purported 
to take place in either Malaysia or Pittsburgh—and in the globalizing, 
totalizing language of O’Blivion’s speech, as he prognosticates that “the 
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battle for the mind of North America will be fought in the video arena,” 
theorizes that “television is reality,” and warns of the “strange new world” 
that Videodrome augurs.
Pattern Recognition
This distinctive synthesis of Shelley’s Frankenstein and McLuhan’s media 
theory in representations of technology recurs throughout the oeuvres of 
both Gibson and Cronenberg: their works not only formulate but repeat, 
with variations, the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology.
Cronenberg’s early body of work, from Stereo (1969) to The Fly (1986), 
comprises a tradition of Frankenstein adaptation unto itself, which Cro-
nenberg has further extended, though more sporadically, with more recent 
films like eXistenZ (1999). Bart Testa (1995) and Jonathan Crane (2000) 
have argued that Cronenberg’s early films belong as much to science fiction 
as to the horror genre, because of their distinctly Frankensteinian fusion of 
both generic conventions. Noting how consistently the early films “reviv-
ify” a “mad scientist” father figure, Crane argues that Cronenberg “reaches 
back as far as the genre will allow, and returns Dr. Frankenstein to the 
present. All Cronenberg’s variations on the father are interested in restor-
ing life to the dead” (2000, 55). Variations on this character type recur in 
Shivers (1976), Rabid (1977), The Brood (1979), Scanners (1981), Videodrome, 
The Dead Zone (1983), and The Fly (1986). In Videodrome’s version of the 
Frankenstein story, Crane recognizes the link between Frankenstein and 
technology that Cronenberg dramatizes in the context of media theory: 
“The vast television audience will be reconstructed in the face of real, direct 
communication effects. Frankenstein, as a pivotal player in new technolo-
gies, will now succeed Rupert Murdoch and Ted Turner” (2000, 56).
For Testa, Cronenberg’s early films all adapt a common Franken-
steinian plot structure of “the monster-protagonist-internal narrator 
searching for Explanation (finally to find his/her origins) and the same 
figure suffering and spreading a rising spectacular monstrosity.” The 
“Explanation” in these films is another commonality they share: “The 
origin of the monster-protagonist is the technological manufacture of 
the body,” based in dubious if not downright diabolical scientific research 
(1995,  47–48). Videodrome is an exemplar of such Frankensteinian plot-
ting, in its first-person point-of-view and in its insertion of other media 
forms, chiefly video footage, to unfold the backstory (45). Moreover, the 
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Cronenbergian “technological manufacture of the body” resonates with 
Canada’s technological nationalism, especially with McLuhan’s contri-
butions to it:
When, in Understanding Media, McLuhan claims the media are 
extensions of the human body he appears provocatively gnomic 
to some, but he recasts a metaphor classic in Canadian imagery 
of national settlement in the northern portion of the continent as 
extending the body—a manufactured body reaching out in railroads, 
telegraphs, televisions. (50)
Echoing Kroker (1984), Testa concludes that “behind the Canadian Cro-
nenberg is .  .  . a discourse on technology springing from the Canadian 
ethos” (51).
In Cronenberg’s early films (many of which, like Videodrome, were 
federally funded under the tax shelter provisions of the Canadian Film 
Development Corporation, now Telefilm Canada, as a nation-building 
cultural policy), the nested narrative frames, monstrous protagonists, and 
irresponsible father-doctors, as well as grotesque and Gothic effects, all 
show that Frankenstein is a potent source text; Videodrome accompanies 
these Frankenstein sources with a sustained and relatively explicit homage 
to McLuhan and Canada’s distinctive media culture.
Together with Videodrome and the considerably later film eXistenZ 
(1999), the 1981 film Scanners exemplifies Cronenberg’s penchant for set-
ting his Frankenstein adaptations in media contexts. Just as Videodrome 
explores the manufactured monstrosity of cable TV and video recording, 
so does eXistenZ explore that of virtual reality and gaming, and Scanners 
that of networked computing and pharmaceuticals. Scanners follows the 
protagonist Cameron Vale on his journey of monstrous self-discovery: he 
learns that he is a “scanner”—he has telepathic powers; that he is embroiled 
in a struggle between telepaths being cultivated by the private security firm 
ConSec and a rogue faction of power-hungry telepaths; that his powers 
result from drugs a ConSec researcher gave to his mother when she was 
pregnant with him; and, finally, that he and the rogue telepaths’ leader, 
Revok, are brothers—both are sons of that researcher. In the course of this 
plot of monstrous awakening, which entails many feints and fights between 
the warring telepaths, Vale also learns that he can “scan” not only human 
minds but media systems. In the film’s most striking scene, Vale uses a pay 
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telephone to access and read the ConSec computer database that includes 
top-secret records about the pharmaceutical program that has produced 
the scanners. For a 1981 film, this scene is remarkably contemporary as a 
fantastic dramatization of modem technology, the use of telephones to 
access computer networks. When one of Vale’s enemies—Keller, ConSec’s 
chief of security—realizes what he’s doing, Keller cuts the connection not 
only to block access but also to hurt him; but this act backfires and Keller 
dies instead. Keller’s notion that terminating a technological link will harm 
the body using it dramatizes the McLuhanesque premise of technology 
as prosthesis; similarly, Keller’s fate as a victim of technological backfire 
dramatizes just one of the many McLuhanesque Frankenphemes of media 
technology that pervade this extraordinary early Cronenberg film.
Unlike Videodrome, Scanners in its soundtrack makes much more use 
of synthesizer instrumentation, not orchestral instrumentation, which 
amplifies its aesthetic of technologized grotesquerie. Like Videodrome, 
Scanners grounds its setting in a globalized business context of corporate 
research and development, particularly R&D on weaponizing both techno-
logical prostheses (such as drugs) and media systems (such as computer 
networks): the ConSec database inventories its arsenal of human bodies 
turned into corporate property and weaponry, and in the plot becomes 
weaponized itself in the skirmishes between ConSec and its rivals. And, 
again like Videodrome, Scanners attributes the origins of its protagonists’ 
technological monstrosity to a mad-scientist kind of father figure: like Brian 
O’Blivion, Scanners’s Dr. Paul Ruth develops a technology that profoundly 
affects and even shapes bodies and subjects, and becomes exploited by 
private interests in order to weaponize bodies and subjects—on a global 
scale. However, in Videodrome, it is the corporation (Spectacular Optical) 
that plots to exploit its monstrous technology on a global scale, while in 
Scanners it is the rogue individual, Revok, who seeks to turn scanners into 
a Frankensteinian race for bedeviling the globe. So Videodrome’s casting 
of the corporation as antagonist represents a significant difference from 
the earlier film.
Critically contextualized as not just horror but also science fiction, Cro-
nenberg’s early oeuvre constitutes a Canadian contribution to a broader 
cinematic trend, mainly Hollywood-driven, in which the Frankenstein 
story has become the dominant narrative framework for blockbuster 
science fiction films today, as illustrated by Westworld (1973), Star Wars 
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(1977), Blade Runner (1982), The Terminator (1983), Robocop (1987), Gat-
taca (1997), The Matrix (1999), Cronenberg’s own eXistenZ, AI (2001), The 
Island (2005), Moon (2009), Splice (2009), and Transcendence (2014)—to 
name just a few in a very long list. These films have exploited Frankenstein 
references for cultural commentaries on a variety of social themes, includ-
ing work, cybernetics, ecology, consumerism, war, and militarization, as 
well as corporate and state power.
Meanwhile, Cronenberg’s recent films have been more varied in their 
plots and subject matter: A History of Violence (2005) and Eastern Promises 
(2007) explore organized crime, for instance. Some recent films have car-
ried on his Frankenstein plotting, though, notably eXistenZ (1999), which 
was the first film after Videodrome that Cronenberg not only directed but 
also wrote. And Cronenberg himself is fond of talking about his filmmaking 
process with nods to Frankenstein. He has “described getting all the pieces 
in place for the kind of films he wants to make as ‘stitching a Franken-
stein quilt’” (Onstad 2013, para. 9); and he repeats the analogy in a more 
recent interview: “I rather like that independent films are put together 
like Frankenstein: You get pieces from all over the world, and you stitch 
them together and hope it ends up being a living organism” (quoted in 
Vlessing 2014, para. 8). The analogy is fitting for a director who established 
his reputation in a series of provocative genre films that transplanted the 
Frankenstein story to corporate North America.
Like Cronenberg’s, Gibson’s body of work demonstrates a recurring pre-
occupation with Frankenstein plots and imagery. Concerns with artificial 
intelligence and technology’s unintended consequences that are first elab-
orated in Neuromancer then recur through the rest of the Sprawl trilogy 
and the subsequent Bridge trilogy, a set of novels set in a nearer, more rec-
ognizably extrapolated future, organized loosely around San Francisco and 
its Golden Gate Bridge. Gibson’s complementary concern with the con-
structed character of human subjectivity itself also recurs across his oeuvre, 
from the volatile assemblage named Armitage who leads but then aban-
dons the heist in Neuromancer, to Virtual Light’s subplot about Videodrome 
and the impact of mass media on subject formation, to the Bigend trilogy’s 
Milgrim, a translator and addict whom one critic likens to “Frankenstein’s 
monster, an experiment of sorts” (Henthorne 2011, 127) for being manipu-
lated and exploited by the spy named Brown in Spook Country (2007).
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After Neuromancer, the first two novels of Gibson’s Bridge trilogy fea-
ture the clearest and most extensive elaborations of his McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme of technology. The trilogy’s first novel, Virtual Light, 
includes recurring references to Videodrome in a subplot about a lapsed 
member of an American cult that worships television; in the cult’s theology, 
Videodrome—together with Cronenberg’s whole oeuvre—is condemned as 
heretical and Satanic. “There’s movies that are clearly of the Devil, Berry. 
Or anyway that’s what Reverend Fallon says. Says all of Cronenberg’s are” 
(Gibson 1993, 295–96). As Dominick Grace argues, in exploring several 
structural and thematic similarities between Cronenberg’s films and Gib-
son’s fiction: “Cronenberg’s ambivalent and interrogative view of technology 
. . . is consistent with the kind of ambivalent interrogation of technological 
change that emerges in much of Gibson’s work and is central to the plot of 
this novel” (2003, para. 12). In Virtual Light, Gibson’s McLuhan-influenced 
extrapolations of the social ubiquity and subject-forming power of mass 
media, especially TV and networked computers, echo Cronenberg’s ear-
lier dramatizations of this ubiquity and power in Videodrome and (via the 
allusion to “all of Cronenberg’s” films) his earlier film Scanners (1980) and 
anticipate his return to these themes in 1999’s eXistenZ, which carries 
forward Videodrome’s premises of media-made subjectivity and the unreli-
ability of “reality” to the new media industry of networked, virtual gaming.
In the Bridge trilogy’s second book, Idoru, the title refers to the Japanese 
adaptation of “idol” and thus to the character Rei Toei, an entirely holo-
graphic pop star, whom a human rock star, Rez, intends to marry. This 
courtship and engagement of a human and an artificial intelligence organize 
the main plot of Idoru; that is, the novel tells the story of a mechanical bride. 
Idoru develops and deepens the fictional near-future mediascape intro-
duced in Virtual Light and uses the word technology and its cognates with 
conspicuous intensity: “technology” itself occurs eight times, and “tech,” as 
prefix or suffix, occurs an additional thirty-seven times in the novel.
In a late chapter in Idoru, Rei Toei and her creator, Michio Kuwayama, 
explain to the investigator Colin Laney how the idoru’s “union” with Rez 
furthers the strategy and plan of Famous Aspect, the corporation that 
has created her. To Laney’s question of what the seemingly impossible 
marriage is “all about,” Kuwayama says that “it is about futurity” and then 
articulates what Gibson represents as an implicitly non-Western, Japanese 
perspective on futurity—and technology:
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“Do you know that our word for ‘nature’ is of quite recent coinage? It is 
scarcely a hundred years old. We have never developed a sinister view 
of technology, Mr. Laney. It is an aspect of the natural, of oneness. 
Through our efforts, oneness perfects itself.” Kuwayama smiled. “And 
popular culture,” he said, “is the testbed of our futurity.” (1996, 314)
This passage in Idoru is as suggestive in illustrating Gibson’s development 
of a McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology as is the “unsupervised 
playground” image in Neuromancer. The use of collective, first-person 
pronouns, as in “our word,” implies that Gibson’s Kuwayama here speaks 
not just for Famous Aspect but for the Japanese; despite the arguable 
Orientalism operating in Gibson’s character development here, through 
Kuwayama’s statement, Gibson imparts an insight about the Western 
world’s view of technology: namely, that in contrast to the purported 
Japanese view of technology, the Western world’s view of technology is 
sinister. Passages like these, taken together with the plotlines of several 
Gibson novels, illustrate how his body of work, like Cronenberg’s, con-
stitutes an extended figuration and dramatization of how and why the 
modern globalized discourse of technology, influenced by the coupled 
forces of Shelley’s Frankenstein and McLuhan’s media theory, has assumed 
its “sinister” character.
Pattern Modulation
Aside from the recurrence of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of tech-
nology throughout Gibson’s and Cronenberg’s oeuvres, Neuromancer and 
Videodrome have remained popular enough in their own right to propagate 
McLuhan’s Frankensteinian discourse of technology. Perennially discov-
ered by new audiences, these texts have graduated from “cult” status to 
popular cultural canonicity. Both are still in print and commercially avail-
able to purchase, over thirty years after their initial release. And both have 
been sampled and cited in other cultural productions—as, for instance, in 
Gibson’s own citation of Videodrome in Virtual Light.
To illustrate the abiding popularity of these texts in just one niche field 
of popular cultural production, electronic dance music (which chapter 7 
will address) yields a rich vein of quotations and adaptations. Videodrome 
has been widely sampled by music producers like Skinny Puppy (“Draining 
Faces” 1987), Front 242 (“Masterhit” 1987), and Messiah; in the process, 
these tracks become secondary Frankenstein adaptations. Messiah’s 
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“You’re Going Insane” (1992) opens with Convex’s words of reassurance 
to Renn as he dons the VR-like vision-recording helmet: “You might catch 
yourself sliding in and out of an hallucinatory state after this is all over. If 
you do, just relax and enjoy it, it’ll soon go away.” Videodrome samples are 
common in 1990s rave tracks (e.g., Messiah’s 1991 “Prince of Darkness,” 
Luna C’s 1993 “Mind of a Lunatic”). The line “ease yourself back into con-
sciousness,” from the film’s opening scene, has been a favourite sample 
among electronic dance music producers, as heard in Bomb the Bass’s 
“Switching Channels” (1991), Cybordelics’s “Adventures of Dama” (1993), 
Dope on Plastic’s “Wave Dub” (1994), and Ed Brown’s “Industrial (P.B.K. 
remix)” (2009), to name a few.
Neuromancer has been similarly cited in electronic dance music. Sev-
eral producers, including Paul Drake, Christian Smith, Yuri Melnikov 
(among others), have taken “Neuromancer” as their professional alias, as 
credited on Drake’s 1992 “Pennywise” and “Nookie” tracks, on Smith’s 1993 
“Journey into Cyberspace,” and on Melnikov’s 2008 EP, 666. UK producer 
DJ Massive (Alan Clark) released a five-track Neuromancer EP in 1992. In 
1995, the German producer Wippenberg released “Neuro Dancer”; Siva 
released the experimental “Aegean Neuromancer” in 2006; Germany’s 
Phantasma Disques label put out the Neuromancer Complex EP in 2012; 
and in 2014, the US synth-goth band William Control released an album 
titled The Neuromancer. In addition, the name “Dixie Flatline” has been 
assumed by a Japanese electronic music producer.
Arguably, Neuromancer and Videodrome recommend themselves 
particularly to the field of electronic dance music in part because of its 
analogous investments and experiments in new media for making music. In 
the early rave culture of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Videodrome’s radical 
interpretive indeterminacy provided a bank of thematically fitting vocal 
samples for the rave scene’s “techno-Romantic” aesthetic of cyber-narcotic 
excess-as-transcendence (see Reynolds 1999); and Neuromancer offered 
a vision of digital culture and “virtuality” that rave embraced and roman-
ticized, in the scene’s cultural function as one subcultural milieu of the 
broader popularization of computer networking that began to accelerate 
in the early 1990s, a popularization also seen in the advent of the World 
Wide Web and the explosion of interest in “virtual reality” interfaces and 
devices. In addition, Neuromancer features Afro-Futurist music signifi-
cantly in its setting and plot. The Zion space station’s Rastas play a constant 
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stream of dub—“a sensuous mosaic cooked from vast libraries of digital-
ized pop” (1984, 104)—and this conspicuously technological, structurally 
spacey music ultimately helps Case find his way to freedom from virtual 
imprisonment by the Neuromancer AI at the novel’s climax (244).
Neuromancer’s own references to electronic music, its citations by 
other electronic music producers, and its aforementioned adaptations 
in other media show just the tip of a virtual iceberg of influence that it 
has wielded over popular culture. The novel’s impact on subsequent print 
science fiction has been widely recognized (Brouillette 2002) and will 
be revisited below. The novel’s pivotal portmanteau, “cyberspace,” has 
achieved an incalculable, quotidian currency in discourses and technolo-
gies of cultural globalization and networked computing (Bukatman 1992, 
199; Downes 2005, 3; Manovich 2001, 250–51; Mosco and Foster 2001, 220, 
233). Specifically, Gibson has been widely celebrated as “the individual who 
. . . coined the term and conceptualized the idea of cyberspace” (Annesley 
2001, 224). Neuromancer has come to enjoy a peculiar distinction (shared 
with only a select few other literary works, by the likes of H. G. Wells 
and Jules Verne) as a fiction celebrated for anticipating a specific techno-
logical innovation—the graphic Internet now known as the World Wide 
Web—and even, according to some of his more radical readers, for having 
played an active role in making its fiction a reality. This position, which 
perennially resurfaces in the popular press (Sullivan 2009, para. 5; Rich 
2014, para. 3), is perhaps best articulated by Gibson’s friend and fellow 
SF author Jack Womack, who asks, “What if the act of writing it down, in 
fact, brought it about?” (Womack 2000, 269). Womack articulates (with 
the help of a Frankensteinian trope, no less) a speculation shared by many 
commentators on “cyberspace”:
When Neuromancer appeared it was picked up and devoured by 
hundreds, then thousands, of men and women who worked in 
or around the garages and cubicles where what is still called new 
media were, fitfully, being birthed. . . . [Gibson] has often said that 
he intended “cyberspace” to be nothing more than a metaphor. No 
matter. Once a creation goes out in the world its creator, like any 
parent, loses the control once so easily exertable over the offspring; 
another variety of emergent behavior, you could say. . . . So rather 
than the theoretical Matrix, we now, thanks to all those beautiful 
William Gibson readers out there in the dark, have the actual Web. 
(2000, 269)
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Given the intervening decades and the massive growth of globalized, net-
worked computing they have witnessed, the question of whether or to 
what extent Gibson’s work actively fostered the nascent Internet remains 
open—a favourite subject of widespread speculation about one of contem-
porary literature’s canonical speculative fictions. As journalist Nathaniel 
Rich says, “Thirty years after the novel’s publication, it’s difficult to tell 
whether Gibson foresaw the future or whether the future, designed by 
technologists who idolized Gibson’s novels, self-consciously imitated his 
novel” (2014, 10).
This question of a fictional influence on historical technological change 
thus prompts a similar question of media theory’s influence on media prac-
tice: Gibson’s acknowledgement of McLuhan’s influence on Neuromancer 
augments the corresponding claims that McLuhan, too, had anticipated 
if not predicted the Internet. Those now familiar claims began to emerge 
in force alongside the explosive popularization of the Internet that the 
early World Wide Web catalyzed in the mid-1990s, exemplified by three 
illustrative samples of the mid-1990s McLuhan revival that accompanied 
the popularization of the Internet.
First, McLuhan was named “patron saint” in the colophon (the list 
of contributors’ credits) of early issues of Wired magazine, which was 
launched in 1993. Something of the thinking behind this canonization was 
spelled out in Gary Wolf ’s 1996 column in the magazine, which suggests 
both the sense of technological revolution that accompanied the Internet’s 
popularization in the 1990s and the anticipatory role of McLuhan’s theory 
in framing contemporary understandings of it: “In recent years, the explo-
sion of new media—particularly the Web—has caused new anxieties. Or 
to put a more McLuhanesque spin on it, the advent of new digital media 
has brought the conditions of the old technologies into sharper relief, and 
made us suddenly conscious of our media environment. In the confusion 
of the digital revolution, McLuhan is relevant again” (1996, para. 3).
Second, Paul Benedetti and Nancy DeHart’s 1996 retrospective col-
lection On McLuhan: Forward Through the Rearview Mirror (the layout 
of which evokes Quentin Fiore’s media-collage designs for McLuhan’s 
popular books) combines statements by colleagues and protégés with 
those by McLuhan himself. The editors stress McLuhan’s “remarkable 
prescience” and attribute “McLuhan’s revival” to “a new wave of techno-
logical innovation . . . a wave signified by the Internet and virtual reality” 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Monstrous Adaptations 131
(1996, 190). In the early 1990s, “people started rereading McLuhan and 
discovered that a quarter of a century before words such as on-line, 
wired, and the Web became part of our vocabulary, they existed in 
McLuhan’s lexicon” (34).
And third, a 1999 episode of CBC’s Life and Times biography program 
on McLuhan introduces him as having “predicted the Internet before 
there was a name for it” and, throughout, emphasizes his revival amidst 
the burgeoning Internet culture and tech sector. Framed by a frenetic, 
media collage backdrop (also reminiscent of Fiore’s design principles), 
in which Internet screen shots and techno music figure prominently, 
interviewees like Lewis Lapham assert that “much of what he said would 
happen or guessed would happen has happened”; and, against a screen 
shot of the online edition of Wired showing McLuhan’s name, a Wired 
editor claims that “Wired is actually reporting the very things that he 
anticipated.” Both Gibson and McLuhan, then, exerted a powerful cul-
tural and conceptual influence over the historical development of the 
Internet: “McLuhan’s works, side by side with those of Gibson, have been 
avidly read by early researchers in MIT’s Media Lab, for these research-
ers also conceive of a VR composed, like the tribal and collective ‘global 
village,’ of ‘tactile, haptic, proprioceptive and acoustic spaces and involve-
ments’” (Theall 1992, para. 3).
Like Cronenberg’s film and Gibson’s novel, the 1990s “revival” of 
McLuhan further amplifies the Frankensteinian inflection of his rhet-
oric of technology, and of his broader ideas of media, by retrieving, 
recontextualizing, and recirculating not only McLuhan’s work but his 
public persona, most suggestively perhaps, in his enlistment as a con-
tributor in the pages of Wired. In both Videodrome and the mid-1990s 
“revival” discourse of McLuhan, the man himself figures hauntologically, 
as a technologized return of the repressed (or more precisely, in his case, 
the unfashionable); as a “prescient” revenant haunting the broadcasts and 
modem handshakes and reanimating new media theory; as an old ghost 
in the new machine. And as significant as the variously purported and 
disputed “prescience” of both McLuhan and Gibson in anticipating new 
media technologies are their shared wariness and dread of these technol-
ogies and the social environments they create, as evinced in their writings’ 
common conjuration of Frankenstein in the very discourse and imagery 
of technology. The next two chapters detail the further appropriations 
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and transformations of McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology in Can-
adian popular culture since Gibson’s and Cronenberg’s influential works, 
focusing in the next chapter on print science fiction, and turning in chap-
ter 7 to electronic dance music.
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6. “Technology  
Implies Belligerence”
Pattern Propagation in Canadian Science 
Fiction
Like McLuhan’s legacy in popular culture, that of Neuromancer and 
Videodrome, together with the larger oeuvres of their creators, can be 
gauged, in a very limited and qualified way, in the traces they leave in 
subsequent texts, statements, performances, and other cultural artifacts.
Within even just Canadian popular cultural production, several texts 
adapt and propagate the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology in 
concretely identifiable ways. This chapter surveys some of these adapta-
tions to suggest the propagation of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of 
technology in Canadian literature.
One relatively early but underappreciated site of such propagation pre-
dates both Gibson and Cronenberg but grafts science fiction concerns with 
technology to McLuhan’s media ecology. Phyllis Gotlieb (1926–2009) was 
a Toronto-based science fiction writer who studied at the University of 
Toronto during McLuhan’s tenure there and who produced a sizeable and 
diverse oeuvre of novels, poetry, short fiction, and radio dramas, several of 
which featured Frankensteinian characters and tropes (e.g., her 1976 novel 
O Master Caliban! and her 1998–2002 trilogy, Flesh and Gold). Gotlieb’s 
1975 poem, “ms & mr frankenstein,” appeared in The Canadian Forum 
in 1975. The poem recounts an absurd, surreal narrative, told by the “ms 
frankenstein” of the title, in which she and her partner, “Scarpino,” use 
salvaged waste and discarded materials to build a giant anthropomorphic 
sculpture—“25 foot high and every inch a junkman” ([1975] 1978, 242). 
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When the persona christens the figure with a “bottle of Old Bubble” (242), 
it comes to life, mouths infantile syllables, shouts “COSMOS I COME!” 
(243), and flies away.
Of particular interest are the many media materials listed among the 
technological castaway consumer goods that go into this figure, like “paper-
clips,” “typewriter keys,” “paperweights,” “gum erasers,” “broken staplers,” 
and “last year’s calendars” (241–42). The figure incorporates materials 
drawn from domains of modern social relations that are both called com-
munication: “bicyclespokes,” “smashed headlights,” and “speedometers” on 
one hand evoke the older sense of communication as transportation, while 
on the other the “typewriter keys” and “broken staplers” conjure communi-
cation as representation and meaning making. The figure rehearses the 
Frankenstein skeleton story of technological backfire when it says things 
other than what the persona expects to hear and when it surprises them 
by flying away, in the process “taking along / Scarp’s wig & false teeth my 
fillings” (243): in other words, their creature’s departure deprives the per-
sona and her partner of their own technological prostheses. In closing the 
poem, the persona wonders ambiguously about what may yet come of the 
figure’s departure “TO THE UNIVERSE”; she wonders “just what kind of 
garbage they’re gonna be sending us,” presumably in retaliation. The figure 
becomes a kind of rocket: one that “zapped out the roof on a pillar of fire” 
and is then mistaken by neighbours for lightning (243). These details play 
archly on their source story. The poem’s image of the monster mistaken for 
lightning likens it to the medium of Victor Frankenstein’s initial inspiration, 
the electrical effects that first led him to pursue galvanism. And with a 
further amplification of Gotlieb’s Frankensteinian thematization of media 
here, the poem’s persona ironically notes newspapers mistaking the figure’s 
spectacular flight for either a comet—or a bomb (244).
Turning from work more contemporary with McLuhan’s own time 
at the University of Toronto to work that emerged amidst his mid-1990s 
revival, we find McLuhan’s Frankenphemes of technology quite promin-
ently articulated in Christopher Dewdney’s 1993 book The Secular Grail 
and his 1998 book Last Flesh: collections of essays, aphorisms, and short 
nonfiction prose that feature a consistent interest in artificial intelligence 
(1993, 124, 133), technology (1993, 17, 187), the constructed character of sub-
jectivity and cognition (1993, 50–51, 140), and haunting and the uncanny 
(1993, 86–87, 125, 184–85). “SOFTWARE IS / THE GHOST I / N THE 
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MACH / INE” declares one aphorism in The Secular Grail (1993, 184). Last 
Flesh makes more explicit Dewdney’s conceptual and stylistic debts to 
McLuhan; the later book, published after the Web’s advent, in the middle 
of the dot-com boom, often cites McLuhan (1998, 97) and reads very 
much like his writing, in its juxtapositions of observations on everyday 
life made freshly strange—as if turned inside-out—together with futurist 
extrapolations of the effects of new media and technology—from net-
worked computing to cloning and nanotechnology—on a vaguely defined, 
collective “us”:
The wave of technology that is almost upon us will not be just another 
manifestation of “progress” to be incorporated into society. It will 
alter the very basis of what it means to be human. . . . A devil’s bargain 
with corporations is necessary in order to secure the vital private 
funding to finance research facilities that will eventually launch the 
posthuman era. . . . But make no mistake: posthuman technology will 
ultimately transform its corporate host, governments and all other 
extant forms of social organization. . . . The inequalities that will arise 
from the uneven distribution of extreme technologies will have to be 
controlled or else we will descend into chaos. (1998, 57–58)
This excerpt from an early section on “Transhuman technology” exem-
plifies the book’s McLuhanesque style and its reproduction of McLuhan’s 
Frankensteinian discourse of “technology”: the “devil’s bargain” that 
Dewdney argues is needed to advance technological development; the 
involvement of corporate business (in the manner of not only McLuhan, 
here, but also Gibson and Cronenberg); the figuring of technology as a 
cause of unintended and potentially catastrophic consequences, often 
linked to the machinations of corporate forces (1998, 181)—and yet also 
(as in Shelley’s original novel) as a harbinger of more-human-than-human 
transcendence. Dewdney’s last chapter extends and extrapolates from the 
work of Hans Moravec—one of the first theorists of up- and download-
able consciousness, of technologically separating subjectivity from the 
body—to speculate fantastically and phantasmically on commodified and 
licensed cognition and memory and on corporate and otherwise collectiv-
ized redefinitions of consciousness and identity. Tellingly, Dewdney was 
a fellow with the University of Toronto’s McLuhan Institute during the 
writing and publication of this book. (We will encounter another illustra-
tive sample of Dewdney’s work in chapter 8.)
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
136 The Medium Is the Monster
The image of technologically transferable subjectivity, first suggested 
by Moravec and taken up by McLuhan, has its own rich tradition of rep-
resentations in popular culture, from the esoteric nineteenth-century 
European fictions surveyed by Friedrich Kittler in Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter ([1986] 1999), to the Max Headroom franchise of the mid-1980s; 
from James Whale’s 1931 Frankenstein film, which attributes the creature’s 
evil to Frankenstein’s inadvertent transplant of a “criminal brain” into its 
body, to the films of Cronenberg and John Mighton’s 1990 play Possible 
Worlds, which Robert Lepage adapted to film in 2000. This image has been 
given a Frankensteinian twist, and sometimes an accompanying McLuhan-
esque twist as well, in Canadian cultural production, Videodrome’s Brian 
O’Blivion being the prime example.
Toronto writer Nalo Hopkinson has adapted this image in her short 
story “A Habit of Waste” ([1996] 2007), in which the protagonist has pur-
chased a new body differently racialized than her prior one and has an 
uncanny encounter with a stranger inhabiting her previous body: “Here 
was someone wearing my old cast-off. She must have been in a bad acci-
dent: too bad for the body to be salvaged. If she couldn’t afford cloning, 
the doctors would have just downloaded her brain into any donated dis-
card. Mine, for instance” (363). This image of transferable consciousness 
partakes of the story’s broader theme of waste and repurposing, applied 
not only—although most dramatically—to embodied subjectivity, but also 
to more quotidian concerns like sourcing local foods. Hopkinson also 
connects the transferable consciousness trope to critical race, class, and 
gender politics. The protagonist has traded her prior black body for her 
current white body: “My parents had been beside themselves when they 
found out I’d switched bodies. . . . ‘But Cyn-Cyn, that ain’t even look like 
you!’” (365). The protagonist wonders if she can afford “another switch. It’s 
a rich people’s thing” (365). And the plot culminates in a narrowly averted 
sexual assault. Such intersectional political considerations are too often 
omitted from narratives and theorizations of posthuman subjectivity (like 
those by McLuhan and Dewdney); Hopkinson’s construction of narra-
tive around these “latitudes of the ex-colonised” (362) brings refreshing 
contextual complexity to this image and more generally to print fiction 
adaptations of the Frankensteinian discourse of technology, as in her cele-
brated debut novel, Brown Girl in the Ring ([1998] 2012).
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
“Technology Implies Belligerence” 137
In this novel, it’s not the brain but the heart of a murdered protagonist 
that takes unexpected control of the antagonist’s body into which it’s been 
transplanted. The story envisions a walled and decaying future Toronto, in 
which poor, racialized inhabitants struggle to overcome a gangster, Rudy 
Sheldon, who runs a downtown abandoned by municipal government. 
Sheldon lives in the otherwise vacant CN Tower and is tasked by the 
provincial government to harvest a human heart for the ailing premier. 
Premier Uttley has refused a transplant from “the Porcine Organ Harvest 
Program,” which a minor character describes in the book’s opening scene 
as having “revolutionized human transplant technology” ([1998] 2012, 2); 
the premier argues that pig heart transplants are “immoral” and holds 
out for a human donor, as part of a complex political scheme to reinstate 
a human volunteer donor program. Ironically, her insistence leads her 
assistant to turn to organized crime to procure a human heart by the 
decidedly less ethical means of murder. The dystopian depiction of the 
abandoned CN Tower—an iconic image of Canadian technological nation-
alism (Kroker 1984, 9)—together with the plot about organ trafficking 
conjures the cultural spectres of both Frankenstein and McLuhan in the 
book’s opening scenes. In particular, the trope of “revolutionary technol-
ogy” to describe xenotransplantation condenses McLuhan’s discourse of 
technology with Frankenstein’s “skeleton story” to form the premise of this 
surreal, Afro-Futurist novel’s plot.
Surreal in a different way—but, like Hopkinson’s work, critically post-
colonial—is Larissa Lai’s novel Salt Fish Girl (2002). This novel’s surrealism 
is partly structural: it juxtaposes two stories, one set in nineteenth-century 
China, the other in a near-future Canadian west coast imagined, à la 
Gibson, as a corporatized dystopia in which migrant and racialized 
women—“the Sonias”—are cloned and genetically engineered to provide 
cheap, expendable labour for capitalist production. Late in the novel, as 
the two historically distant narratives begin to converge, the protagonist 
Miranda coerces a confession out of the markedly Frankensteinian “mad 
scientist” character, Flowers:
“You don’t know,” said the doctor, “what monstrosities might have 
come of those births. . . . It was too dangerous.”
“But what you did to make me, to make us, was not? I should cut 
your heart out and eat it.”
“I’m a scientist, Evie. Whereas those Sonias . . . not human . . .”
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The blade nicked his skin and he began to bleed. Sweat poured 
down his forehead.
“Please, Evie,” he said. “Didn’t I save you?”
“I wish you hadn’t.”
“I saved you because I love you . . . daughter . . .” (2002, 255–56)
This climactic scene in Lai’s novel is reminiscent of Cronenberg’s plotting, 
in its late presentation of a confessional explanation by a mad scientist 
father figure. Miranda’s apprehension of “a free society of their own kind” 
comprises a postcolonial variation on Victor Frankenstein’s envisioning 
of “a race of devils”; Flowers’s rationalization of the extermination of the 
Sonias echoes Victor’s destruction of the creature’s “bride”; and the more 
generalized, rhetorical linking of birth and monstrosity also hearkens back 
to Shelley’s text. Elsewhere in the novel, Lai makes the intertextual link 
explicit, as Evie recounts her escape from the workers’ bunker: “I crossed 
a glacier to throw them off the scent. Just like Frankenstein, you ever read 
that one? I spent a night on the glacier and came out of the mountains in 
the morning” (159).
While Frankenstein is a prominent intertext in Salt Fish Girl, McLuhan 
is not, although his ideas of ascendant corporatism, the communicative 
capacity of things not conventionally seen as media, and technology as 
manufactured monstrosity at large in a violent global village are all at work 
in the novel’s deep theoretical background. For one instance that condenses 
these kinds of media ecology ideas, the Sonias turn their shoe manufacture 
tools into a subversive messaging medium: “They had been producing 
moulds for the soles of a special edition cross-trainer they dubbed ‘sabots.’ 
Some told the stories of individual Sonias’ lives, some were inscribed with 
factory workers’ poems” (249). The Sonias make the shoe an extension not 
just “of the foot” (McLuhan and Fiore [1967] 2001, 31–32)—but, somewhat 
synaesthetically, of the eye too. And the naming of the coded shoes as 
“sabots” evokes the spectre of Luddism, of the sabotage of manufacturing 
as a form of resistance to industrialization and technocracy.
Lai’s more recent book of poetry, Automaton Biographies (2009), deals 
more directly in the McLuhanesque problematic of the technological 
construction of subjectivity. Automaton Biographies consists of four long 
poems, or as the briefest of prefaces suggests, “four eyes,” a pun on the 
technological prosthesis of eyeglasses and a foreshadowing of the four 
different personae that speak these poems. The first poem, “rachel,” is an 
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acknowledged adaptation of Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner (1982), itself 
an adaptation of Philip K. Dick’s 1968 novel about rebellious human-made 
androids, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (Lai 2009, 165). Lai also 
quotes Donna Haraway’s influential “Cyborg Manifesto” as an epigraph to 
the poem: “There is no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal 
knowledge of machine and organism, of technical and organic” (quoted 
in Lai 2009, 11). “rachel” complements Scott’s film, which focalizes its plot 
through the point of view of the cop Deckard as he hunts a group of rogue 
android “replicants,” by refocalizing the story through the perspective of 
Rachel, a kind of “company showroom” replicant who has not rebelled and 
who becomes romantically involved with Deckard. The poem integrates 
samples of film dialogue, reimagines key scenes from Rachel’s viewpoint, 
and fleshes out a fuller, more conflicted personality than what was scripted 
for her in the film: 
i rank my anger
rail against this solitude
was a princess with perfect clothes
beloved daughter of a new elysium
our flawless manufacture
had shed earth’s dirt
imperfection’s disease toil filth. (30)
Images of “manufacture,” mechanism, doubling, and technology juxtapose 
images of childbirth and biblical creation (18, 20) to render the poem an 
extended interrogation of the boundary between the organic and techno-
logical, the authentic and artificial: “my wires heat on semiconductor 
technology” (39). Lai conducts this interrogation with evocations of 
Frankenstein that are both implicit—filtered through their prior adapta-
tion by Dick and Scott—and intertextually explicit. With reference to a 
“replicant”—a nominally organic if corporately cultivated creature—Lai’s 
electric and electronic images, as in the “battery,” “wires,” and “super-
conductor” of the above-quoted lines, both evoke the discourse and 
technics of electricity around which so much of Frankenstein’s modern 
mythology has been organized and at the same time seem anachronistic, 
even obsolete, with reference to futuristic bioengineering. Lai’s poem 
thus encodes into its persona’s very vocabulary a tension between old 
and new technologies, a tension common to both Shelley’s novel and 
McLuhan’s theory as well.
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Lai also encapsulates the fundamentally Frankensteinian “skeleton 
story” of technological backlash in one of Rachel’s late reflections in the 
poem: “faith in wiring / we illegitimate offspring / our father’s lawful / 
monsters to turn or not to turn” (39).
Rachel’s reference to “contagion” (24, 30) and her description of one of 
the fugitive replicants as a “dangerous twin” and “devil” (33) likewise echo 
the language of contagion in Shelley’s novel, and more specifically the 
fearful fantasy of Victor Frankenstein that his work may produce a “race of 
devils.” Lai also recontextualizes a specific clause spoken by the creature in 
Shelley’s novel, in which he tries to assure Walton that he “will not be the 
instrument of future mischief”; compare Lai’s stanza: “i mourn purity / in 
guilt in fear / my perfect construction’s / the instrument of” (31).
The imagery of “rachel” draws in many of the specific technologies 
that—via Frankenstein and McLuhan—have figured largely in the modern 
demonization of technology in general: nuclear weaponry (33); guns (22, 
26, 28); electronic media (19), including computers (13, 18); as well as capital 
and industrial production (13, 14, 17, 25).
Lai does not openly cite McLuhan as she cites other sources like 
Haraway. Lai does, however, wield the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme 
of technology to powerful aesthetic effect. In addition, as a long poem 
adaptation of a Hollywood film based on a novel (and a novel based on 
Frankenstein’s “modern myth,” of course), “rachel” carries on the peculiarly 
McLuhanesque practice of articulating questions about the nexus of tech-
nology and identity in experimental, media-mixing, and genre-bending 
forms, rather than in the more straightforward expository prose of jour-
nalism and scholarship.
In this context of Canadian literary and media experimentalism, Lai’s 
long poem neatly complements Margaret Atwood’s 1966 long poem 
Speeches for Doctor Frankenstein, a chapbook on which she collaborated 
with Charles Pachter, who illustrated the text; Speeches was published 
in an extremely limited edition of only fifteen copies. As Lai’s “rachel” 
gives a new voice to the creature, so Speeches gives a new voice to the 
creator: Atwood’s poem retells Shelley’s story mainly from the perspective 
of Victor Frankenstein, with occasional interjections from his creature, 
all in condensed poetic language. As “rachel” represents a genre- and 
media-traversing form of adaptation, so does Speeches, juxtaposing 
Atwood’s poems with Pachter’s original prints. Like Lai’s poem, Atwood’s 
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foregrounds McLuhanesque images of media and power; one image of 
the “sparkling monster” describes “his mane electric” and “his clawed feet 
/ kindling shaggy fires” (1966, 18). Atwood also emphasizes the Arctic 
setting of Shelley’s story, recontextualizing it according to the early Can-
adian postcolonial concerns with landscape and identity that informed 
her landmark literary study Survival (1972) and related, nationally focused 
criticism of the period by McLuhan and Northrop Frye, among others. To 
this emphasis on northern landscape she brings a recognizably Canadian 
concern with communication media, though with no explicit use of the 
word technology. As the doctor chases the monster over “this vacant winter 
/ plain,” he recounts, “I scratch huge rescue messages / on the solid / snow” 
(15). These images and themes converge in the final poem: as the doctor 
faces “the creature, his arctic hackles / bristling,” the latter “glows” and then 
says, “You sliced me loose // and said it was / Creation” (20).
In addition to Speeches for Doctor Frankenstein, Atwood’s poems and 
other writings feature numerous such representations of technology as 
manufactured monstrosity. “Notes Towards a Poem That Can Never Be 
Written” juxtaposes images of gendered violence with reflections on the 
limits and complicities of media technologies: “Elsewhere, this poem must 
be written / as if you are already dead” ([1981] 1990, 411). Atwood’s 1968 
poem “It Is Dangerous to Read Newspapers” tersely and potently articu-
lates the monstrosity of the media in its very title, which anticipates the 
closing lines. “It is dangerous to read newspapers,” Atwood concludes. 
“Each time I hit a key / on my electric typewriter, / speaking of peaceful 
trees // another village explodes” ([1968] 1987, 59).
As Kroker observes, Atwood’s oeuvre, from early on, was characterized 
by “searing reflections on the ‘anxiety structures’ at the heart of techno-
logical society” (1984, 8). As a Toronto writer who emerged in the 1960s, 
Atwood became acquainted with McLuhan’s work early in her career. She 
acknowledges that her very first (and as yet still unpublished) attempt at 
a novel was influenced by the collage style of McLuhan’s The Mechanical 
Bride (1951), which she describes as “a piece of genius” (2011). She has 
also defended Survival’s eschewal of McLuhan’s theories (for which it was 
criticized, although not by Kroker, for whom her work and McLuhan’s 
both belong to the Canadian tradition of thinking on technology) on the 
grounds that her work differed in focus from his: she jests that she “would 
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have liked to have been Marshall McLuhan—it seemed a ton o’ fun—but 
he had the job pretty much cornered” (quoted in Cavell 2002, 296n52).
Referring to Atwood’s early reading of The Mechanical Bride, Cavell 
observes that “one is not hard-pressed to find mechanical brides”—mean-
ing both signature Atwood protagonists and McLuhan’s influence—“in a 
number of her literary works.” He points in particular to The Handmaid’s 
Tale, in which the redemption of the protagonist, Offred, “comes via the 
orality of the tape recording” (296n52). In addition, The Handmaid’s Tale 
(1985) offers, as its fictional premises for the transformation of North 
American society into the misogynist dystopia of Gilead, two instances 
of technologies turned monstrous: the onset of ecological catastrophe 
that harms humans’ reproductive capacity; and the freezing of women’s 
financial savings and assets, an expropriation of wealth made possible by 
computerized banking technology.
Atwood’s more recent dystopian fiction—the MaddAddam trilogy of 
Oryx and Crake (2003), The Year of the Flood (2009), and MaddAddam 
(2013)—also exhibits the influences of both McLuhan and Shelley in its 
representations of monstrous technology. In creating its postapocalyptic 
vision of a violent “global village” in which elite haves and impoverished 
have-nots are all wiped out by a human-made plague, the trilogy extrapo-
lates from several present-day symptoms of globalization as catastrophe: 
tempestuous climate change; slavery and human trafficking; the increasing 
blurring of the social and technological line between the real and the vir-
tual; inexorable and ubiquitous privatization and militarization; and the 
annexation of biological science by corporate capital. 
Introducing us to the trilogy’s dystopian future, Oryx and Crake cen-
tres on the story of Snowman, formerly known as Jimmy, who believes 
that he is the sole human survivor of a pandemic apocalypse and who 
takes it upon himself to look after the emergent society of the “Crakers,” 
a posthuman species created by Crake, a mad scientist character, whom 
Jimmy had befriended in the period before the catastrophic pandemic. 
The Year of the Flood focuses on the stories of Toby and Ren, women who 
belong to a technophobic, neo-Luddite, Christian environmentalist sect 
called the God’s Gardeners, another group of survivors of the pandemic, 
or the “Waterless Flood,” as they call it (2009, 6). MaddAddam continues 
the story of Toby and Ren and fills out the story of Zeb, a street fighter 
and saboteur who has worked with both the God’s Gardeners and Crake’s 
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coterie of biogeneticists, the MaddAddam collective. Unlike Frankenstein, 
none of the novels focalizes its narrative through the perspective of the 
mad scientist character, Crake, himself; instead, he looms in the stories 
told by the other focalizing protagonists (more like the creature in Mary 
Shelley’s novel does).
Frankensteinian images of technology construct a stark con-
trast between the first volume’s narrative focalizer, Jimmy, who has a 
hyper-mediatized, consumerist perspective, and that of the second and 
third volumes, Toby, who belongs to the technophobic God’s Gardeners. In 
the first volume, the emphasis falls on the highly sophisticated technology, 
especially media technology and biotechnology, in which its protagonist 
is immersed, while the second instead emphasizes oral tradition and the 
Gardeners’ demonization of all technology, from writing to genetic engin-
eering. The third volume partially returns the focus to scenes and images of 
advanced technology, its plot moving between the bunkered world of the 
God’s Gardeners and the technologically advanced but morally benighted 
wider world ruled by corporate capital that existed prior to the pandemic. 
This volume ultimately reveals, through Toby’s account of Zeb, that the 
God’s Gardeners are less dogmatic about technology than their preachings 
claim, given their leaders’ own covert use of media technologies to spy on 
their enemies (2013, 331).
The first volume’s plot of unfettered technological experimentation 
yielding both monsters and catastrophe constitutes an extensive adapta-
tion of Frankenstein’s skeleton story; this novel also invokes Frankenstein 
twice. In one postapocalyptic scene, Snowman asks (like the creature), 
“Where’s my Bride of Frankenstein?” (2013, 169). And, in a flashback to 
preapocalyptic days, Snowman recalls poring over archival footage and 
photos and recognizing one photo as a riot scene “from a movie remake 
of Frankenstein” (257). The second volume has no explicit Frankenstein 
references but emphasizes the manufactured monstrosity of technol-
ogy in general—not merely the biotechnologies that bring about the 
pandemic but also technologies of representation: “Beware of words. Be 
careful what you write. Leave no trails” (6). Explicit Frankenstein refer-
ences return in the third volume, mainly in the slang prefix “Franken” 
applied to genetically engineered entities, from “Frankenbacon” (2013, 
19), or genetically modified pig meat, to “Frankenpeople” (19), in refer-
ence to the Crakers.
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Of the three volumes, Oryx and Crake relates most extensively to 
both Shelley and McLuhan: to the former because of its Frankensteinian 
plot and open intertextual acknowledgements; to the latter because of its 
intensive use of media in character development; and to both, in the Frank-
enphemes of technology it thereby produces. In addition to its adaptation 
of Frankenstein’s skeleton story of manufactured monsters and ensuing 
mayhem, however, Oryx and Crake also adapts The Last Man, Shelley’s 
other seminal science fiction novel, first published in 1826. The Last Man 
is set in an imagined future world of the year 2097, when the sole survivor 
of a pandemic plague, one Lionel Verney, is left, like Snowman, to record 
a posthuman future for a nonexistent posterity: “I will write and leave 
in this most ancient city, this ‘world’s sole monument,’ a record of these 
things. I will leave a monument of the existence of Verney, the Last Man” 
(Shelley [1826] 1996, 364).
The doubling of Shelley’s stories in Atwood’s plot reflects a doubling 
pattern that permeates its other narrative strategies. The main characters 
have double names: Snowman had been Jimmy; Crake had been Glenn 
(an allusion to Glenn Gould, the pianist who was greatly influenced by 
McLuhan [2003, 70]); Oryx—like Frankenstein’s creature—“didn’t have 
a name” (90). “Snowman” is the deliberately decontextualized nickname 
with which Jimmy presents himself to the Crakers, in a globally warmed 
world where snow no longer exists. The nickname conjures monstrosity 
(the “abominable” snowman) and also adapts, for character develop-
ment, the snowy setting of Frankenstein’s Arctic frame narrative. What 
for Shelley was a representative site of modernity—nautical circumpolar 
exploration—becomes for Atwood one of a myriad relics of lost language 
that construct Snowman’s sense of subjectivity. And crucial to character-
izing this subjectivity is a doubling in the narrative point of view, which is 
always third-person but focalized only through Snowman.
Snowman’s intertextual identity and the schizoid narrative voice pro-
vide keys to the protagonist’s character development, and so to the way this 
novel weaves a critique of new media into its Frankensteinian plot. Snow-
man focalizes a narrative viewpoint fraught with tropes of “dead” and new 
media and other McLuhan allusions. This focalization develops Snowman, 
and other main characters, as textual constructions, subjective palimp-
sests and pastiches of multiple media and references. A character who in 
his life before the pandemic worked, not insignificantly, in advertising, 
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“the promotionals” (2003, 245), Snowman sees himself as a decaying web 
of quotations and media forms: his “head is becoming one big stash of 
obsolete fridge magnets” (148), which “tell a lot about a person” (347); 
he carries a “burning scrapbook” in his head (10), and imagines that, like 
Frankenstein’s Walton, he could “keep a diary” and “emulate the captains 
of ships” (40); he sees his own thoughts in a cartoonish “voice balloon” 
(290); his mind “replays” memories (68) like “old films” (283).
Through Snowman’s thoroughly mediatized perspective, the other 
characters become similar media constructions: his father is a “pastiche,” 
his mother a “Polaroid” (2003, 49); Crake belongs to an intellectual elite 
with “brains like search engines” (81), and he describes his bioengineering 
work in the language of computing: for example, installing, programming, 
and “editing” genetic features (303). As for Oryx, whom Snowman first 
sees on a porn website, he is later able “to piece her together from the 
slivers of her he’d gathered and hoarded” (114). The gestures of collecting—
scrapbooks, fridge magnets, and website pictures—indicate how diverse 
and serialized media practices both mobilize a decadent consumerist cul-
ture and render it ecologically unsustainable; in addition, the different 
media tropes used to develop different characters underscore the differ-
ences of power among them. Crake’s tropes of computing figure his rise 
to a leadership role in the biotech industry that centres Atwood’s future 
socio-economic order. Oryx develops through the photographic and film 
media that introduce her as a pornographic object: “being in a movie . . . 
was doing what you were told” (139). Snowman partakes of multiple media 
forms, but develops with more emphasis on tropes of film and writing than 
on newer media: calling himself a “word person” (67), he feels acutely his 
difference from those with “brains like search engines” and instead indul-
ges in “unproductive random scanning” (207).
It is in the context of old and new media generally (and Frankenstein 
texts specifically) that Snowman becomes aware of his programming by 
Crake to become a kind of shepherd for the posthuman Crakers: “Why 
am I on this earth?” he asks. “How come I’m alone?” (2003, 169). Snow-
man’s immersion in new media fixes him as their consumer, whereas 
Crake learns to program and edit genetic sequences, to hack computer 
networks (85–86), and to “program” receptive subjects like Snowman. 
Snowman’s serialized consumption of media, drugs, and sex turn him 
into a pathological kind of Everyman, the symptomatic consumer-subject 
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of corporate capitalism not unlike that which Max Renn becomes in 
Videodrome: susceptible and subjugated to ubiquitous, “interactive” 
media programming. Snowman reflects how he used to “go to a movie 
. . . to convince himself he was part of a group” and, as the plot concludes, 
describes watching the end of the world “like a movie” (342) until there 
is “nothing more to watch” (344). Virtually addicted to print shibboleths 
and hardcore websites alike, Jimmy becomes deadened to affect by the 
simulacral ubiquity of media and, also like Videodrome’s Renn, becomes a 
killer, taking at least five lives during the plague panic, including Crake’s. 
The similarity or even identity that, Atwood suggests, inheres between 
the typical postmodern consumer and the typical serial killer echoes not 
only Cronenberg, but also Mark Seltzer’s (1993) theorization of serial 
killers as impersonators or mimics of human subjectivity (rather than 
as fully realized subjects themselves) and the broader “sociopathology 
of commerce” thesis of Joel Bakan, as presented in the film The Corpor-
ation (Achbar and Abbot 2003)—which itself also quotes Frankenstein, 
as I’ve analyzed elsewhere (McCutcheon 2011). Oryx and Crake impli-
cates both a McLuhanesque nostalgia for print and a deregulated digital 
mediascape in its Frankensteinian critique of “human society” as “a sort 
of monster” (2003, 243).
The Year of the Flood (2009) extends this Frankensteinian premise of 
Atwood’s fictional future—that technology, cultivated by humankind to 
grow monstrously autonomous, in turn renders human society equally 
monstrous. As told in the lore of “God’s Gardeners,” humankind’s Prome-
thean embrace of technology represents one step in the species’ long and 
ongoing biblical Fall: “the Fall of Man was multidimensional . . . they fell 
from instinct into reason, and thus into technology” (2009, 188).
Throughout The Year of the Flood, less extensive and more incidental 
references to technology are nevertheless laced with the dread and danger 
with which the God’s Gardeners’ lore imbue it. The Gardeners regard with 
caution verging on terror all media technologies and practices that leave 
traces or store data—indeed, all fixed forms of representation: “It seemed 
so dangerous, all that permanent writing your enemies could find—you 
couldn’t just wipe it away, not like a slate” (216). The Gardeners’ appre-
hension of technology as catastrophic danger also extends to nano- and 
biotechnologies. The protagonist Toby worries of the activist Gardener 
Zeb: “Maybe he’d been black-marketing some proprietary item, such as 
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a nanotechnology or gene splice. That could be fatal if you were caught” 
(119). Here, the lethality of being “caught” with nanotechnology is that of 
capital punishment under laws that protect corporations and their prop-
erty, not the public, but the detail foreshadows the “waterless flood” of 
the story’s title, which is what the Gardeners call the humanity-killing 
pandemic: as is recounted otherwise in Oryx and Crake, the pandemic is 
caused by a biological weapon that is crafted under proprietary conditions 
in a corporate compound, and then distributed informally, and globally, 
by Crake’s followers.
The story’s focalization through perspectives of members of an environ-
mentalist Christian sect, with echoes of Luddite and Mennonite traditions, 
enables some especially vivid and resonant images to build the novel’s 
satire on neoliberal corporate rule, consumer capitalism, and ecological 
devastation. One early exchange between a Gardener elder and a new-
comer depicts the corporate pharmaceutical and nutrition supplement 
industries as a massive Frankensteinian experiment: “Those Corporation 
pills are the food of the dead, my dear. Not our kind of dead, the bad kind. 
The dead who are still alive. We must teach the children to avoid these pills” 
(105). Atwood does a particularly deft job of imagining an environmental-
ist theology that reconciles biblical teaching with modern science, in the 
face of ecological breakdown, via the sermons of Adam One, the sect’s 
leader, who interprets biblical texts for modern times (which are of course 
also end times) with the creative latitude and critical rigour of Hebrew 
midrash tradition. Of the first of “the two floods”—the first being that 
recounted in Genesis, the second being the looming global pandemic—
Adam One pointedly uses the discourse of science in describing “Man” 
as an “experiment”: “God . . . knew something had gone very wrong with 
his last experiment, Man, but that it was too late for him to fix it” (90). 
The Year of the Flood both extends and complements the thematic and 
satirical concerns of its prequel; in contrast to the target-market consumer 
subjectivity of Oryx and Crake’s narrator, Year’s focalization through the 
perspectives of members of a group disenfranchised and demonized by 
the power centres of global capital and advanced technology enables it to 
articulate a far more categorical and explicit demonization, in turn, of tech-
nology in its own right—which here is the right always arrogated by capital.
The questions of whether a consumer society is made monstrous by 
technology, and whether technology is inherently monstrous itself, also 
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come up insistently in the science fiction of Toronto writer Peter Watts. 
Trained as a marine biologist, Watts has developed an oeuvre of hard sci-
ence fiction—technically and theoretically knowledgeable, but also violent 
and nihilistic. The Rifters trilogy—Starfish (1999), Maelstrom (2001), and 
βehemoth (2004)—is set in the mid-twenty-first century and concerns 
the tense operations and apocalyptic implications of a geothermal energy 
project based on the floor of the Pacific Ocean. The Firefall series—which 
consists of Blindsight (2006) and Echopraxia (2014)—is set in the very 
late twenty-first century; after an array of unknown satellites surrounds 
Earth only to burn up in its atmosphere, the spacecraft Theseus carries a 
specialized crew to the outer solar system to investigate a signal suspected 
to be linked to the “firefall” of alien satellites. Both series focus on pro-
tagonists who are spectacular cyborgs, featuring the cyberpunk imagery 
of bodily incorporated digital technology; moreover, Watts’s protagonists 
are gradually revealed, in plot structures reminiscent of Cronenberg’s, 
to be not only factitious but “programmed” constructs. Both series also 
figure technology as manufactured and monstrous, in diverse ways. The 
Rifters trilogy’s second novel, Maelstrom (2001), derives its title from the 
novel’s depiction of a chaotic, mid-twenty-first-century Internet. The first 
Firefall novel, Blindsight (2006), shows most explicitly Watts’s use of the 
McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology.
The protagonist of the Rifters trilogy, Lenie Clarke, is a cyborg in that a 
mechanical gill has replaced one lung; this and other bodily modifications 
allow her, like the other “Rifter” workers, to labour in the deep ocean, 
outside air-pressurized human habitats. As Maelstrom unfolds, Lenie dis-
covers that she has also been neurologically programmed: her memories 
of past trauma turn out to have been implanted, via the molecular-level 
manipulation of her very synapses by her employer, the energy-producing 
Grid Authority. She comes to this realization after leaving a trail of retalia-
tory destruction in her eastward trek from the Pacific coast, across North 
America, to seek revenge on the Grid Authority for its mismanagement of 
the deep sea power station: at the conclusion of the first novel, Starfish, the 
Authority defers executive operating decisions to a “head cheese” (1999, 
65), a crude artificial intelligence that summarily ends station operations by 
destroying it, in the process unleashing earthquakes and microbial plagues 
all along the west coast. Maelstrom, then, reads much like the story of 
Frankenstein’s creature, as Clarke wreaks widespread, violent destruction 
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on any and all she deems responsible for her undersea abandonment, 
before arriving at a peripatetic knowledge of herself and her origins.
Most other characters in the Rifters and Firefall series exhibit similarly 
monstrous technological modifications. The Rifters antagonist Achilles 
Desjardins depends on digital data delivered via “optical inlays” that “pro-
jected the same images onto line-of-sight whether or not his eyelids were 
in the way” (2001, “Cascade”); he has also been deliberately infected with a 
retrovirus nicknamed “Guilt Trip” that controls his sociopathic tendencies. 
Blindsight’s characters are all cyborgs or assemblages, reminiscent of Gib-
son’s cyberpunk characters. “Jigsaw,” “topology” (2006, 279), and figures of 
fragmentation and reassembly (315) recur as words to describe identity and 
subjectivity. Like Lenie in Maelstrom, the narrator of Blindsight, Keeton, 
gradually awakens to an alarming apprehension of the artificial nature of 
consciousness—not only his own, but that of the human species. Faced 
by a form of life that the Theseus crew nickname “scramblers,” a radically 
unknowable alien life form that has superior spacefaring technology but 
no consciousness—“intellect but no insight, agendas but no awareness” 
(323)—Keeton concludes that human sentience is an evolutionary aberra-
tion, and subjectivity a superfluous illusion: “the homunculus behind your 
eyes . . . that arrogant subroutine that thinks of itself as the person, mistakes 
correlation for causality” (301). Informed not by poststructuralism but by 
neuroscience, Watts arrives at something very like subject theory, in Blind-
sight’s contemplation of the Cartesian cogito as an effect mistaking itself for 
a cause. “Am I nothing but sparking chemistry?” Keeton asks himself (313), 
echoing Frankenstein’s suggestive image of the “spark of being” (Shelley 
[1831] 2000, 60). The zombie images that appear throughout the book to 
describe creatures lacking consciousness become ironic, in their ultimate 
applicability to creatures possessing it.
Alongside images of automatons, “constructs,” avatars, robots, AI, 
mosaics, biomechanics, the undead, and impersonators, Watts emphatic-
ally uses characteristically Frankensteinian pairings of zombie and vampire 
images in order to describe, by turns, the crew members, the alien life 
forms they encounter, and the human race in general. Keeton opens the 
novel’s narration by recounting a childhood memory in which kids called 
him “zombie” because of brain surgery that had altered his personality: 
“‘I think you did die,’ said my best and only friend. . . . ‘And you’re some 
whole other kid that just, just grew back out of what was left’” (2006, 16). 
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The Theseus crew spends the majority of its space travel time in a cyber-
netically controlled dormancy that’s repeatedly called being “undead” (22). 
Keeton describes the Theseus crew as “four optimized hybrids somewhere 
past the threshold of mere humanity, one extinct predator who’d opted to 
command us instead of eating us alive” (117). The last reference is to the 
mission commander, who is a “vampire”: in Watts’s fictional world, an 
alternate-anthropology subplot posits a race of humanoid, quasi-cannibal 
predators who feed on “baseline” humans—in other words, vampires. In a 
further Frankensteinian twist, this race of vampires has been reconstituted 
and rehabilitated from the novel’s fictional antiquity by scientific means. 
As the narrator puts it, with a touch of Frankensteinian foreshadowing, 
to reintroduce a lost race of super-human apex predators to the general 
populace was “to resurrect our own nightmares in order to serve us” (59).
As a “hybrid” collective of cyborgs, zombies, and vampires, then, the 
Theseus crew comprises a microcosm of Watts’s fictional world, which 
like Gibson’s extrapolates an advanced neoliberal ruling order of corpor-
ate governance. Towards the end of the novel, a rigorous discussion two 
crew members have about consciousness and mimicry of consciousness 
turns to global capital: “If impersonating something increases fitness, 
then nature will select good impersonators over bad ones.  .  .  . Interest-
ing to note how many sociopaths show up in the world’s upper echelons, 
hmm?” This passage alludes (like Oryx and Crake’s characterization of 
Snowman) to Bakan’s thesis on the sociopathology of commerce (Achbar 
and Abbot 2003) and to vulgar social Darwinism, as the crew hypothesizes, 
first, that natural selection privileges impersonators for their adaptabil-
ity; then, that people in power need not impersonate but rather act as 
models for others to impersonate; and finally, that the “ruthlessness and 
bottom-line self-interest” of the corporate elite may be leading it to aban-
don or adapt beyond sentience (via technology, not evolution), in order to 
more effectively increase market share and profits. “Eventually,” concludes 
Cunningham, “there aren’t any real people left. Just robots pretending to 
give a shit” (2006, 311). This theoretical discussion draws together the 
images of cyborgs, zombies, and vampires that characterize the crew and 
projects them more broadly onto capital and its globalized reproduction.
Watts’s extensive scientific learning furnishes his novels with a 
vocabulary of terms, arguments, and experiments that persistently and 
perspicaciously interrogate the fragile boundary between the organic and 
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technological, natural and artificial. “Are scramblers even alive?” Keeton 
asks his shipmate, a technologically augmented biologist named Cun-
ningham. “Maybe they’re just biomechanical machines.” Cunningham 
replies: “That’s what life is, Keeton. . . . Get your head out of the Twen-
tieth Century” (2006, 250–51). While Blindsight mechanizes the human, 
Maelstrom animates the digital. The title refers to the name the novel’s 
characters use to refer to the Internet in the mid-twenty-first century: 
“maelstrom,” a cybernetic jungle teeming turbulently with digital artifi-
cial life (2001, “Cascade”). Overrun with rudimentarily self-aware viruses 
and other variously benign and malevolent software and subroutines, the 
“maelstrom” also constantly teeters on the edge of collapse between the 
Scylla of chaotic social complexity and the Charybdis of overburdened 
infrastructure resources:
The Net. Not such an arrogant label, back when one was all they 
had.
The term cyberspace lasted a bit longer—but space implies great 
empty vistas, a luminous galaxy of icons and avatars, a hallucino-
genic dreamworld in 48-bit color. No sense of the meatgrinder 
in cyberspace. No hint of pestilence or predation, creatures with 
split-second lifespans tearing endlessly at each others’ throats. Cyber-
space was a wistful fantasy-word, like hobbit or biodiversity. . . . If you 
could watch the fornication and predation and speciation without 
going grand mal from the rate-of-change, you knew there was only 
one word that really fit: Maelstrom. (“Cascade”)
Watts explicitly contrasts this digital “meatgrinder” against Gibson’s 
“cyberspace,” which is invoked as a quaint shibboleth, a nostalgic image 
of networked computing as a “wistful fantasy-word” in contrast to the 
stormy digital wilderness of Watts’s fictional future. His hyper-Darwinian 
image of the near-future Internet comments satirically on the competi-
tion, adaptation, and survivalism of our present-day digital ecology, while 
speculating with signature scientific rigour on the Internet’s technological 
development, particularly as a breeding ground for digitally based artifi-
cial life; like Watts’s other novels, Maelstrom provides detailed notes and 
references: endnotes 25 through 30 document scientific sources for his 
extrapolation of the Net as “maelstrom.” Furthermore, the image of the 
maelstrom is one of McLuhan’s favourite tropes (as we saw in chapter 4): 
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McLuhan took the image from Poe’s story “A Descent into the Maelstrom” 
to describe the postwar mediascape.
Blindsight also uses the word “maelstrom” to describe not the Inter-
net, but, more literally, the turbulent and toxic storm of magnetic and 
radioactive forces that the Theseus “descends into” so it can approach and 
communicate with the alien craft (2006, 118). But the same kind of hostil-
ity which Watts attributes to the digital communications of his imagined 
midcentury world obtains for communication per se in Blindsight: at 
the novel’s climax, the Theseus crew come to comprehend that the vapid 
“scramblers” have all along been treating the humans’ communications as 
a hostile stimulus, a viral attack that provokes counterattack as the only 
response. To the scramblers, the humans’ earnest attempts at meaningful 
communication only ever “mean” evidence of advanced technology and 
therefore hostility. The Theseus crew’s attempts at outreach and under-
standing thus ironically exemplify the very threat that the crew has been 
led to see in the scramblers themselves, as an alien life form capable of 
traversing interstellar space and targeting planets bearing life: the threat 
constituted by advanced technology in and of itself.
“Technology implies belligerence” (44): this “mantra” recurs, verbatim 
and with variations, throughout the novel, an axiomatic heremeneutic 
of suspicion for understanding extraterrestrial life, advanced by a school 
of thought Keeton calls “the Historians” (80–81). “What is Human hist-
ory,” Keeton reflects, “if not an ongoing succession of greater technologies 
grinding lesser ones beneath their boots?” (79). This pessimistic caricature 
of history condenses and channels ideas drawn from Orwell, Darwin, the 
Grundrisse of Marx, and McLuhan’s model of history as a series of differ-
ent media ages punctuated by epoch-defining technological revolutions. 
Amidst Blindsight’s pervasive extrapolations of advanced technology and 
theorizations of technological advance, the novel draws together a vast 
constellation of not only scientific but cultural, historical, and political 
references: to the Luddite revolts (181); to McLuhan’s “global village” (141); 
to the aforementioned uploadable consciousness trope, illustrated here in 
a virtual-reality retirement community called “Heaven”; to zombie eco-
nomics and the global corporate elite as a kind of hybrid, zombie-vampire 
class (311–12); and even to the ancient Hebrew legend of the Golem, here 
a name given to a biological weapon that accelerates bone growth (292). 
Taken together with the plot—in which terrestrials and extraterrestrials, 
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however incommensurate their fundamentals of being, both respond in 
ironic kind to advanced technology as hostile stimulus—this constellation 
of references renders the novel’s nihilistic mantra legible as a variation on 
McLuhan’s maxim. For Watts, “Technology implies belligerence” comes to 
mean something like “the medium is the message,” or, closer still, like “every 
technology necessitates a new war” (McLuhan and Fiore 1968, 98). Not 
merely uninterested in but physiologically incapable of comprehending the 
content of the humans’ benign communication, the scramblers act only 
on its apparently baleful form.
Blindsight thus essays an extended inquiry into the nature of sentience 
and humanity, in the socio-historical context of technological development 
and the speculative context of complicated encounter among “baseline” 
humans, “optimized hybrids,” and radically “other” forms of life. Like 
Watts’s other novels, Blindsight spectacularly foregrounds the ubiquitous, 
mutual interpenetration of human subjectivities and technological innov-
ations; but Blindsight goes further than his other novels in theorizing and 
interrogating the posthuman implications of this interpenetration, which 
repeatedly yields the historically and culturally conjoined images of zombie 
and vampire, robot and cyborg, as figures of the epistemological horizon 
to which such interrogation leads, a horizon that remains still very much 
a Frankenstein barrier.
After Gibson and Cronenberg, Atwood and Watts have furnished the 
most extensive, explicit, and globally grounded articulations of McLuhan’s 
Frankenpheme of technology in Canadian literature, and in Canadian sci-
ence fiction literature specifically. Dominick Grace’s reading of common 
plot points in Gibson and Cronenberg extends equally well to the Atwood 
and Watts works discussed here:
Pell-mell forward action, sinister organizations, double agents, 
protagonists lacking crucial information until near the end of the 
story, complex plotting, elliptical narrative style, moral ambivalence, 
obscure or irreconcilable plot elements; all figure strongly in the 
work of both Cronenberg and Gibson, as does a focus on characters 
well-removed from the corridors of power (Grace 2003, para. 5)
Grace’s summary also illuminates, more by flashes than by a steady light, 
how Frankenstein’s “skeleton story” of technological hubris furnishes the 
foundational armature on which these plot points get arranged. And to this 
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summary must also then be added the prominent representation of media 
as environments, which all four authors, as well as the others discussed 
here, depict as monstrous technologies, implying belligerence.
Gibson’s “cyberspace” and Cronenberg’s Videodrome have thus joined 
McLuhan’s media theory in becoming cultural and conceptual touchstones 
for a discourse of technology that continues to weave through representa-
tions of technology and new media to this day. The next chapter turns from 
literary texts to other media, to sound and image, tracking McLuhan’s 
Frankensteinian discourse of technology into the scene of Canadian elec-
tronic dance music production and performance.
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7. Is It Live or Is It  
Deadmau5?
Pattern Amplification in Canadian 
Electronic Dance Music
If David Cronenberg’s 1983 film Videodrome and William Gibson’s 1984 
novel Neuromancer, both globally popular texts, establish a pattern of 
McLuhanesque Frankensteins that refracts throughout Canadian popular 
culture, then electronic dance music (EDM) culture is a lower-profile but 
profoundly rich and resonant subcultural scene for reproducing, recircu-
lating, and further amplifying this pattern. Some of this scene’s adaptations 
of Frankenstein and articulations of technology discourse occur textually 
and linguistically, but often they emerge in audio and visual representa-
tions that dramatically exhibit and further circulate the McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme of technology. This chapter sketches some background for 
contextualizing EDM culture both globally and in Canada and considers 
in detail two exemplary Canadian EDM acts: the Paladin Project (a.k.a. 
Len Jaroli), an underground DJ act; and the more recently established but 
already globally successful Canadian EDM producer Deadmau5 (a.k.a. Joel 
Zimmerman). These examples illustrate and dramatize dance culture’s 
Frankensteinian contexts and put McLuhan’s theories into dance-floor 
practice. The chapter then turns to a theatrical production steeped in 
EDM culture—Matthew MacFadzean’s fringe play richardthesecond—to 
consider how EDM culture engages with other sites of cultural produc-
tion and scene making to further disseminate McLuhan’s Frankensteinian 
discourse of technology.
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“Experimenting on their own nervous systems”: EDM Culture’s 
“Techno-Romanticism”
A backgrounder on EDM might be helpful to begin with. Today’s dance 
culture is both diversified and robust, building on more than half a cen-
tury of dance scenes that have pivoted on DJ culture and the playback of 
recorded music: from postwar US record hops and Jamaican sound system 
clashes to the rapid rise and exaggerated “death” of disco, which actually 
lived on in the electronic sounds of Chicago house, Detroit techno, and 
New York garage. These sounds stayed very marginal subcultures in North 
America through the 1980s and 1990s, while becoming massively popular 
in Europe, especially the UK, where rave culture spawned huge dance 
parties, some amassing tens of thousands of partygoers for a night or a 
weekend. By the mid-1990s, UK rave culture had become a target of quite 
draconian neoliberal regulation and suppression, such as the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1994, which outlawed a gathering of ten or more listeners 
to music “characterized by repetitive beats.” UK raves put together black 
American dance music, traveller culture nomadism, and nascent new 
media technologies like cellphones and the Internet.
North American rave culture emerged in the wake of UK rave but 
modelled itself more openly on the mediatized scene making of 1960s 
counterculture: just as 1960s counterculture adopted McLuhan’s 
then-current ideas for its psychedelic scene making, so did 1990s rave cul-
ture adopt McLuhan’s then-revived ideas for its cyberdelic scene making. 
Like UK raves in the mid-1990s, towards the turn of the millennium North 
American raves were subjected to extraordinarily suppressive policy and 
policing as they gained greater popularity; they became, in effect, a domes-
tic front in the US “war on drugs.” The globalized dance music industry fell 
into an economic slump in the mid-2000s, but, since around 2010, dance 
music has become much more firmly established in the pop soundscape, 
as heard by the prevalence of electronic dance songs in commercial, “hit 
format” FM radio. If the purported death of disco was belied by the rise of 
raves, the decline of raves amidst bad press, moral panics, and legislative 
zeal has in turn been reversed by EDM. Simon Reynolds argues that some 
of the success of EDM might be attributed to a “rebranding coup” that 
evokes cultural legitimacy, where raves formerly signalled transgressive 
excess: “What were once called ‘raves’ are now termed ‘festivals’; EDM is 
what we used to know by the name of techno. Even the drugs have been 
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rebranded: ‘molly,’ the big new chemical craze, is just ecstasy in powder 
form (and reputedly purer and stronger) as opposed to pills” (2012, para. 1). 
And Deadmau5, a.k.a. Joel Zimmerman, a producer from a working-class 
Niagara Falls background, tours dance floors around the world, wearing a 
cartoonish, vaguely trademark-infringing mouse-head helmet as the face 
of disco’s latest resurrection.
The Frankensteinian language of death and resurrection in dance cul-
ture articulates three of this culture’s constitutive contexts: the oscillating 
popularity of dance sounds in the global music market, as outlined above; 
the culture’s “techno-Romantic” representations of excess as experiment; 
and its uses and fetishizations of technology in reconfigurations of “live-
ness” in music media and performance practices.
The long-running historical predisposition of western modernity to 
treat bodily affective music with suspicion or outright hostility (McClary 
1994) has made social dance scenes reliable and routine targets for various 
kinds of public controversy and moral panic. In disco and its electronic 
successors, the racializing anxieties once visited on rock and roll became 
compounded by heteronormative anxieties: early house music was reviled 
by the music press as not just a fad but as an unexpected return of disco, 
and moreover a kind of disco that amplified a stark, alien minimalism of 
drum loops, bass lines, and other machine sounds and thus exaggerated 
the foundational queerness of disco. As rave culture codified and popular-
ized (even while sometimes strenuously disavowing) the interface between 
electronic dance music and MDMA or “Ecstasy,” the moral panics that 
reductively caricatured rave culture as drug culture (from the UK’s 1994 
Criminal Justice Act to the turn-of-the-millennium “war on raves” in 
North America) traded on myths and misconceptions about MDMA—for 
example, as depersonalizing hallucinogen not self-affirming empathogen—
that positioned MDMA as a “synthetic” or “designer” drug. Philip Jenkins 
notes that the rhetoric of “designer” drugs
is Promethean, portraying scientists as irresponsibly venturing into 
realms of knowledge not meant for human beings. . . . The Franken-
stein image is so frequently cited in discussions of synthetic drugs 
because, as in the original tale, a quest for human improvement 
results instead in the creation of what are identified as terrifying 
figures. . . . Through chemical technologies, drug users abandon full 
humanity in a quest for a superior state. (1999, 8)
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This “quest” activity has long structured raving, clubbing, and other 
social dance leisure activities and is organized not according to chemical 
technologies alone but in concert with cultural technologies, chiefly music. 
This activity is what Reynolds calls “techno-Romanticism”: the pursuit 
of the palace of wisdom on a path of excess “expressed in the discourse 
of science and technology,” as in Iggy Pop’s reflection on fronting for the 
Stooges by taking so many drugs that, as he puts it, “I sublimated the 
person” and “became a human electronic tool” (quoted in Reynolds 1999, 
200). Iggy Pop’s language and performance practice exemplify the way in 
which subcultural scene makers use “the discourse of science and technol-
ogy” to represent practices of music making—and drug taking: “In rave,” 
Reynolds writes, “kids play the roles of both Frankenstein and the monster, 
experimenting on their own nervous systems” (1999, 204).
Techno-Romanticism also aptly describes the aesthetics of EDM’s 
musical foundation in Afro-Futurism, the tradition of black Atlantic music- 
and scene-making in which producers and performers like George Clinton 
and Kool Keith adopt “mad scientist” personae and in which marginalized 
and racialized dancers breakdance or jack their bodies with stylized robotic 
moves, in empowering practices of “technological identification” whereby 
“the fearful paradox of the technological age, that machines created as 
artificial slaves will somehow enslave and even mechanize human beings, 
is ritually enacted at the discotheque” (Hughes 1994, 151). About rave more 
specifically, Reynolds adopts a more negative view in describing raving 
as a zombie-like “living death” (1997, 102), arguing that the dance-drug 
interface is “an engine for programming sensations .  .  . connotative of 
enthrallment, of loss of control” (109).
These Frankensteinian figures of dance music’s “techno-Romanticism” 
reverberate with representations of EDM music making, performance, and 
consumption in terms of “liveness” and death: representations of EDM 
as a monstrous synthesis of sampled fragments (Reynolds 1998, 45); as 
autonomous technology, where “the sequencer and sampler take over” 
(Chapman 2002, 17); as “soulless” artifice versus authentic presence—
recording versus “liveness.” The conventional performance of EDM by 
DJs revolves around a paradox of live playback: the improvised, responsive, 
site-specific selection and sequencing of tracks. EDM culture illustrates 
Philip Auslander’s argument that “the ‘live’ has always been defined as that 
which can be recorded” (1999, 86)—and, moreover, that “liveness” marks 
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“a site of anxiety, an anxiety that infects all who have an interest in main-
taining the distinction between the live and the mediatized” (87). Following 
theorists like Benjamin and Derrida, scholars of media and culture have 
observed the reconfigurations of aura and authenticity not only between 
unmediated presence and mediation but also between different kinds of 
media (for instance, Bolter et al. 2006). Sarah Thornton documents these 
reconfigurations in dance culture, from early twentieth-century musicians 
organizing against jukeboxes and DJs to DJs themselves, by century’s end, 
dreading the “death of vinyl” (1996, 64) amidst the rise of CDs and digital 
sound. “Since the mid-eighties,” Thornton writes, “‘live’ qualities have been 
increasingly attributed to recorded events,” while “music performances 
have become more reliant on recording” (85).
EDM’s estranging reconfiguration of “liveness” converges commodity 
fetishism and the technological sublime: media live and die and achieve 
uncanny, monstrous effects, confusing the biological and the technological. 
From techno-Romantic representations of EDM consumption in terms 
of experiment and automatons to techno-fetishizing representations of 
EDM production in terms of automatic yet autonomous technology, dance 
culture is fraught with the discourse of technology as Frankensteinian 
monstrosity. These historical and discursive contexts thus suggest how the 
McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology courses through the techno-
logically immersed and experimental culture of EDM, as becomes more 
concretely illuminated in the work of particular EDM cultural producers: 
the Paladin Project and Deadmau5.
The Paladin Project: “You are a big rechargeable battery”
Many DJs and producers before Deadmau5 have used costume and tech-
nical spectacle in their acts and their performing personae: perhaps none 
more so than a fixture in Canada’s dance underground, the Paladin Project, 
a.k.a. Len Jaroli. From 1996 until 2015, Jaroli donned (and incessantly modi-
fied, tweaked, and revamped) an elaborate cyborg costume with which he 
DJ’d as “the Paladin Project” at raves and other dance events across North 
America.
Paladin’s costumes both exaggerated and satirized the militarized hyper-
masculinity that has long dominated DJ culture. Over the twenty years of 
Paladin’s performance career, Jaroli constantly modified his costume and its 
attendant array of technical gear. The first Paladin performance I attended 
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was at the “E Space” venue in Toronto’s West End, for a Hallowe’en party in 
1997. Paladin’s set included samples of the “Imperial March” anthem from 
Star Wars, and his costume consisted of bright, day-glow orange camouflage 
fatigues, repurposed sports equipment, and a gas mask. At the end of the 
1990s, the costume assumed a storm-trooper or riot-police look, complete 
with helmet. Jaroli also adapted the show to specific occasions; for instance, 
at a Hallowe’en party at a Richmond Street club in 1999, Paladin replaced his 
helmet with a fanged, bug-eyed alien mask. By the time Jaroli retired the Pal-
adin Project, in 2015, it had reached its “6.3” iteration, which exaggerated the 
storm-trooper militarism of the suit, sound, and show and featured a helmet 
that displayed an Expressionistic skeletal mask (figs. 4 and 5). 
Figure 4 The Paladin Project in performance, circa 2011. Paladin’s version 6 
iterations featured a grotesque monster mask as well as the machine-military 
costume and props. Photo courtesy of Ben Ripley Photography. Copyright © 
2011 by Ben Ripley.
Paladin’s performance persona adapted the name, cultivated anonym-
ity, and vigilante image from CBS’s 1957 TV series Have Gun Will Travel 
(Alan Filewod, pers. comm, 11 June 2003)—but gave it a science fiction 
spin. Paladin’s costume combines a kind of “Robocop” imagery of body 
armour, gadgetry, and weaponry, with masks ranging from gas mask, to 
face-plated helmet, to grotesque, grimacing monster. Paladin’s costume 
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also incorporates media: mounted cameras, lasers, and screens; built-in 
monitors and microphone; and even an FM transmitter. Evoking both 
Marx’s vampire image of capital and The Matrix’s image of bodies as bat-
teries, the Paladin “darkandhard.ca” website that was up in 2006–7 stated: 
“As far as PALADIN is concerned . . . you are a big rechargeable battery 
that actually enjoys having the life force pounded out of you. The harder 
you dance the harder PALADIN plays.”
Figure 5 The Paladin Project in performance, circa 2011. Photo courtesy of C. 
Jaroli. Copyright © 2011 by C. Jaroli.
Like many cultural practitioners, Paladin embraced social media in 
the later 2000s, discontinuing his independent “darkandhard.ca” website 
in favour of the newer affordances of Facebook and Soundcloud, where 
“P4L4DiN” and “thepaladinproject” accounts, respectively, remain opera-
tive as of this writing and archive a great deal of photos and mixes from 
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various performances over the years. The “darkandhard” site, though, also 
included a “Technical Data” web page that detailed the tech specs that 
went into the Paladin Project, which was at that time in its “5.1” version 
(Paladin 2006b). The description is worth quoting at some length, given 
the meticulous attention to creative and highly technologized detail that 
Jaroli put into developing and delivering his DJ act:
After over 7 years of development, The PALADIN Project has now 
released the latest version of the worlds first P.rototype A.rtificial 
L.ifeform A.nd D.ata I.ntegration N.etwork: The PALADIN 5.1 
Advanced Prototype. Music programming is best described as dark 
and hard, and utilizes a combination of vinyl / original tracks and a 
MC-303. . . . The PALADIN 5.1 system also includes a custom made 
wireless F.L.I.R. (forward looking infra red) camera system. Utilizing 
advanced technology similar to that used by military and govern-
ment agencies. Totally wireless . . . with a range beyond 100 meters, 
this custom made one of a kind camera system emits no (negligible) 
visible light—yet the 58 high power infra red LED’s provide true 
night vision images on projector screens as well as giving a never 
before seen view of the dance floor from the PALADIN system itself. 
In addition to wireless video output, the PALADIN 5.1 system is 
also equipped with a stereo FM transmitter and signal booster. The 
capability of the PALADIN system to broadcast on any standard FM 
frequency adds yet another layer to the complete experience. The 
standard configuration currently allows participants to hear discreet 
voice communication from PALADIN. With an on board voice 
processor and noise cancelling microphone; PALADIN can walk 
and talk to any individual with a receiver . . . or feed the signal to the 
main system. At larger events, this capability can be configured to 
independently provide music to anyone with a FM radio—within the 
operational range of the on-board 4ft antenna—or—at a proximity 
close enough to PALADIN to hear the onboard 10 watt amplified 
speaker system. To complement the audio, is an on-board visual 
system unlike any other. The primary component is an arm mount-
ed—5mW—bright green—DPSS laser system. This compact laser is 
capable of projecting a beam over 4000 meters away, and is visible 
without the augmentation of a fog machine. On the chest is a 1.3'' 
LCD screen as well as a 10 band graphic spectrum analyzer for real 
time visual interpretation of sound at any volume. . . . Completing 
the equipment list is a CSA® approved helmet with a custom mesh 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
Is It Live or Is It Deadmau5? 163
front that blocks all light including camera flashes at close range as 
well as concealing a Sony® VDR700 custom headphone monitor. . . . 
The PALADIN 5.1 prototype demonstrates what is possible when 
advanced technology and unrestrained creativity are combined into 
one complete package. (2006b)
These technical details suggest that Paladin’s shows came to consist of 
more than music mixes played by a DJ in costume. In particular, the sys-
tems that fostered interactivity—like short-range broadcasting, audio input 
and output feeds, and patches for them into the sound system used for 
DJing—played creatively with the “interactivity” for which many digital 
media and processes have been widely lauded (from games, to message 
boards, to social networks). The technological sophistication of Paladin’s 
act suggests not only creativity but considerable cost; but the act proved 
successful enough in the dance underground that from the mid-1990s 
to the mid-aughts, DJing was Jaroli’s only employment and source of 
income (Paladin 2006a, para. 8). Paladin’s performance act, like much of 
rave culture more generally, extended the earlier 1960s counterculture’s 
McLuhan-influenced practices of intensely stimulating and professedly 
interactive multimedia experimentalism (Rycroft 1998).
The creative cybernetic details that made Paladin both a unique dance 
music performer and an eminently McLuhanesque multimedia monster 
also made him a favourite act in the North American electronic dance 
scene. As evinced in the above passage, and in numerous statements and 
samples during performances, Paladin dramatized the technological 
sublime. Paladin’s technological sublime is a figure of the “fetishism of 
mechanical power,” with music sets that not only drove intense audience 
engagement on the dance floor but also sometimes represented abstract 
musical narratives of power, paranoia, and panic. In a 2006 interview, Jaroli 
theorized that
PALADIN’s sole purpose is to generate as much energy as possible 
for its consumption—using the energy to increase its own output. If 
you don’t like PALADIN . . . leave . . . because if you aren’t a power 
source then you’re taking up space. . . . If you get into a PALADIN 
set—you don’t just “dance.” You become one of a thousand scream-
ing dancers with clenched fists and stomping feet . . . an incredibly 
powerful—and unique experience. (Paladin 2006a, para. 10)
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In this interview, Jaroli also expressed his preference for surprising new 
audiences over playing to established followings: “A big show in a city that 
has never seen PALADIN is what I love above all” (para. 25). This prefer-
ence suggests that surprise and novelty were key performance values in 
Paladin’s audiovisual construction of technological spectacle; surprise and 
novelty are analogous to and associated with the elements of shock and 
revolution that are integral to the discourse of technology, as chapters 1 
and 3 showed.
Paladin also dramatized novelty, surprise, and the trope of “revolution-
ary technology” in his performance by continually changing, modifying, 
and “upgrading” the costume and multimedia show. Moreover, the chan-
ges in Paladin’s costume, from the day-glow fatigues, football gear, and 
gas mask of the mid-1990s to the cybernetic storm-trooper armour and 
death’s-head helmet of the 2010s not only demonstrated Jaroli’s tech-
nical creativity with new media technologies, they also spoke sometimes 
to changes in the political economy of Toronto’s dance scene over the 
years. The turn of the millennium saw a spotlight put on Toronto’s rave 
scene, as city officials banned raves from public municipal sites, provincial 
legislators proposed bills to suppress dance events, the Toronto police 
began a systematic crackdown on—and shakedown of—Toronto rave 
organizers and partygoers, and the press and media consequently shone 
a national spotlight on raves in Toronto and across the country. Amidst 
the crackdown, in early 2000, the chief of the Toronto police proposed 
to dramatically change the force’s uniform to adopt a more paramilitary 
image; the proposal drew public criticism for perceptions the new uniform 
looked too fascist, even neo-Nazi (Blackwell 2000, A5). Around the same 
time, Paladin debuted the “5.0” iteration of his project: this was the first 
iteration that introduced the storm-trooper look, departing drastically 
from the previous fatigues-and-gas mask ensemble with a black, armoured 
suit, helmet, backpack, and body-mounted laser. In the context of the 
cops’ crackdown and their chief ’s somewhat ridiculous sartorial proposal, 
Paladin’s futuristic riot-cop look seemed hardly coincidental and caused 
a sensation on the dance floor. On ending a set, Paladin would often exit 
the DJ booth to stalk slowly around the dance floor, turning a moment 
of audience appreciation into a parody of police surveillance. After the 
summer of 2000, the dramatically increased visibility of actual, paid-duty 
police officers at dance parties (a requirement imposed by the force in an 
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attempt to make raves prohibitively expensive via the cost of hiring more 
paid-duty officers) lent Paladin’s costume and dance floor patrol a pointed, 
carnivalesque irony, calling the crowd’s attention to the escalating militar-
ization of leisure space and to the studied performativity of the officers’ 
own dress, presence, and actions amidst the dancers and partygoers.
Paladin’s dramatization of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of 
technology in performance also emerged in the music around which his 
performance practice revolved (and which can still be heard in several of 
his DJ sets that have been archived online). Paladin consistently described 
the music style he played as “dark and hard”: house and techno character-
ized by 140 beats-per-minute tempos, driving 4/4 kick drums often given 
echo effects to make them stomp harder, distorted Roland 303 bass lines, 
minor-key strings sections and synthesizer riffs, and a range of Gothic 
and dystopian sound effects like horror film samples, sirens, and gunfire. 
Early Paladin sets sometimes included 45 rpm hardcore tracks played at 33 
rpm, and a favourite mantra of the performer is this: “Faster isn’t harder. 
Harder is harder.” A track often heard in Paladin sets of the later 1990s was 
Brainbug’s “Nightmare” (1996), and samples from the Nightmare on Elm 
Street films recur frequently in later mixes (Paladin 2014). Paladin’s 4.5 mix 
from 1999 opens with an extremely slowed-down playback of the lyrics 
from the Foremost Poets’ 1998 track “Moon-Raker,” in which a man’s voice 
(in Paladin’s mix slowed to a muddy growl) tells the audience to “remain 
calm” and not leave the dance floor while the DJ tests the sound system 
for “an unidentified frequency” that “has become a threat . . . used by a 
secret society in conjunction with Lucifer to lure and prey on innocent 
partygoers, with hypnotism, syncroprism, tricknology, lies, scandal, and 
pornography” (1998). This sample has been repurposed extensively in EDM 
to the point of becoming cliché; Paladin’s use defamiliarizes the sample by 
pitching it way down so the voice becomes a cadaverous croak. The pun on 
“technology”—“tricknology”—becomes a self-reflexive comment on Pal-
adin’s own performance practice and an explicit invocation of the discourse 
of technology whose monstrousness his whole performance is devoted to 
dramatizing. The track that follows this ominous opening amplifies the 
Frankenpheme of “tricknology” by starting with a low-frequency synth 
note that sounds intermittently, evoking an alarm klaxon, as a low voice 
starts to punctuate the bar changes by repeating only the word “annihilat-
ing,” before a spare, echoing kick drum drops to establish the tempo and 
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gradually becomes syncopated with an additional drum track that sounds 
like simulated machine gun fire. A subsequent track in the mix samples a 
similarly down-pitched voice that asks the listener, in a guttural growl, the 
popular dance-floor question that here sounds like a rudimentary Turing 
test: “Can you feel it?” (1999).
Paladin’s music selections and sequencing, taken together with his 
spectacular stage show, conjure a techno-Romantic, dystopian sound-
scape of beat-regimented hedonism, industrial and postindustrial sounds 
of automation and militarization, and pervasive Gothic atmospherics. The 
“hard” in Paladin’s brand signals, in a gender-coded way, his music’s and his 
show’s “hardcore” credentials: the music is audibly abrasive, even hostile, 
an acquired taste, even for fans of other EDM styles like house and trance; 
it is a definitively “underground,” non- or anticommercial sound. And yet 
at the same time, this music also sounds like the culmination of industrial 
capital in automation verging on artificial intelligence, bolstered by inten-
sifying militarism and securitization. Paladin’s music is resolutely, critically 
“underground,” and yet at the same time it also sounds like a virtual sound-
track for neoliberalism. The Paladin Project’s coherent and detailed creative 
presentation of both a militarized cyborg figure and a dystopian soundscape 
made his act a unique dance-scene act and a profoundly McLuhanesque 
media monster: a DJ’s dramatization of the “rise of the machine” and its 
monstrous takeover. In the process, the Paladin Project prefigured the more 
recent and more globally recognized music and performance of another 
Canadian EDM artist, Deadmau5, a.k.a. Joel Zimmerman.
Deadmau5: “An unhealthy obsession with technology”
While, largely because of the more hardcore style of his music, Paladin 
stayed very much in EDM’s underground niche, Deadmau5 has achieved 
global popularity for more accessible productions, with slower tempos 
(around 128 bpm), more major-chord melodies and harmonies, and sung 
lyrics. But like Paladin—and like French house producers Daft Punk, who 
also combine costume and spectacle to play on human-machine ambi-
guities (2005)—Deadmau5 plays, in his performance, production, and 
promotion, on EDM’s structuring tensions between liveness and death. 
Zimmerman says the “Deadmau5” pseudonym derives from his once 
having found a dead rodent in his computer. That which is named “dead” 
plays “live” (like the Grateful Dead); the name also connotes “mouse” as 
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computer peripheral, the device that translates the digits into the digital, a 
McLuhanesque “extension” of the hand. The mouse is a synecdoche for the 
hand; here, the dead mouse is a synecdoche for the dead hand, a complex 
evocation at once of the problem of “liveness” in electronic music, of the 
disembodied yet autonomous hand known as “Thing” from The Addams 
Family, and of “Dead Hand,” the nickname of the Soviet military com-
puter system programmed to launch nuclear missiles across the northern 
hemisphere in a war scenario where human command had been wiped 
out (Thompson 2009).
Figure 6 Deadmau5 live in San Francisco, at Facebook’s F8 conference, 25 March 
2015. Deadmau5’s signature mouse helmet requires him to see what he’s doing 
via video, not with his own eyes. Note, too, the prominence of recording and 
playback technology, here, both on the stage and among the audience. Photo 
CC2.0 licensed from Maurizio Pesce. Copyright © 2015 by Maurizio Pesce.
Deadmau5’s costume is a helmet shaped like a cartoon mouse head; 
the mouse icon has become recognizably Deadmau5’s own brand while 
also clearly evoking, in a potentially trademark-infringing way, the image 
of Mickey Mouse (fig. 6)—clearly enough that in September 2014, Disney 
launched a trademark action against Deadmau5, who counter-sued Disney 
for unlicensed use of his music; ultimately, the two parties called the whole 
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thing off (O’Reilly). The Deadmau5 helmet and Zimmerman’s visible 
tattoos of video game icons evoke the formal basis of his music in the 
assembly of samples, including some appropriated ones.
Deadmau5 produces house music of the “electro” and “progressive” 
subgenres—popular dance music styles that are staples at nightclubs, 
especially the major clubs of Ibiza, London, and Miami that are central 
scenes and tastemakers for the global EDM economy. Although it is a more 
accessible and less alienating sound than Paladin’s, Deadmau5’s music, like 
Paladin’s, features Gothic motifs and textures, including explicit references 
to horror figures like Frankenstein. The 2010 track “Cthulhu Sleeps” evokes 
the monster of Lovecraft’s story. (Deadmau5’s Twitter account sometimes 
states his location as “Rlyeh”: the undersea city that houses Cthulhu in 
H. P. Lovecraft’s 1928 story “The Call of Cthulhu.”) “Cthulhu Sleeps” uses a 
sampled vocal “whoop” that we also hear in Armand Van Helden’s “Witch 
Doktor,” which itself also samples Parliament’s The Clones of Dr. Funken-
stein (1976)—a record also sampled by Deadmau5 in a different track, the 
eponymous “Dr. Funkenstein,” in which the only lyric is the utterance of 
this name, in a sonorous bass voice. Deadmau5’s “Dr. Funkenstein” has 
since been widely remixed; for Hallowe’en 2009, Deadmau5 released the 
Dr. Funkenstein Remixes EP (2009a), featuring the original track together 
with nine remixes by other EDM producers, in a range of EDM styles.
Gothic and horror references abound in other Deadmau5 tracks. “Com-
plications” (2008) includes the metronome pulse of an electrocardiogram, 
which flatlines during sequences when the kick drum cuts out, and then 
stops when the kick drum resumes, as though the drum beat replaces the 
heartbeat; the arrangement signals an oscillation from life to death, and 
back to life—or its digital simulation. The 2009 track “Ghosts ’n’ Stuff” 
propelled Deadmau5 to chart-topping fame; its lyrics open with a disori-
enting image of shared disembodiment: “It’s been so long I’ve been out of 
my body with you” (2009b). The song’s hook is a heavy organ riff (which 
in itself evokes Frankenstein, according to the tradition of organ instru-
mentation discussed in chapter 2). The companion track “Moar Ghosts 
’n’ Stuff” (2009c) opens with the funeral march by Chopin and modulates 
this into the organ hook of “Ghosts.”
The 2012 track “The Veldt” extends these thematics of death and 
technics in its adaptation of the eponymous Ray Bradbury story, and 
its unsettling juxtaposition of major-chord melody, bucolic samples of 
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bird- and insect song, and subtly gruesome, dystopian lyrics: “Happy life 
with the machines . . . Happy technology / Outside the lions run / Feed-
ing on remains” (2012b). In an interview with CBC, Zimmerman (2012a) 
described “The Veldt” as an homage to the Bradbury story “in which an 
unhealthy obsession with technology ends up having murderous conse-
quences.” He said that part of his intent with the song was to renew interest 
in that story. In a way both suggestive and symptomatic of the discourse 
of technology as Frankenpheme, the interviewer then asked Zimmerman:
Interviewer: Do you have an unhealthy obsession with technology?
Zimmerman: Yeah, absolutely. It’s incredibly unhealthy.
Interviewer: Tell me how it’s unhealthy.
Zimmerman: Well, because I have absolutely no social skills whatso-
ever. I cannot unplug. It’s not like I’m addicted to it, like a drug . . . 
well, maybe I am. (2012a)
As if to deliberately overstate the point, Zimmerman subsequently 
answered his cellphone while still on the air.
Deadmau5’s performance aesthetic and his productions alike thus 
dramatize and thematize the Frankensteinian problematic of life, death, 
and undeath. And in June 2012, Zimmerman reanimated the debate in 
popular music over “liveness” versus playback: in a Rolling Stone interview 
(Eells 2012), he claimed that EDM performers—including himself—”just 
hit play”—that is, preprogram whole sets—instead of improvising a mix of 
tracks. In follow-up music press coverage and social media, Zimmerman 
tried to clarify that he was referring specifically to EDM producers who 
are expected to perform at concerts and are held—absurdly, he holds—to 
expectations to perform music “live” the way singer-songwriters would: 
that is, to play music, not to play it back: “we all hit play,” he said (Deadmau5 
2012c). But Deadmau5’s claim that he could show up at a gig, press the 
spacebar, and then just fist-pump for the whole show touched a nerve with 
DJs as well as producers (thus showing some slippage and identification 
between these two roles, which have long overlapped in the EDM econ-
omy). On Twitter, Canadian expat DJ Sydney Blu continued the debate, 
writing: “Some idiot accused me of prerecording my set last night. That’s 
the funniest thing ever because I am one of the few djs that still beat match” 
(@SYDNEYBLU, 23 December 2012, 11:13 am).
In this way, Deadmau5 is extending not just recent traditions in Can-
adian EDM, but a broader legacy of McLuhan-informed Canadian music 
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making, like that demonstrated by Glenn Gould. But while Gould famously 
forsook the live concert for the recording studio, Zimmerman, conversely, 
brings the recording studio to the concert. In the perennial crisis of “live-
ness” in music, Zimmerman’s “just hit play” comments transposed the 
terms of this crisis more deeply into the already mediatized context of 
EDM and inflamed deep-seated and long-standing anxieties over technol-
ogy as labour’s monstrous supplement, which perennially recur in music as 
new instruments, production processes, and performance practices alter-
nately assist or supplant human labour (Porcello 1991). For those who don’t 
know or don’t like EDM, Deadmau5’s remark feeds these anxieties and 
plays into stereotypes of DJs as doing work other than music making, and 
of EDM as something other than music. What does Deadmau5’s admission 
leave the performing body to do? To parody liveness, to act as conductor? 
As Bolter et al. (2006) argue, “aura” is now just a design parameter for 
digital media. Opting out of the aura of liveness, it seems, has hurt neither 
Zimmerman’s touring schedule nor his music sales.
Deadmau5’s performance practice includes a further detail that fur-
nishes an apt coda to this discussion: when he performs while wearing 
the version of the mouse-head helmet that lights up with LEDs, he cannot 
actually see out of the helmet with his own eyes. Instead, he wears video 
goggles. As he explained in his CBC radio interview:
Zimmerman: I got a camera coming out of this thing so I can see my 
hands—
Interviewer: So wait a sec—there’s a camera in the mouse head?
Zimmerman: Yeah, there’s video goggles in the mouse head, so I’m 
looking through video goggles and there’s a camera down here by 
my neck.
Interviewer: You’re watching a video of what is in front of you.
Zimmerman: Yeah, it’s really weird. And there’s a two millisecond lag 
on it and it drives me crazy. (2012a)
Identifying hypermediatization with intoxication, and technology with 
addiction, and making and playing music in ways that amplify the Frank-
ensteinian figuration of technology, Zimmerman as Deadmau5 thus 
represents a recent, globally popular contribution to the tradition of 
McLuhanesque Frankenstein adaptations in Canada’s EDM scene. As 
Canadian representatives of a globalized EDM culture characterized by 
“techno-Romanticism” and immersive mediatization, the Paladin Project 
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and Deadmau5 problematize anxieties over liveness and labour in their 
productions and performance practices that amplify McLuhan’s Frank-
ensteinian discourse of technology.
Despite EDM culture’s organization around subcultural capital and 
insulating “gatekeeping” practices and discourses, it is a fundamentally 
social cultural scene; and while its heavy investments in digital media com-
plicate and problematize “liveness,” by the same token they thus show that 
EDM culture is a profoundly performance-oriented scene. These social 
and performative dimensions of EDM scene-making have facilitated its 
cross-pollination with other sites and forms of cultural production in 
Canada; in the process, EDM culture’s performance practices, reference 
points, and techno-Romantic aesthetics—with their emphasis on the 
McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology—have spread to and been 
adapted by other sub- and popular cultural scenes and processes. One salu-
tary example of this cross-pollination is the fringe play richardthesecond 
(2001), by Toronto-based actor and playwright Matthew MacFadzean.
“The new celebrity is gonna be genetic pioneers”
MacFadzean’s richardthesecond, first performed at the 2001 Summer-
Works festival in Toronto, is an intensely intertextual production: an 
acknowledged adaptation of Shakespeare and an implicit adaptation 
of Mary Shelley’s “skeleton story,” with numerous nods to Videodrome 
and Toronto’s rave scene, among a dizzying array of other popular cul-
tural points of reference. The play distills its manic mix of subcultural, 
pop-cultural, and canonical sources into an eminently McLuhanesque 
meditation on new media technologies and their monstrous implications.
richardthesecond is a one-actor play, and as the plot unfolds this 
dramaturgy assumes a rich irony. The protagonist, “Richie Excellent,” 
introduces himself as a cocky young hipster-raver; he tells the audience 
of his ambition to make a difference in the world, amidst a tangle of segues 
and non-sequiturs about Star Wars, Electric Circus, and other pop cul-
ture touchstones. Between his live monologue and video footage, which 
includes speeches by a “mad scientist” character named Gene, we gradually 
learn that Richie has been cloned as part of a research project led by Gene. 
In the first pages of the script, Gene’s references to Darwin and eugenics 
frame the project that Richie ultimately describes very much according 
to the familiar Frankenphemes that have historically articulated public 
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
172 The Medium Is the Monster
concerns with experiments in cloning (Morton 2002, Turney 1998): later in 
the script, video footage shows “protesters holding placards reading ‘Stop 
Cloning Now’” (MacFadzean 2001, 18). Gene’s introductory references to 
Darwin and natural selection also bear self-reflexively on MacFadzean’s 
play as an adaptation in its own right (albeit of the cultural not biological 
kind). By the end of the play, which concludes Richie’s search for identity 
and ethics among the simulacra of postmodernity, neither the audience 
nor Richie himself knows if he is the original Richie, or the second.
The play’s similarities to Videodrome abound, from its opening on a 
TV screen showing noise not signal, to the O’Blivionesque (which is to 
say McLuhanesque) restriction of Gene’s role to a posthumous, televised 
presence and his characterization as a mad scientist preoccupied with 
human adaptation, to Richie’s references to TV as a kind of surrogate 
parent figure: “I sorta .  .  . stumbled onto destiny. Birthed by must-see 
tee-vee” (MacFadzean 2001, 10). Like O’Blivion, Gene only ever appears on 
a video screen, as a recording, and he provides the explanation of the pro-
tagonist’s monstrous origins. As in Videodrome, this explanatory sequence 
occurs late in the plot, a revelation of Richie’s true, “second” nature as 
a clone. Something of O’Blivion’s apocalyptic tone—which itself echoes 
McLuhan’s tendency to generalize his claims about media into nothing 
less than epochal terms—resonates in a late montage sequence wherein 
a TV announcer welcomes the audience to “the Next Age of Man” (16). 
Like O’Blivion, a great deal of Richie’s identity is bound up in a videotape 
library, in this case, a complete collection of every episode of the TV show 
Electric Circus (which was Toronto’s answer to US dance shows like Solid 
Gold and Soul Train): “I watch Electric Circus to know I’m alive,” Richie 
asserts, echoing O’Blivion’s claim in Videodrome that “television is reality.”
Like Atwood’s Snowman, Richie is a collage of a character, a pastiche 
of pop-culture and media references, one of which is Cronenberg’s film 
Dead Ringers (which Richie cites to describe Gene). As Richie’s role in the 
cloning experiment becomes clear, he also becomes his own doppelgänger: 
unsure whether he’s the first or second Richie, he adds that additional 
“me’s” will be built “at age 2, 20, 40, 60, 80” (20). “I’m tellin ya,” he boasts, 
“the new celebrity is gonna be genetic pioneers, and if that’s the case 
I’m like grade seven Canadian history” (21). Apprehending the Franken-
steinian character of his fate in terms of media—and the mediatization not 
simply of performance but of subjectivity itself—Richie expects that he will 
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eventually become downloadable (21), describes himself as a “high-speed 
connection,” as a “telegram” (23), and, more abstractly and ambiguously, 
as simply “shared” (27).
Recognizing that the play’s compulsive referentiality risks dating it, the 
script’s stage directions call for “pop culture updates” as “necessary” (2), 
thus rendering a constellation of script details subject to both obsolescence 
and interchangeability—and therefore amplifying the Frankensteinian 
resonance of the play’s intense intertextuality. This intertextuality encom-
passes echoes of and allusions to other previous Frankenstein adaptations: 
not only Videodrome but also Max Headroom (in early footage of Gene, 
edited to loop, repeat, and stutter) and 2001: A Space Odyssey (in subse-
quent footage of the iconic rebellious computer, Hal) (21). The play also 
alludes to Frankenstein itself, in that Richie’s concluding reflection—and 
confusion—is set against the mediatized backdrop of repeating video foot-
age of an “arctic vista” (20, 25, 30), and the play’s end mirrors its beginning 
in footage of TV “snow” (30).
Electronic dance music accompanies the play’s action; productions 
have for the most part used not prerecorded music but “live” mixing per-
formance by an offstage DJ. The script sometimes suggests what kind of 
music is to be played, with repeated references to “tech” in its stage dir-
ections: “like some massive tech-anthem” (2); “muscle car techno” (12). 
These references to “techno”—the music genre—mark the performances 
of techno music in the production and textually complement the script’s 
other references to technology, which culminate in the denouement’s stage 
directions for a climactic montage of footage including “rapid firing off of 
images on screen symbols, slogans, inventions, technologies, ending with 
a shot of Darth Vader with his mask taken off” (29).
Techno music accompanies the action and dialogue, references to 
technology and prior Frankenstein adaptations augment the script, 
and MacFadzean’s commentary on the play suggests how it furthers a 
McLuhanesque and Frankensteinian discourse of technology. Describing 
his play as a “techno-opera,” the playwright told Now magazine that “what 
I like most about Shakespeare is that each play mirrors an era, and Richard 
II seems to be ours” (quoted in Kaplan 2001, 53). Detailed production notes 
identify Richard II’s protagonist as a “dreamer” who is fascinated by the 
strange fruits of technology and capitalist excess, while wilfully oblivious 
to “impending environmental shutdown” (MacFadzean 2002).
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richardthesecond thus adapts major canonical literary works, pop cul-
ture references and media samples, and the subcultural milieu of EDM to 
stage a story of technological backfire organized around a scientific field 
whose long-standing controversy has been framed emphatically in Frank-
ensteinian terms. As a fringe play, the production has occupied a liminal 
niche where subculture, pop culture, and canonical or “high” culture con-
verge—and where they enable cultural hybridization and experimentation 
with form and media. Together with the music production and performance 
practices of Paladin and Deadmau5, theatrical works like richardthesecond 
dramatize the Frankensteinian and McLuhanesque contours of new media 
technology and media discourse in Canada. These multimedia productions 
and performances, occupying intersecting milieus of localized subculture 
and globalized popular culture, also illustrate how the discourse of tech-
nology functions legibly in sound- and image-making practices as well as 
textual and language articulations. And they demonstrate that Canadian 
popular culture represents a pivotal site both for theorizing adaptation in 
cultural production and for popularizing McLuhan’s sense of technology 
as something modern, manufactured, and monstrous.
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8. Monster Mines  
and Pipelines
Frankenphemes of Tar Sands Technology 
in Canadian Popular Culture
The company is welding together old pipelines and new ones, 
reversing the flow on some and pumping up the volume on 
others, building their very own Frankenstein pipeline down to 
the Gulf coast. (LaFontaine 2012)
Weather forecasters are predicting that Hurricane Sandy 
could merge with another weather system as it moves, bring-
ing a “Frankenstorm” to parts of Eastern Canada and the U.S. 
in time for Halloween. (CBC 2012)
Friday marks the fourth day of an intense firestorm in 
Canada’s boreal forest that has engulfed large parts of Fort 
McMurray, Alberta—a frontier town that serves as the base 
for the province’s oil sands region. . . . “The beast is still up. It’s 
surrounding the city,” said fire chief Darby Allen. . . . Fire is a 
natural part of the boreal ecosystem, but what’s happening in 
Fort McMurray isn’t natural. . . . We’ve reached an era where all 
weather events bear at least a slight human fingerprint, which, 
as Elizabeth Kolbert points out in the New Yorker, means 
“we’ve all contributed to the latest inferno.” (Holthaus 2016)
Cultural representations of the Alberta tar sands industry demonstrate 
the pivotal role that Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein have played in 
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constructing and popularizing a globalized discourse of technology. This 
chapter contextualizes the popular cultural tradition of Canadian adap-
tations of Frankenstein in relation to Canada’s resource extraction-based 
industries, and hence to globalization. Moreover, in finding an abundance 
of cultural representations of oil in Canada alone, this chapter answers 
and tempers Imre Szeman’s (2011) claim that “our fiction of energy surplus 
appears to be so completely shielded from view as to be hardly named in 
our literary fictions at all.” He sees energy infrastructure and especially 
oil as a “dearth . . . in contemporary fiction,” pointing to works like Upton 
Sinclair’s Oil! (1927) as exceptions to this rule. Szeman focuses on “literary 
fictions” and gives only a nod to science fiction, a genre that is central to 
cultural images of oil. For Szeman, Avatar (2009) illustrates science fic-
tion’s fantastic, clean energy futures, a curious misreading of the film that 
seems to miss its tar sands allegory, as I will discuss. 
Today, the Alberta tar sands industry, located northeast of McLuhan’s 
hometown Edmonton, represents a significant and symptomatic site of 
technology as a Frankenstein trope: it is the world’s biggest industrial pro-
ject and capital’s most hubristic gamble with climate change catastrophe 
(Berman 2013). In 2016, the region where this industry is located suffered 
a catastrophic, long-running wildfire dubbed “the Beast” by firefighters 
and described by Naomi Klein (evoking the Frankensteinian rhetoric of 
galvanism) as the result of “El Niño supercharged with climate change” 
(2016). An extraction business of enormous scale and unprecedented 
destructiveness (Patchett 2012), the tar sands literalize David McNally’s 
observation that “the idea that something monstrous is at work in the 
operations of global capitalism is never far from the surface today” (2011, 
9). Accordingly, technologically reductive articulations of Frankensteins 
have emerged to represent the tar sands—and the climate change that the 
oil business is now known to accelerate. Cultural representations of the 
Alberta tar sands demonstrate the pivotal role that Canadian adaptations 
of Frankenstein have played in constructing and circulating the globalized 
discourse of technology.
Here we should first recall that allusion, adaptation, and other modes 
of cultural appropriation can as readily serve strategies of interpretive 
closure (Baldick 1987, 5) as those of openness and ambiguity. Frankenstein 
references often function as sensational rhetoric designed to thwart ser-
ious, reasoned discussion. The figure of Frankenstein stalks contemporary 
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journalism and commentary on oil and the tar sands, among critics and 
supporters. A 2009 US advertising campaign by the environmental advo-
cacy group Forest Ethics warned about “the dirtiest oil on earth” and 
described “the Tar Sands” as “a Frankenstein of local and global environ-
mental hazards” (quoted in Craven 2009). In 2012, the National Wildlife 
Federation described Enbridge’s proposed pipeline expansion in a flurry 
of Frankenstein images: “If Keystone XL is the ‘zombie pipeline’ that won’t 
die, it’s pretty clear the Enbridge expansion is the ‘Frankenstein’ of tar 
sands. The patchwork, 2,600 mile pipeline is right out of a mad scientist’s 
dream” (LaFontaine 2012). Conversely, the oil lobby Energy Tomorrow also 
invoked Frankenstein to refute criticisms of diluted bitumen, or “dilbit,” 
the tar sands’ product: “Dilbit isn’t some Frankenstein-like product and 
lots of care goes into shipping it” (Green 2012). References like these are 
more rhetorical moves than aesthetic ones, although the availability of 
Frankenstein to both sides of this debate refracts a bit of the ambivalence 
of the story and its near-ubiquitous invocation with reference to public 
questions concerning technology.
Across different media and genres, Canadian cultural texts exhibit a 
range of reductive and ambiguous uses for Frankenstein’s story of techno-
logical backfire to represent oil business, energy crisis, and climate crisis. 
Take McLuhan, for instance: his work does not address energy as exten-
sively as media, but references to energy industries furnish contextual 
bookends for the first and last chapters of Understanding Media (1964). 
That study devotes a chapter to the car, figured according to the same 
Frankenstein allusion that titled his first book: that chapter is called 
“Motorcar: The Mechanical Bride” ([1964] 2003, 291). For McLuhan, the 
car is a cyborg technology, described in terms as Frankensteinian as those 
with which he describes new media generally: “It was the electric spark 
that enabled the gasoline engine to take over from the steam engine. The 
crossing of electricity, the biological form, with the mechanical form was 
never to release a greater force” (296). As an “extension of man”—that is, 
as a medium—the car “turns the rider into a superman” (297); the car is 
not only a medium but also a weapon, a “misguided missile” (300) whose 
destructive power is its drastic environmental impact and social trans-
formation: “cars have become the real population of our cities, with a 
resulting loss of human scale” (293).
doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771992244.01
178 The Medium Is the Monster
In 1973 (at the onset of the first postwar energy crisis), Christopher 
Dewdney’s first book, A Paleozoic Geology of London, Ontario, includes 
a prose poem called “Sol du Soleil” (“Soil of the sun”), consisting of two 
paragraphs: the first defamiliarizes the point of view of a car driver; the 
second figures the fossil fuel industry in monstrous, geological terms. The 
second paragraph speculates how the “continued use of fossil fuels” will 
“slowly replace the present composition of the atmosphere with the chem-
ical composition of the atmosphere some 200 million years ago. . . . This 
atmosphere will become capable of generating the life-forms essential to 
this ancient form” (1973, 5).
The poem posits fossil fuel use as ironic technological backlash: the 
human use of fuels made from the fossils of ancient life forms is changing 
the climate to make the earth once again hospitable to those life forms. 
In this concise speculation on energy futures, the unintended end and 
radical externality of oil is the return of the compressed. The ironic sense 
of cyclical time in the context of fossil fuels expressed in Dewdney’s poem 
has been more recently expressed in an Internet meme that started 
circulating around 2013; the meme image varies (some versions show 
stock “meme” characters like Philosoraptor), and the source is unknown 
(because of the anonymous and viral character of memes), but the text 
reads: “If oil is made from decomposed dinosaurs, and plastic is made 
from oil, are plastic dinosaurs made from real dinosaurs?” (Kim 2013). 
The question has since been taken up online, in discussion forums and 
web comics, to assess if there’s any scientific truth to it, although the main 
interest in the meme is its implied questioning of consumerism in an 
oil-based economy and its accompanying hint—which recurs elsewhere 
in popular cultural representations of oil—that this economy symbol-
ically depends as much on archaic, fossilized ideas and ideologies as it 
materially depends on fossil fuels.
Another suggestive period text that represents the oil business and 
extraction technology in Frankensteinian terms is Richard Rohmer’s 
early-1970s trilogy of novels that imagine a Canada threatened with US 
annexation for its Arctic oil and gas reserves. The first of these, Ultimatum 
([1973] 2003), also includes a subplot concerning First Nations protests 
over territorial and resource rights—and a controversial pipeline, no less, 
giving it an uncanny timeliness and even prescience concerning today’s 
“Frankenstein pipelines” and growing interest in Arctic fuel sources. 
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Rohmer’s novel takes the energy crisis quite seriously: the story envisions 
a near-future oil boomtown in Resolute Bay. Interestingly, much of the plot 
action takes place over the phone, as the US president and the Canadian 
prime minister engage in extensive and exhausting negotiations to resolve 
the crisis and stave off a US invasion of Canada. This may seem odd for a 
techno-thriller (and, well, less than thrilling) but it belongs to a distinctly 
Canadian and McLuhanesque tradition of integrating media, their effects, 
and their environments into not only the setting but also the action of a 
story (as discussed in chapter 5, concerning Cronenberg’s films). In an early 
scene in Ultimatum, as the US president arrives in Resolute Bay to tour its 
undersea drilling operation, the narrator supplies some backstory that is 
also foreshadowing: “It was right about here that the first big gas discovery 
was made in January ’70. It came up under such enormous pressure that it 
blew. . . . No one had the know-how or the technology then to cope with 
high-pressure finds like that” (118). Ironically, then, the operation that the 
president inspects subsequently ruptures and blows. Although the Arctic’s 
fossil fuels have turned Resolute Bay into a boomtown, the “know-how and 
technology” for extracting and distributing them remain sketchy at best, 
subject to backfire as well as sabotage, all while the threat of neoimperial 
war hangs on the phone wire between the state leaders’ offices.
The period’s popular music also addressed the energy crisis. Neil 
Young’s 1974 song “Vampire Blues” invokes the vampire (a figure with 
close historical ties to Frankenstein, as discussed in chapter 2) to depict 
the oil business: “I’m a vampire, babe / Suckin’ blood from the Earth . . . 
Sell you twenty barrels’ worth.” 
More recently, Young has become a prominent, outspoken critic of the 
tar sands; his Honour the Treaties concert tour of 2014 was a legal fund-
raiser for the Fort Chipewyan reserve, the First Nations community that 
has been most gravely afflicted by tar sands pollution. Young’s tour and his 
controversial statements polarized and galvanized Canadians.
Turning to more contemporary work, the Canadian photographer 
Edward Burtynsky has drawn public and critical attention to the tar 
sands. His photographs of “manufactured landscapes” play with scale and 
perspective, for instance by using elevated or aerial vantage points to sug-
gest the enormity of infrastructural technologies, their social effects, and 
their drastic consequences and externalities. Images of industrial enor-
mity, of “the rise of the machine” have, since Marx, included a tradition 
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of Frankensteinian references (Baldick 1987), and Burtynsky has played 
on and extended this tradition in his revealing photographic work. An 
exemplary photo is Alberta Oil Sands #6 (fig. 7).
On the horizon, we see only “darkness and distance” (Shelley [1818] 
2012, 221). In the middle distance, an oil sands refinery sprawls, like Archi-
bald Lampman’s nightmarish “city at the end of things.” From the middle 
distance to the foreground stretch two flat, rectangular areas that dis-
rupt the industrial realism of the composition; they are fields of unnatural 
yellow and rust hues, like lakes of fire in hell. These areas—which are 
sulphur collection beds—convey Burtynsky’s signature ability to turn 
documentary into defamiliarization, confronting us with a shocking kind 
of realism that verges on the surreal, in a way that might prompt us to 
wonder whether the images have been digitally enhanced. OIL, a book pro-
duced to accompany an exhibit of Burtynsky’s photographs, itself features 
explicitly Frankensteinian language, in curator Paul Roth’s description of 
Burtynsky’s work, in which, he argues, we see “no industrial Golem, no 
homicidal Frankenstein. Rather, we see the ordering force of man, and the 
chilling, corrosive, penultimate threat that lies at the black heart of our 
rationalism” (Burtynsky et al. 2011, 169). Roth’s reference to Frankenstein, 
intended to disavow its relevance, still conjures its association with tech-
nology, and it is suggestively worded as well: that “we see” no Frankenstein 
may not so much deny the monstrous horror of Burtynsky’s images as 
instead implicate us, the viewers, in the environmental horror show docu-
mented in Burtynsky’s photographs. That is, we may understand ourselves 
as Frankensteins or, at least, as accomplices to Big Oil’s Frankensteinian 
work—like Walton aboard the icebound ship, who first hears the stricken 
scientist’s story but ultimately assumes an active role in it.
Returning to popular music, the Albertan singer-songwriter Corb 
Lund approaches the petroculture of his home state from a libertarian 
perspective. The grim, apocalyptic song “Gettin’ Down on the Mountain,” 
from Lund’s 2012 album Cabin Fever, begins with an odd arrangement of 
juxtaposed acoustic plucking and growling electric bass, over which Lund 
opens the lyrics with this ominous refrain: “When the oil stops, every-
thing stops.” What follows is like a lyrical three-minute version of Cormac 
McCarthy’s desolate, postapocalyptic novel The Road (2006): images of 
gridlock, supply shortages, and starvation, punctuated by pointed, peda-
gogical questions to the listener about survival skills. “Can you break the 
Figure 7 “Darkness and distance”: Edward Burtynsky, Alberta Oil Sands #6 
(2011). Burtynsky’s signature aerial vantage point and wide scope crucially 
document extraction technologies otherwise hidden from public view. Photo 
copyright © Edward Burtynsky, courtesy Nicholas Metivier Gallery, Toronto.
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horse, can you dig the well?” (Lund 2012). In the chorus, the song’s persona 
shares his own plan: “Don’t wanna be around when the shit goes down / I’m 
going to ground on the mountain” (2012). The song is a musical version of 
the “peak oil” thesis whose proponents are characterized by the bunkered, 
embattled survivalism conveyed here in passages like “Brother can you 
pass the ammo?” The song emphasizes its premise in the precariousness 
of the oil-based economy; both the first and the last verses start with the 
same line: “When the oil stops, everything stops.” The lyrics’ present-tense 
and interrogative wording make the imagined scene less an extrapola-
tion than a foregone conclusion: the future present. In the backfire of 
this single technology—the unanticipated unsustainability of fossil fuel 
dependence—Lund reads the ripping of “the social fabric”: peak oil is a 
man-made monster in its overinvested valuation, as everything that keeps 
men from acting like monsters to one another.
In the tone with which it represents the oil business, this song contrasts 
sharply with “The Roughest Neck Around,” from Lund’s 2002 album Five 
Dollar Bill. “Roughest Neck” is an upbeat ode to the oil patch worker. The 
“roughest neck” is larger than life, a superhuman Everyman characterized 
by hard work, technical expertise, and devotion to family and society; “he 
brings power to the people.” And yet he is figured in grotesque, almost 
monstrous terms. “He’s got a “real long reach,” with “the power in his hands 
to pull the dragons from the ground.” He is the oil industry’s globalized 
product as much as its producer: “He’s been all around the world,” and he’s 
got both “power in his heart” and “dragons in his chest” (2002). Musically, 
too, the swinging roadhouse blues of “Roughest Neck” contrast with the 
halting, plodding rhythm of “Gettin’ Down.” These two songs about oil 
production contrast each other in tone, but not in overall ethos; both 
appeal, albeit in different ways, to more right-wing discourses of individ-
ual responsibility and self-making. Thus, their Frankensteinian images 
complement each other: the former figures the oil worker as monstrous 
superman, the latter posits peak oil as a global threat, and the shadow of 
Frankensteinian technological backfire looms over both.
Several recent plays by Alberta theatre companies—plays like Good 
Fences (2012) and Extraction (2013)—have turned to the tar sands for 
dramatic subject matter (Nestruck 2012). One allusive and suggestive 
production is Catalyst Theatre’s Frankenstein (Christenson 2006), which 
premiered in 2006 at the Keyano Theatre in Fort McMurray—the northern 
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Alberta town adjacent to the tar sands operation. Catalyst Theatre’s Frank-
enstein is an extensive, acknowledged adaptation on Hutcheon’s (2006) 
model, and it uses many of the key points of Shelley’s original plot: the 
Frankenstein family servant Justine is tried for the murder of the boy Wil-
liam; Frankenstein destroys the “bride” he promises the creature, who 
then murders his betrothed; in the middle of the story, the creature con-
fronts Frankenstein on a glacier and tells its “origin story”; Frankenstein 
is accused of murdering his friend Henry Clerval. Catalyst’s stage version 
also makes significant changes: Justine is young Victor’s science tutor and 
mentor; Walton’s frame narrative is replaced by a loose chorus of narra-
tors who introduce, interrupt, and look on the main action; Frankenstein 
completes and animates the “bride” before destroying it; and the play ends 
with Frankenstein incarcerated in an institution for the mentally ill, where 
the creature visits him in the final scene.
The script dialogue and narration are largely structured by rhyming, 
song-like lines, and the costumes and props are highly stylized according 
to a stark Expressionist aesthetic: all the costumes and props are paper, 
paper-surfaced, or papier-mâché and mostly all white, with only a very few 
accents of colour, which tend instead to be produced by lighting effects 
and makeup. The rhyming script and musical numbers, together with 
the striking, monochromatic visual effects, lend the play a surreal period 
atmosphere. The abundance of paper, its use to create an Expressionist 
visual vocabulary reminiscent of silent film, and its presence in a stage play 
all make for a self-reflexive commentary on dramatic form and established 
media like writing and live performance, at a time when reminders for audi-
ences to turn off mobile devices have become as routine as the inevitable 
disruptions said devices cause. In its script and its staging, Catalyst’s Frank-
enstein mounts a self-consciously theatrical, pointedly low-tech production.
The script’s opening is particularly noteworthy for relating the play 
to its site of production in Fort McMurray and thus to the tar sands with 
which the town is popularly identified. The introduction sets the scene for 
the story it unfolds against a backdrop of “strange signs” seen in “strange 
times” that could be either Shelley’s period or the present:
Nick: These are strange days we live in.
Strange days to be alive!
Who knows where we’re heading?
Or how long we may survive?
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Nancy: For five hundred days a poisonous haze
Has spread across the sky.
Tim: Perhaps it’s a sign of the sickening times:
Tracy:  Grim and foreboding—sent from on high. 
Sarah:  Something’s gone terribly wrong in this world,
Something beyond repair. . . .
Tim: Another strange, malignant plague
Annihilates ten thousand men.
Sarah: Another record-breaking storm
Claims a hundred thousand more. (Christenson 2006, 1)
The suggestion of “strange days” precedes a litany of unusual—and 
globalized—phenomena and crises. The “poisonous haze” alludes to the 
“Year without a Summer,” 1816, which saw temperatures fall across Europe 
as a result of an Indonesian volcanic eruption; this was the unseason-
able summer that Shelley spent with her circle of friends in Switzerland, 
when they made their famous agreement to write ghost stories, Shelley’s 
being Frankenstein. But “poisonous haze” also alludes to the pollution 
produced by the tar sands operations, visible in the vicinities of Fort 
McMurray and Edmonton, and a subject of perennial news coverage and 
scientific study (like Parajulee and Wania 2014). Similarly, the “plague” 
could refer either to the significant cholera outbreaks of Shelley’s time 
(which inspired her 1826 novel The Last Man), or to any number of global 
disease outbreaks today, such as the 2014 Ebola scare. But among these 
“signs,” the “record-breaking storm” seems decidedly more about the 
present than about the past. The term “record-breaking” is a construction 
of modern usage, and the image of a monster storm—a “Frankenstorm,” 
as Hurricane Sandy got called (CBC News 2012) or “the Beast” of the 
Fort McMurray fire—is an emphatically contemporary image, and one 
increasingly understood in close relation to the climate change caused 
by widespread fossil fuel use.
The relevance of Catalyst’s Frankenstein to the tar sands, especially 
in its relation to Fort McMurray and its apocalyptic script, has not been 
lost on those involved in staging the play. Dov Mickelson, an actor who 
plays several roles in the play (including Frankenstein’s father and younger 
brother), has said of the play that
certainly it has present day implications. We first performed this 
show in Fort McMurray (in –40 February!) and what is going on 
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there with the oil sands and the environment had an eerie resonance. 
It made me wonder if it was the same for the author 200 years earlier 
and the onslaught of the industrial revolution as a backdrop to what 
was going on. (quoted in Cross 2010)
The play’s apocalyptic sense of foreboding and looming catastrophe 
gets put in a significantly—and symptomatically—global context, in 
the above-quoted opening lines: “Something’s gone terribly wrong in 
this world” (2006). From these first lines forward, the play consistently 
connects the local to the global, the personal tragedy of Frankenstein to 
the broader catastrophes of the world, often through the invocation of a 
collective “we”; in this way, Frankenstein’s “first irreversible blunder” is 
universalized, the cause of a global “terrible mess” (65) that encompasses 
“us” in its querying of responsibility and complicity: “How did we come to 
this point? . . . The time will come to face our fears . . . We close our eyes, 
we cover our ears, / We know the end is drawing near” (65–66). If there 
were ever a global, technological, and ecological crisis in which “we” are 
implicated as a collective, it is certainly that of the capitalist world-system’s 
structural dependence on oil.
The last but not least example to be analyzed in detail here is the 2009 
blockbuster film Avatar, directed by Canadian expatriate James Cam-
eron, whose most successful films—for instance, The Terminator (1984), 
Aliens (1986), and Titanic (1997)—have all been dramas of Frankensteinian 
technological backfire. One of the most successful Hollywood movies to 
date, Avatar is also a powerful representation of the tar sands, and this 
representation has been mobilized for activism, against the “Avatar sands” 
(Sierra Club et al, 2010), by NGOs, Indigenous groups, and Cameron him-
self (Mirrlees 2013, 7). Among the many appropriations and critiques of 
Avatar, an overlooked narrative aspect is that its plot is a Frankensteinian 
story of technological backfire. The uncanny “native alien” body that the 
disabled soldier Sully learns to occupy is a lab-grown body. As a host for 
Sully’s projected consciousness, the avatar enacts a doubled role, making 
Sully his own doppelgänger. The avatar body is also gigantic and blue—as 
were most nineteenth-century stage performances of Frankenstein’s mon-
ster. The scene in which Sully first “wakes up” in his avatar body echoes the 
typical “creation scene” in Frankenstein films, as the creature awakens to 
cause a ruckus in the lab and breaks its restraints. Avatar’s plot becomes 
one of technological backfire, as the transformed Sully rebels against his 
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masters, abandoning his mission to join the oppressed Na’vi in resisting 
the military-industrial colonists. The success of the Na’vi’s resistance forces 
the decolonization of the planet Pandora. While this is a Hollywood happy 
ending, it is also a dramatization of the SF “Frankenstein barrier”: here, 
the Na’vi cut off Earth’s staple fuel source; this contingency effectively 
forecloses on the planet’s future.
What especially enabled the adoption of Avatar for activism against 
the “Avatar sands” are the early establishing shots that show the colonists’ 
mining operation on Pandora. The resemblance of these shots to the tar 
sands is openly acknowledged by Avatar’s art director, Alberta-born 
Todd Cherniawsky, who is quoted in the documentary The Tipping Point 
(Thompson and Radford 2011): “What was going on in Alberta,” he says, 
“was hugely informative in building and designing this environment.” The 
first view of the Pandora mine appears through the landing spacecraft’s 
windshield as the copilot says “the mine is in sight”—a subtle script empha-
sis on making visible an extraction industry characterized as “uniquely 
occluded” (Pendakis and Wilson 2012, 5). The next shot (fig. 8) shows the 
fuller vista of the mine in the middle distance and the refinery in the back-
ground; this shot strongly resembles Burtynsky’s distinctive aerial-angle, 
panoramic photographs of the Alberta tar sands operations.
The camera then pans and cuts to a shot that details the operation: 
loaded dump trucks and soldiers traversing a narrow access road, behind 
which a massive bucket-wheel excavator sends up dust as it chews into the 
earth (fig. 9). 
Significantly, in this close shot the bucket-wheel appears so gigantic that 
it exceeds the frame, as does the gigantic dump truck in a subsequent shot 
where the protagonist stops as the truck drives past, revealing a number of 
arrows that have been shot into its tires. The script for this scene invokes the 
discourse of technology explicitly: “The neolithic weapons are jarring amid 
all the advanced technology” (Cameron 2009, 8). The bucket-wheel image 
itself is suggestively critical: the bucket-wheel excavator was discontinued in 
the 1990s (Gismondi and Davidson 2012), so it appears here as an obsolete 
icon of extraction machinery, as if to signal the unsustainability and ultimate 
failure of the Pandora mine and to suggest the combined obsolescence and 
rapacity—the living death—of fossil fuel technology in general.
Across a range of different media and genres, then, Canadian rep-
resentations of the tar sands invoke Frankenstein to depict and question 
Figure 8 Avatar (2009), at runtime 00:03:59: “The mine is in sight.” Author’s 
rendering of the original shot. (This and the next artistic rendering of scenes 
from Avatar are used because such renderings constitute fair dealing for 
purposes of criticism, while the licensing cost to reprint the film still-frames of 
these scenes would exceed $1000 USD. To see the film still-frames, just search 
the Internet for “Avatar unobtainium mine.”)
Figure 9 The bucket-wheel excavator, from Avatar, at runtime 00:04:07. Author’s 
rendering of the original shot. 
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this industry’s scale, danger, and obsolescence; in the process, they dem-
onstrate how Canadian culture and industry have both popularized the 
general discourse of technology as human-made global monstrosity and 
promoted public awareness of the causal relation between fossil fuel use 
and climate change. Taken as a group, these texts also provide a grotesque 
critical vocabulary of images for Canada’s tradition of technological nation-
alism—which the oil business restructures as a transnationalism—and for 
its postcoloniality: if Canada is sometimes positioned as a “dutiful daugh-
ter” of Empire or a victim of the cultural imperialism of US popular culture, 
texts like those analyzed here articulate and dramatize how the resource 
extraction industry anchored in the tar sands has made Canada a neoim-
perial economic leader in its own right, with all the predictable failures of 
democratic integrity and environmental stewardship that such leadership 
tends to confer (Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015). Taken together, these 
texts tell a story—which itself may trade in the oversimplifying interpret-
ive closure of “technological reduction” that has fuelled Frankenstein’s 
global popularity—in which the tar sands are the mad scientist, and climate 
change its monster.
And in a further Frankensteinian irony, the climate change exported 
by Canada’s tar sands has accelerated a polar melting that now brings Big 
Oil to the Arctic for exploration and extraction (Al Jazeera 2012; Chazan 
2008). Recent Frankenstein scholarship reflects this trend: “Arctic explor-
ation was in the news at the time Mary Shelley was working on her novel, 
much in the same way that the circumpolar region is in the news in our 
own time due to global warming. It is probably for this very reason that 
most of the articles on Mary Shelley’s Arctic have been published within 
the last ten years as we become conscious of and concerned with Arctic 
issues once again” (Bachinger 2010, 162). Like Mary Shelley’s novel, Big 
Oil’s own Frankenstein story of technological backfire is destined to press 
north, towards greater hubris and atrocity; and it will all too likely end, as 
well, in self-destructive conflagration.
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Conclusion
In concluding this study, I want to turn from Canadian popular culture to 
survey a set of works by major international scholars—mainly in media 
studies—that build on McLuhan’s media theory to globally distribute his 
Frankenpheme of technology. This survey will establish a point from which 
to suggest some tentative conclusions to be drawn and some possible 
further directions in which to take this work, in terms of its possible impli-
cations for adaptation studies generally and for studies of Frankenstein in 
particular, and in terms of other national or regional sites of Frankenstein 
adaptation in cultural practice. These transnational considerations in turn 
prompt a return to the question of what precisely is Canadian about these 
adaptations and about the discourse of technology, and whether, accord-
ingly, the long-standing socio-cultural mode of Canadian technological 
nationalism (Charland 1986) might warrant rethinking or reconfiguring 
as something more like a “technocratic transnationalism.”
McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of Technology in Global Scholarship
Widely misread as a techno-enthusiast, McLuhan personally opposed 
technological change: “No one could be less enthusiastic about these rad-
ical changes than myself” (1969, 158). He argued individuals and societies 
respond to the tumult and havoc new media bring about by going into 
shock or enduring “autoamputation”: “With the arrival of electric tech-
nology, man extended, or set outside himself, a live model of the central 
nervous system itself” ([1964] 2003, 65). The spectre of artificial intelli-
gence and the imagery of “amputation” that pervades McLuhan’s work 
amplify his Frankensteinian sense of technology as modern, manufactured, 
and monstrous.
If we see the postcolonial conditioning of McLuhan’s discourse of 
technology in his Cambridge training, his reliance on British literary 
touchstones (such as Blake, Byron, and Joyce), and his popularization via 
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the “global underground” counterculture (Rycroft 1998) and US advertis-
ing and media industries, we then see the global circulation of McLuhan’s 
discourse of technology in its receptions, relays, and reformulations by 
scholars of media and technology around the world. The international 
corpus of media theory, communications, and technology studies that 
has built on and extended McLuhan’s legacy has also reproduced and 
reinforced his specifically Frankensteinian trope of technology as one of 
this corpus’s central keywords.
In the United States, two major studies of the theory of technology 
explicitly link McLuhan and Frankenstein: Langdon Winner’s Autonomous 
Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (1977) 
and Avital Ronell’s 1991 The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, 
Electric Speech. In Autonomous Technology, Winner credits McLuhan 
and Jacques Ellul (to whom his study more specifically responds) with the 
“ability to sensitize modern audiences to something they had overlooked: 
we are surrounded on all sides (possibly even the inner side) by a myriad 
of techniques and technologies” and speculates their work warrants con-
templating new approaches for social science and theory (1977, 6). Winner 
refers repeatedly to McLuhan’s idea of technology as prosthetic or cyber-
netic “extension” (178, 202, 285). He observes how the word technology 
itself “is applied haphazardly to a staggering collection of phenomena” 
(10) and provides his own three-part definition of technology as appar-
atus, techniques, and organizations (11–12), on which he then builds a 
theorization of it as less determinist than substantivist—that is, a theor-
ization that attributes autonomy and agency to technology. Significantly, 
Winner concludes his extensive study with a chapter called “Frankenstein’s 
Problem”: an explication of Mary Shelley’s novel that crystallizes his own 
point about “our involvement with technology”: that “we are dealing with 
an unfinished creation, largely forgotten and uncared for, which is forced 
to make its own way in the world” (316). Winner insists early on that his 
central argument is “not . . . that technology is a monstrosity or an evil in 
and of itself” (316), but his alternating critique and reproduction of tech-
nology as autonomous—together with his acknowledgement of McLuhan’s 
influence and his discussion of Frankenstein—demonstrate a redeployment 
of McLuhan’s distinctive vocabulary and figuration of this quintessentially 
modern term as a specifically manufactured kind of monstrosity.
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Ronell’s Telephone Book is a deconstructive treatise on the telephone, 
a communication technology that, the author argues, is strangely absent 
from mainstream media studies. In the course of her analysis, Ronell 
develops an extended comparison of Alexander Graham Bell to Victor 
Frankenstein:
We can ask the same question of the Frankenstein monster as we do 
of the telephone. After all, both inventors—Bell and Victor Frank-
enstein—were invested in the simulacrum that speaks and hears; 
both, we might add precipitously, were elaborating works of mourn-
ing, memorializing that which is missing, in a certain way trying to 
make grow the technological flower from an impossible grave site. 
Both inventors were motivated to reanimate a corpse, to breathe 
life into dead body parts. . . . He [the monster] shares in the atotality 
of the telephone that seeks its other in the remote possibility of a 
long-distance summoning. (1991, 194)
To sustain this narrative and theoretical analogy between Bell and Victor 
Frankenstein, and between the telephone and Frankenstein’s monster, 
Ronell, very tellingly, calls on McLuhan. “It cannot suffice to say, with 
McLuhan, that this machinery extends the body in a way that would not 
be discontinuous,” she writes; the monster “was an answering machine 
of sorts, one whose call was to hang up and disconnect” (194–95). Here, 
the analogy is informed by McLuhan’s idea of media technology as exten-
sion; elsewhere in the book, it is informed by his imagery of amputation, 
which is also resonant for Ronell’s purposes and prompts her to ask 
Frankensteinian questions of McLuhan’s own work. She notes that in 
the fourth chapter of Understanding Media, McLuhan writes that “with 
the arrival of electric technology, man extended, or set outside himself, 
a live model of the central nervous system”—and that this “outering,” as 
McLuhan would call it, also represents for him “a desperate and suicidal 
auto-amputation” (quoted in Ronell 1991, 89). Why a “live model”? Ronell 
asks. “The live model of the electric switchboard sounds more like a con-
stative statement about Frankenstein’s monster than anything else. This 
is not bad, since electric currents no doubt compel scrambling devices to 
recode the philosophical opposition of life/death, body/machine.” Ronell 
reads McLuhan’s major work as developing “a hermeneutics of despair,” a 
“shock registry” that includes (unlike many media studies) the telephone 
among its “other live electric extensions” (1991, 89–90). The resonance of 
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McLuhan’s “live modelling” and “hermeneutics of despair” then echoes 
in Ronell’s subsequent discussions of technology, as when later in the 
book she links Frankenstein to the trope of “technological revolution” 
(340), and, more tersely, asserts that “technology . . . is inseparable from 
catastrophe” (341).
Another notable American reception is Neil Postman’s work. With 
his explicit elaboration of McLuhan’s work as media ecology and his 
popular-audience publications, Postman has been positioned as McLuhan’s 
successor as pre-eminent media theorist. Postman cites McLuhan as a 
major influence in his 1985 book Amusing Ourselves to Death—recog-
nizing that it was then “fashionable” to disavow him (1985, 8); McLuhan’s 
reputation would be rehabilitated in North America in the early 1990s. 
The influence has persisted and echoed throughout Postman’s work, with 
particular reverberation in his 1993 book Technopoly: The Surrender of 
Culture to Technology (note in the title the play of both terms that name 
McLuhan’s institutional home at the University of Toronto). In this book, 
technology is a central keyword, but one Postman does not clearly define, 
except, following McLuhan, as a determining, material and ideological 
social force: “The uses made of any technology are largely determined by 
the structure of the technology itself” (1993, 7). Like both McLuhan and 
Winner, Postman is concerned with the potential of technology to achieve 
autonomy, a potential he sees as a threat. Any technology, he writes, “has a 
tendency to run out of control” (138); it “tends to function independently 
of the system it serves. It becomes autonomous, in the manner of a robot 
that no longer obeys its master” (142). The echoes of Frankenstein and 
McLuhan are equally clear here: in the former’s popularization as a drama 
of technological backfire; and in the latter’s evocation of this drama to 
state his personal position on technology in the Playboy interview (as dis-
cussed in chapter 4). Postman’s chief illustration of potentially autonomous 
and rebellious technology is the computer: “There has never been a tech-
nology that better exemplifies Marshall McLuhan’s aphorism” (118). For 
Postman, the McLuhanesque “message” of the computer, then, is a Frank-
ensteinian message: “that we are machines—thinking machines, to be sure, 
but machines nonetheless. . . . The computer claims sovereignty over the 
whole range of human experience, and supports its claim by showing that 
it ‘thinks better’ than we can” (111). And the computer is, accordingly, 
the pre-eminent technology pivotal to the state of “technopoly”—a state 
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of “totalitarian technocracy” in which all forms of cultural life submit to 
the sovereignty of technology—a state that Postman argues the US has 
attained in the postwar period (52).
To Winner, Ronell, and Postman, we could add many other anglophone 
media and technology scholars who have adapted and amplified McLuhan’s 
Frankensteinian discourse of technology: Donna Haraway, Arthur Kroker, 
Olivia Harvey, Stelarc, and Cavell, whose Spectres of McLuhan project 
documents and exemplifies the revenant discourse in question. But here 
I want to consider two European scholars: Jean Baudrillard and Friedrich 
Kittler. Addressing them means attending to differences in language and to 
translation: this is both problematic, given my focus on the globalization of 
technology discourse in English, but also productive, given the influence 
of Baudrillard and Kittler on anglophone scholars.
The English word “technology” finds two approximations in French, 
“la technique” and “la technologie”: these can each be defined more or 
less expansively than their English counterpart (Ellul [1954] 1964, xxv). 
Early French reviews of McLuhan tended to use “la technique” (Riesman, 
quoted in Genosko 2005, 194; Morin, quoted in Genosko 2005, 209). Bau-
drillard adopted and adapted McLuhan’s ideas (Husseyn 1989), including 
McLuhan’s main idea of media as prosthetic extensions (Genosko 2005, 
238); and like Postman, Baudrillard has been hailed as “a new McLuhan” 
(Kellner 1989). His canonical essay on postmodernity, “The Precession of 
Simulacra,” in Simulations, amplifies the monstrous and revenant reson-
ance of McLuhan’s media theory in its references to “artificial resurrection” 
(1983, 4), its use of sciences long associated with Frankenstein—the “nuclear 
and genetic”—to describe the “operation” of simulation (3) and its echo 
of Frankensteinian presumption in the suggestion that God is a simula-
tion (10). “Precession” invokes neither “la technique” nor “la technologie” 
explicitly, though Baudrillard’s work does elsewhere (quoted in Husseyn 
1989, 13); and (in much the manner that media and technology were vir-
tually interchangeable terms for McLuhan), as Douglas Kellner notes, “the 
theory of autonomous media also returns with Baudrillard; thus the cri-
tiques of autonomous technology can usefully and relevantly be applied 
to Baudrillard, and, more generally to postmodern social theory” (1989). 
In “Precession,” too, occurs the image of “the desert of the real” (Bau-
drillard 1983, 2)—which gets sampled, along with many other Baudrillard 
references, in The Matrix, a film that rehearses a familiar “technological 
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reduction” of Frankenstein, but also bases its “rise of the machines” version 
on the premise of a literalization of McLuhan’s image of humans as “the 
sex organs of the machine world.” Baudrillard’s writings on the real as 
technologically overdetermined dystopia—and his intertextual appearance 
in a film dramatizing the same—amplify the “demonology of technology” 
(Haraway 1991, 181) that McLuhan codified and popularized.
There is a further sense, too, in which Baudrillard’s construction of 
the postmodern mediascape on the model of the simulacrum resembles 
McLuhan’s world-historical anthropomorph, “electric man,” as a Franken-
steinian figure; Baudrillard describes the overdeveloped modern West as 
“a world completely catalogued and analysed and then artificially revived 
as though real” (1983, 16, emphasis in original). Baudrillard theorizes the 
simulacrum as a copy without any original, much like Frankenstein’s crea-
ture is not a simulation but a simulacrum of humanity. As an attempt 
to improve on human biology and anatomy, Frankenstein’s creature 
is both more human than human and not quite human; as Mellor has 
observed, significantly (1988, 112), the creature is composed of not only 
human but also animal parts, a detail Victor Frankenstein makes explicit 
in describing how he gleaned materials from “the dissecting room and the 
slaughter-house” as well as “the unhallowed damps of the grave” (Shelley 
[1818] 2012, 81). For Baudrillard, the globalized corporate media institu-
tions traffic not in images that simulate or refer to external referents in the 
so-called real world, but rather in “irreferent” images (1983, 5) that have 
dispensed altogether with referentiality and construct instead a kind of 
self-enclosed, self-sustaining virtual ecology. The apocalyptic implications 
of this “phantasmagoria of the social contract” (29) leads Baudrillard, else-
where on this same subject, to deploy the discourse of demons ([1984] 1987, 
13) and the “diabolical” (14)—precisely the discourse Victor Frankenstein 
uses often to describe his creature (Shelley [1818] 2012, 60, 84, 106, 209).
Turning to German, we find a similar translation pattern. The English 
word’s closest German equivalent is perhaps Technologie; however, the 
term used in Martin Heidegger’s seminal STS essay—“Die Frage nach der 
Technik” (1954)—is not Technologie but Technik. Like its French equiva-
lent, Technik can mean “technique, craft, skill” (Weber 1989, 981)—it is 
used more broadly and capaciously than the English word “technology” 
that has become common since William Lovatt’s 1977 translation of Hei-
degger’s essay as “The Question Concerning Technology.” Both Technologie 
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and Technik appear in Friedrich Kittler’s Gramophone, Film und Type-
writer (1986, translated into English in 1999). A media discourse analyst, 
Kittler rigorously and dynamically develops McLuhan’s discourse of tech-
nology. He integrates McLuhan’s ideas with those of Foucault and Lacan in 
critical historicizations of relationships “between the history of technology 
and the body” and “between modern technologies and modern warfare” 
([1986] 1999, 34). For Kittler, the “so-called” human subject is a “discourse 
network” structured by media technologies: “technical media are models 
of the so-called human” (36). Moreover, these developments Kittler shows 
consistently to be productions of warfare: “the development of all previous 
technical media, in the field of computers as well as optical technology, 
was for . . . military purposes” ([2002] 2010, 30). In Gramophone, Kittler 
elaborates an unsettling understanding of modern subjectivity as a kind of 
simulation program both sustained and subverted by a kind of “discourse 
network 1900”: the industrial proliferation of recording media, namely 
gramophone, film, and typewriter, the last of which also ushers in the 
postwar computer ([1986] 1999, 251). Kittler’s method is to work back-
ward from the Lacanian argument that the Cartesian cogito is an effect 
of language mistaking itself for a cause, to the Foucauldian premise that 
historically contingent discourses structure language practices, to arrive 
at a McLuhanesque a priori that discourses depend on equally contingent 
media technologies.
Like McLuhan, Kittler theorizes the modern humanist subject as the 
content of media—but also as increasingly vestigial and tangential to a 
nascent, globalizing regime of ascendant cybernetics, automation, and arti-
ficial intelligence: here is a more concrete theory, then, of humans “as the 
sex organs of the machine world.” In Gramophone, Kittler writes that “once 
the technological differentiation of optics, acoustics, and writing exploded 
Gutenberg’s writing monopoly around 1880, the fabrication of so-called 
Man became possible. His essence escapes into apparatuses. Machines 
take over functions of the central nervous systems” ([1986] 1999, 16). The 
book’s historicization of media technologies at the advent of the age of 
mechanical reproduction teems with Frankensteinian imagery of spectres 
(12), doppelgängers (149), and dissected bodies (151). “Media-technological 
differentiations opened up the possibility for media links,” he writes in one 
especially resonant passage that describes the discourse network of 1900 
as a Frankensteinian assemblage: “After the storage capacities for optics, 
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acoustics, and writing had been separated, mechanized, and extensively 
utilized, their distinct data flows could be reunited. Physiologically broken 
down into fragments and physically reconstructed, the central nervous 
system was resurrected, but as a Golem made of Golems” (170). A manu-
factured monster of ancient Jewish legend, the golem has been suggested 
as a pretext for Frankenstein and here figures similarly as both piece and 
whole of a modern subject radically imagined as a “resurrected” linkage of 
media technologies (terms Kittler tends to use together, not interchange-
ably as McLuhan did). Like Baudrillard’s amplification of McLuhan in 
his apocalyptic critiques, Kittler’s extension of McLuhan to historicize 
technology as the engine of subjectivity, and war in turn as the engine of 
technological change, represents a scholarly engagement with McLuhan’s 
work that illustrates its international reach and influence in globalizing 
its distinctive discourse of technology. Consider this summary of Gram-
ophone in The Guardian’s obituary for Kittler:
Kittler . . . tapped into humanity’s fear of being neutralised by its own 
tools. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter was written in the wake of such 
science-fiction fantasies as William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984). . . . 
Kittler’s point was not that machines will exterminate us; rather that 
we are deluded to consider ourselves masters of our technological 
domain. (Jeffries 2011)
Like Baudrillard’s, Kittler’s work in English translation has done as much 
as that of anglophone scholars to consolidate and popularize McLuhan’s 
Frankensteinian discourse of technology.
We find a suggestive coda to McLuhan’s global influence on the imagery 
and discourse of modern technology in the architecture of Berlin. Ber-
lin’s Canadian Embassy, built in 2005, features a high-tech, multimedia 
“McLuhan Salon” (Government of Canada 2012). And the new embassy 
literally shadows the ruins of the Führerbunker, site of Hitler’s last pro-
verbial stand in the German capital, now a grassy knoll, conspicuously 
neglected and just as conspicuously unmarked. The renovated site for 
a new global assertion of Canada’s technological nationalism shadows 
the demolished site of Germany’s prior assertion of similar technological 
nationalism, and both sites are just south of a monument to one of the 
twentieth century’s most emblematic catastrophes of technological nation-
alism: the Holocaust Memorial. In this juxtaposition emerges the spectre 
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of Frankensteinian hubris and ruin that Canadians would do well to heed, 
susceptible as Canada and indeed many nations have been, in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, to political populism, ultra-nationalism, and 
corporate protectionism, principles widely recognized as associated with 
and symptomatic of fascism.
From Technological Nationalism to Technocratic 
Transnationalism
Given the Canadian government’s prioritization of the business interests 
of global capital, a prioritization that is exclusive neither to any one gov-
erning party, nor to the Canadian state in this age of globalized “neoliberal 
empire” (McNally 2011, 168); given the continuing centrality of technology 
to capital—as seen in hegemonic policy terms like technology transfer and 
the technological imperative (Lorimer, Gasher, and Skinner 2008); and 
given the corresponding privilege accorded “STEM” disciplines (science, 
technology, engineering, mathematics) above others: for these reasons, 
among others discussed in this study, it might be worthwhile to reconsider 
technological nationalism, now, as something more like technocratic trans-
nationalism: less an endeavour in applying technology to build a nation, 
as Charland’s (1986) theory argued, and more a prevailing arrogation of 
governance by global capital through advanced technological means.
At late capital’s intersection of the “technological imaginary” popular-
ized by McLuhan (Genosko 2005, xxxvi) and the “transnational matrix” 
theorized by Gibson (Moylan 1995, 184), technological nationalism may be 
productively reconfigured in terms of transnationalism, which describes 
the transformation, transgression, and transcendence of national borders—
and national forms. As Watts comments wryly in Maelstrom: “National 
identity was so irrelevant that nobody’d even bothered to dismantle it” 
(2001, “Complicity”). The notion of revising technological nationalism 
as technocratic transnationalism emerges in reading the McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme of technology against the grain of—or as the dangerous 
supplement of—the primacy of technology in capitalist modernity. The 
patterns and traditions of McLuhanesque Frankensteins in Canadian popu-
lar culture not only prompt us inevitably to think of Frankenstein when 
we talk of technology, they also share an intriguing commonality in con-
sistently and critically representing corporate business and its neoliberal 
hegemony with Frankensteinian figures of technology. McLuhan discussed 
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the modern corporation often in his works; while he tends to use the lan-
guage of the corporate in a more general and abstract way as a synonym for 
the collective or the community, sometimes he invokes corporate business 
specifically and explicitly, and in suggestively Frankensteinian terms, as 
in his aforementioned, incisive claim about how media “lease our central 
nervous systems to various corporations” (McLuhan [1964] 2003, 99–100).
And if, since Shelley’s hideous progeny first entered political and public 
discourse as an allusion, it has been invoked widely by conservative com-
mentators to advise caution against progressive policies, to criticize certain 
scientific and technological experiments (St. Clair 2004; Turney 1998) and 
to demonize labour (Baldick 1987), Frankenstein has also been invoked 
by progressives and radicals to caution against conservative policies, to 
criticize certain scientific and technological experiments, and to vilify 
corporate business (sometimes citing Marx’s aforementioned image of 
capital as vampire). As Hitchcock (2007) notes, the early twentieth-century 
predations of robber-baron capitalism that triggered the Great Depression 
prompted representations of corporate business like Mitchell Dawson’s 
1930 article “Frankenstein, Inc.,” which criticizes the corporatization of 
legal practice. Today, ongoing corporate campaigns to arrogate more rights 
and privileges unto themselves, often at the expense of democracy, citizens’ 
rights, and the public interest, suggest that the nullification of government 
about which Dawson warned may be well underway, under the auspices 
of neoliberalization and globalization. The Frankenstein image of corpor-
ate business has been vividly reanimated in the Canadian documentary 
The Corporation (2003), which describes the profiteering mandate of a 
corporation as a “monstrous obligation,” and in which two interviewees 
suggest that an apt metaphor for the modern corporation is none other 
than Frankenstein’s monster: “Corporations are artificial creations; you 
might say they’re monsters, trying to devour as much profit as possible, at 
anyone’s expense,” says one interviewee early in the film, immediately after 
which, another elaborates: “Dr. Frankenstein’s creation has overwhelmed 
and overpowered him, as the corporate form has done with us” (Achbar 
and Abbot 2003).
As an intensification of the global, technologized flow and accelerat-
ing concentration of capital, the modern corporation and the neoliberal 
globalization processes it demands provide a common target for many 
Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein that reproduce the McLuhanesque 
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Frankenpheme of technology. Among these, Videodrome and Neuro-
mancer remain globally recognized and significant exemplars. In these 
Canadian Frankenstein stories, technology in general and media technol-
ogies in particular are monstrously figured, as insidious programming; 
as tools of colonization, domination, and exploitation; as supplements 
that threaten humanity with obsolescence; as weapons. As Robins and 
Webster claim, “The global space that has been instituted through the 
new information and communication technologies has turned out to be a 
catastrophic space” (1999, 130). By monstrously figuring technology and 
the “new flesh” it makes, Canadian Frankensteins relate transnational cap-
ital’s technological futures back to its industrial origins, reinscribing the 
robustness of a text that identified, at the advent of industrial modernity, 
an epistemic limit for that modernity.
In addition to corporate business, Canadian adaptations of Franken-
stein also show a common preoccupation with media, evincing McLuhan’s 
abiding influence. Texts like Cronenberg’s, Gibson’s, and the myriad analo-
gous Frankenstein adaptations that follow them consistently represent 
media—especially new media—as technologies that are not just routinely 
vulnerable to backfiring or running amok but also vital instruments of 
globalizing corporate hegemony and the technocratic governance struc-
tures that privilege, sustain, and subsidize it. By constructing Frankenstein 
figures of technologies and corporations, these adaptations become legible 
as critiques of capital itself.
Every week, evidence of the consolidation of technocratic trans-
nationalism and of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology that 
shadows it is audible in the CBC Radio program Spark. The program dis-
cusses “tech, trends, and fresh ideas” and it is hosted by Nora Young, 
for whom McLuhan and Foucault are strong, acknowledged influences 
(Gunn 2012). We hear this influence in several recurring claims Young 
consistently makes in numerous episodes: “technology” means more than 
just what’s new and “high-tech”; technology is about more than tools or 
devices, it’s also about their “social contexts”; and technology often har-
bours significant, unintended consequences. That is, each week Spark 
reproduces and disseminates McLuhan’s Frankenpheme of technology 
in its wide-ranging discussions of new software, devices, and systems, 
new and old media technologies, algorithms and artificial intelligence, and 
scholarship and journalism in STS and related areas, as well as the social 
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costs and benefits of the various items under discussion. Several recur-
ring concerns in Spark’s diverse reporting on technological development 
illustrate the constant circulation of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme 
of technology in the radio show (which is also available in podcast and 
web streaming media). One of these recurring concerns is automation’s 
displacement of human labour: what happens “when your boss is a piece of 
software” is a topic in one episode (Young 2015b). Another is the discourse 
of technology itself:
What do we talk about when we talk about tech? Is it an engine of 
economic growth? Instrument of oppression? An extension of our 
identity and emotions? . . . In an age when our tech is more powerful 
and more intimately connected to us than ever, we’d better choose 
those metaphors carefully. (Young 2015a)
And another significant concern is the spectre of technological autonomy. 
“What if there really is a Skynet?” Young asks, introducing an item on a 
group of scientists’ recent announcement that the achievement of artifi-
cial intelligence is imminent—and a danger. Of one group member, Young 
asks: “We’ve seen some startling examples of autonomy in computers 
and machines . . . but how pervasive is this in our society now?” And she 
subsequently asks: “So what should we be doing as a society to safeguard 
ourselves from this technology getting hideously out of control?” (2014a). 
In addition, in light of the discursive pattern this study has traced, the pro-
gram’s subject matter often leads Young and her interviewees to explicitly 
cite Frankenstein: for instance, a Microsoft representative describes his 
tablet stylus development project by saying, self-deprecatingly, that “we’re 
building these bizarre Frankenstein devices with wires hanging out of 
them and so forth” (quoted in Young 2014b). And for Spark’s Hallowe’en 
2017 episode, Young (2017) drew together some of these recurring ideas 
and issues in the show, speaking at length about Frankenstein as “the gov-
erning metaphor for our fears about out-of-control tech,” with specific 
reference to emerging critiques of the unexpected consequences of social 
media. As suggested by even this cursory sampling, the McLuhanesque 
Frankenpheme of technology enjoys regular circulation in CBC Radio’s 
popular technology show. So, it must be said, does a cultural and philo-
sophical problematization of technology and the discourse of technology, 
which occurs about as often as does the show’s usage of technology as 
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Frankenpheme. Some of the show’s sophistication is encapsulated in its 
very title, which evokes an image of electrical engagement that is popularly 
identified with new ideas—and with the “spark of being” (Shelley [1831] 
2000, 60) that animates Frankenstein’s monster.
Amplifying Adaptation Studies
The myriad ways in which Frankenstein has cast a long shadow over 
technology discourse, taken together, suggest a richness, resonance, and 
above all a profound ambivalence. The discourse of technology, in which 
technology is so widely figured as a McLuhanesque Frankenpheme, thus 
represents, somewhat contradictorily, both an instance of and counterex-
ample to the gestures of simplification and interpretive closure for which 
Frankenstein allusions have been historically used in political, economic, 
and scientific discourse and debates (Baldick 1987, St. Clair 2004). The 
McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology instantiates the gesture of 
interpretive closure in its consistent intimation of hubris and ensuing 
catastrophe; it represents a counterexample in its diversity of iterations 
and inflections. And what opens up or reopens receptions of Frankenstein 
to such varied and even contradictory readings is a more expansive, more 
minutely attentive approach to adaptation studies: more expansive in the 
range of forms, genres, and media to which it attends; and more minutely 
attentive in its readings of both the formal details and social contexts of the 
texts and other cultural practices given consideration. While this book has 
engaged with a variety of forms and media both extensive and ephemeral, 
both popular and scholarly, there are of course many others that invite 
reading for evidence of the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology: 
advertising, comics and cartoons, digital games, food products, toys, cur-
ricular materials (fig. 10), and graffiti (fig. 11) to name just a few.
Similarly, there are many other sites of cultural practice that would 
invite such a reading. Canadian adaptations of Frankenstein demonstrate 
recurring preoccupations with the discourse of technology, media, corpor-
ate business, and globalization—the latter of which also puts in question 
the very category of the nation-state, of Canada itself. In light of these 
preoccupations—and mindful of the qualifying question that puts the con-
text of the national under nominal erasure—what might be identifiable 
preoccupations or emphases of Frankenstein adaptations in other regional 
or national sites, such as the United States or India? Relatedly, how has 
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the McLuhanesque Frankenpheme of technology circulated across the 
English-speaking postcolonial world? The above survey of salutary articu-
lations of it among major US and European scholars’ works perhaps only 
shows the tip of a massive cultural iceberg.
Figure 10 “My Frankenstein” as a second-grade school assignment, Hallowe’en 
2014, illustrating both the common use of the creator’s name for that of his 
creation and the text’s pedagogical adaptability. Courtesy of the author’s 
daughter.
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Figure 11 Stencil graffito depicting Boris Karloff’s iconic portrayal of 
Frankenstein’s creature, in James Whale’s 1931 film. Photographed in Kinsmen 
Park, Edmonton, 2010. Photo copyright © 2010 by Mark A. McCutcheon.
When I first undertook this study, my mentor and friend, the late Con-
stance Rooke, asked me a pointed question: “What’s Canadian about all 
these adaptations of Frankenstein? Because, you know: it could be noth-
ing.” This interrogative caveat has stayed with me through the pursuit and 
completion of this work. The short answer, I suppose, is that McLuhan 
is what’s Canadian about these adaptations, since they all connect his 
theory to Mary Shelley’s story. But Rooke’s caveat has taken on few dif-
ferent meanings—not least of which is this question of Canada’s existence 
under a neoliberal world-system of technocratic transnationalism. What 
is Canadian about these adaptations of Frankenstein is that they are also 
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simultaneously adaptations of McLuhan’s media theory; however, in 
the process, they have constructed and popularized a nationally con-
textualized discourse of technology that—sometimes subtly, sometimes 
stridently—renders unsettling and uncanny technology’s place of privilege 
and presumption in the modern capitalist world order. As Mark Kingwell 
observed in a Globe and Mail editorial, “fear remains the dominant emo-
tion when humans talk about technological change” (2017, F7). Kingwell’s 
subject is artificial intelligence, an area rife with Frankensteinian anxieties, 
allusions, and adaptations; and even in this quite short prose piece on the 
subject, McLuhan gets cited as one of “the best voices in the critical liter-
ature about technology” (F7)—though Kingwell reproduces the popular 
reception of McLuhan as a voice counselling understanding, not fear, when 
as we’ve seen, he more ambivalently articulated both.
And as was pointed out to me in one of the early talks that formed the 
basis of this book, there is a good deal of irony in the gender politics of 
technology discourse and its historical provenance. The globalized dis-
course of technology is a pivotal discourse of capitalist modernity—which 
is also a patriarchal and paternalistic modernity (Haraway 1991). And 
technology, in its pride of place in this world-system, has become widely 
understood as a gendered discourse, a domain of boys and their toys. 
How ironic, then, that the epistemic foundations of this discourse were 
set down, one unseasonably, erratically cold summer, by the prodigious 
and audacious imaginings of one well-read teenage girl. 
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